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Abstract 
Cloud computing offers cost effective computational and storage services with on-demand 
scalable capacities according to the customers’ needs. These properties encourage 
organisations and individuals to migrate from classical computing to cloud computing from 
different disciplines.  
Although cloud computing is a trendy technology that opens the horizons for many businesses, 
it is a new paradigm that exploits already existing computing technologies in new framework 
rather than being a novel technology. This means that cloud computing inherited classical 
computing problems that are still challenging. Cloud computing security is considered one of 
the major problems, which require strong security systems to protect the system, and the 
valuable data stored and processed in it. Intrusion detection systems are one of the important 
security components and defence layer that detect cyber-attacks and malicious activities in 
cloud and non-cloud environments. However, there are some limitations such as attacks were 
detected at the time that the damage of the attack was already done. In recent years, cyber-
attacks have increased rapidly in volume and diversity. In 2013, for example, over 552 million 
customers’ identities and crucial information were revealed through data breaches worldwide 
[3]. These growing threats are further demonstrated in the 50,000 daily attacks on the London 
Stock Exchange [4]. It has been predicted that the economic impact of cyber-attacks will cost 
the global economy $3 trillion on aggregate by 2020 [5].  
This thesis focused on proposing an Intrusion Prediction System that is capable of sensing an 
attack before it happens in cloud or non-cloud environments. The proposed solution is based 
on assessing the host system vulnerabilities and monitoring the network traffic for attacks 
preparations. It has three main modules. The monitoring module observes the network for any 
intrusion preparations. This thesis proposes a new dynamic-selective statistical algorithm for 
detecting scan activities, which is part of reconnaissance that represents an essential step in 
network attack preparation. The proposed method performs a statistical selective analysis for 
network traffic searching for an attack or intrusion indications. This is achieved by exploring 
and applying different statistical and probabilistic methods that deal with scan detection. The 
second module of the prediction system is vulnerabilities assessment that evaluates the 
weaknesses and faults of the system and measures the probability of the system to fall victim 
to cyber-attack. Finally, the third module is the prediction module that combines the output of 
 
 
 
the two modules and performs risk assessments of the system security from intrusions 
prediction. The results of the conducted experiments showed that the suggested system 
outperforms the analogous methods in regards to performance of network scan detection, which 
means accordingly a significant improvement to the security of the targeted system. The 
scanning detection algorithm has achieved high detection accuracy with 0% false negative and 
50% false positive. In term of performance, the detection algorithm consumed only 23% of the 
data needed for analysis compared to the best performed rival detection method.           
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Cloud Computing  
Recent era of human existence is characterised by technology revolution. Computer invention 
and advances in electronics field have led the transformation of computerise of many daily 
human jobs and services. This increase reliance on computers urges to more advances and 
developments in computer field that results in hardware and software that are more 
sophisticated. This advances resulted in the appearance of new technologies such as internet 
technologies, large volume of data storage and processing, prevalence of virtualization. The 
existence of such advanced technologies and the need for using resources remotely are factors 
contributed in the emergence of cloud computing. Cloud computing is a new way of delivering 
services and provision resources over the Internet [1]. It brought many advantages; 
economically by reducing expenditure on hardware and software for the companies and 
personals, the flexibility of developing and deploying applications rapidly regardless the hosted 
hardware and software, and the ability to scale resources up and down according to customers 
need [2]. On the other hand, cyber-based systems inherited the security problems of the 
classical computing and the Internet. Figure 1.1 shows basic architecture of cloud as following:     
 
Figure 1.1. Cloud Computing Architecture [3] 
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Figure 1.1 shows different services offered by cloud computing such as Infrastructure As A 
Service (IAAS) (Servers, Storage), Software As A Service (SAAS) (Software Platform, Virtual 
Desktop, Applications). These services are accessible by the end users via the Internet, where 
the end user uses different terminal devices such as personal computers, smart phones, and 
tablets to access the cloud.     
1.1.1 Security Challenges and Attacks in Cloud Computing 
Many challenges and attacks have faced the cloud computing due to the broadness of both 
vulnerabilities and attack vectors. Multiple types of challenges to this environment are posed 
from different technologies and levels of software and hardware. In this section presents an 
introduction to these attacks and challenges to give the reader a comprehensive view of the 
state of art of cloud security, and will present a detailed description in the next two chapters.  
There are three types of cloud deployment; private that is deployed with an organization for 
internal use, public that provides different service for various originations, and hybrid that 
combines the two previous types. These forms of deployment are accompanied by security 
threats such as data leakage due to cloning and resource pooling [4], and unauthorised access 
to data residuals that are obsolete in different server of the public cloud [5]. Private clouds 
produces an ‘elastic perimeter’ concept due to alternate between centralizing and distributing 
the data according to user need, which results in data loss when storing data in higher level of 
authorization zones  [6]. The multi-tenant aspect of the cloud poses another security threat 
when an illegal access to data is been tried by an authorised costumer that share the same 
hardware with the victim [7].  
As mentioned previously, cloud computing offers a number of services such as Software as a 
Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) that, in 
turns, poses different challenges to cloud security according to the types of offered the services. 
While the types of security threats in cloud deployment models are dependent more on 
exploiting managerial faults or bugs, the threats at service level are mostly using the technical 
vulnerabilities to achieve the malicious purposes. This is more obvious in the security threats 
that are caused by the virtualization concept of the cloud such as Virtual Machine (VM) 
Hopping, Mobility, and Denial of Service and Service Hijacking. In Virtual Machine Hopping 
[8] , an attacker could gain access and control another VM on the same server, which impact 
the confidentiality and the availability of the victim severely. In VM Mobility, the VM and its 
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contents are saved as portable soft copies so it could easily relocated from server to another via 
portable devices without having a copy on fixed storage [4], this process can lead to serious 
security threats such as data leakage and loss, and targeted attacks like man in-the-middle 
attack. VM Denial of Service (DoS) happens when a VM consumes all the available resources 
that server cannot operate the other VMs resides in the server [9]. Service hijacking is also 
threat to cloud that occur when an unauthorized users gaining illegal control on certain services 
[10]. Backups of data may leads to security threats when misconducted that results in data 
leakage or misused by an unauthorised parties [11] .  
Network-based attacks are another type of security threats, whether these attacks targeting the 
network infrastructure or software. Browsing attacks are such attacks where the browsing 
software is used to launch the attacks such as sniffing, SQL injection, and XML signature 
wrapping attacks. In the sniffing attack, the attacker install malware on an intermediary host to 
steal the victim credentials, which leads to illegal use of legit credentials. SQL injection attacks 
work by inserting malicious code in a model SQL inputs that leads to granting the attacker an 
unauthorised access to the database and consequently to other confidential information [12]. 
The XML Signature Element Wrapping attacks targeting to disturb the cloud service by 
inserting malicious data in signature part of the massage, this may lead the cloud interface to 
execute arbitrary methods [12]. Different types of attacks might target the network 
infrastructure such as flooding attacks, which target the bandwidth of the network in order to 
affect the service availability [13]. In addition to many network based attacks that targets the 
conventional networking systems, and applied to the cloud for malicious purposes such as the 
DoS attack.        
To demonstrate the impact of cyber-attacks on cloud computing environment, this section 
present a recent snapshot of these attacks and their implications on both global economy and 
people. In recent years, cyber-attacks have increased rapidly in volume and diversity. In 2013, 
for example, over 552 million customers’ identities and crucial information were revealed 
through data breaches worldwide [3]. These growing threats are further demonstrated in the 
50,000 daily attacks on the London Stock Exchange [4]. It has been predicted that the economic 
impact of cyber-attacks will cost the global economy $3 Trillion on aggregate by 2020 [5]. 
These immense effects and implications have urged the United States Department of Defence 
to categorize cyber-attacks as an act of war, meriting physical military force in response [4]. 
Such a categorization depicts the severe view countries across the globe now have of cyber-
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threats.  The classical cyber-attacks such as the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) are 
continuing to target the cloud such that four in five organizations has been targeted by DDoS 
attack during 2017 [14]. Furthermore, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) predicts 
sophisticated ransomware attacks will target the cloud in 2018 [15]. Based on such cyber 
security atmosphere, the cloud security market will rise from $1.4 Billion to $12 Billion by 
2024 [16]. The consequences of cyber-attacks such as huge economic expenses, business 
effects, and personal damages encourage security researchers to focus on this area in order to 
mitigate these consequences.   
1.1.2 Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 
The varieties of systems used to counter intrusions are operated in order to detect, prevent and 
mitigate attacks and their consequences. Among the existing traditional defence systems, 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are playing a major role. Typically, they are composed of 
software or hardware that automatically monitors computer systems or networks and performs 
an analysis function to detect intrusions [2]. IDSs are generally grouped into a number of 
classes: host-based intrusion-detection systems such as Cisco IDS Host Sensor [3] ; Network-
based IDS such as Snort [17] Security Onion [18] and distributed intrusion-detection systems 
such as myNetWatchman [19] and DShield [20].   
Prior to commencing any attack, adversaries collect information about the targets such as 
identifying and mapping the target network, checking the potential victims for vulnerabilities, 
and other network scanning activities. The initial stage of any attack is planning and 
reconnaissance, when it comes to attacks that use the network as an attack medium, the 
reconnaissance is achieved by network scanning activities. This gives the detection of network 
scanning activities the importance, as it enables the security administration to be aware of the 
attacks at early stages. Based on the gathered information, the attacker designs the attack plan 
and chooses suitable attacks according to the discovered weaknesses in the targeted machine. 
Therefore, identifying and detecting such hostile network scanning activities will support 
blocking of further harmful attacks. 
Network scanning activities are usually performed to discover and specify the online machines 
that are hosted in the network, and correlate the offered services on these hosts to open ports. 
Different types of solutions have been proposed to detect scanning activity including 
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monitoring failed connections [21][22], statistical calculations [23][24], network behaviour 
abnormalities [25][26] and monitor connections to network unused IPs [27]. The purpose of 
these approaches is to identify the remote host that performs scanning activity to a local 
network. The majority of scan detection methods associate the activities related to scanning 
that originate from the same source, this is called an attribute-based detection scheme. In some 
cases, attackers might use techniques to escape such type of detection, for example by 
performing a slow scan or heavily distributed scans to evade been detected by attribute-based 
detection schemes, which affecting these methods performance.   
Network-based intrusion detection systems are generally categorised, based on the detection 
approach, into signature based (misuse), anomaly and specification-based detection systems. 
In signature-based detection systems, they compare the monitored data to previously identified 
malicious behaviours; that is the attack is detected when the data under test matches malicious 
access patterns. This type of solution does not need to be trained and is simple in 
implementation and deployment. However, these solutions are only capable of detecting known 
attacks, which means the system should have a prior knowledge of the malicious patterns, and 
hence, novel malicious patterns cannot be detected under this approach. The second type of 
network based intrusion detection is anomaly detection, which compares the behaviour of the 
network to a model of expected behaviour such as the system proposed in [28] [29]. These 
systems are first trained with normal attack-free data to build the normal access model using 
machine-learning techniques, which implies a time and datasets for training. These systems 
detect the deviation of the network traffic from the normal models, which means they are 
capable of detecting new attacks. On the other hand, this type of detection approach faces 
challenges such as defining the normal situation in modern networks, effectiveness of machine 
learning for huge amounts of data to online detection, etc. The third type of detection approach 
cannot be classified under the latter two types such as Specification-based detection that 
develops a legitimate system behaviour that accepts benign behaviour and blocks any other 
behaviours according to specific security rules of the system.  
In the field of cloud computing, intrusion detection and prevention systems are used in different 
parts and technologies of the cloud, and every used technology of these defence systems has 
its own limitations and issues [6]. Despite its many advantages like the possibility to use 
resources remotely and huge volumes of storage, the growth in cloud computing has further 
exacerbated the threat posed by cyber-attacks, as critical infrastructures and digital service 
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providers now have multiple access points to protect [7] [8]. Hence, intrusion-detection 
systems in a cloud environment are in need of significant research efforts to enhance 
performance and overcome the challenges and issues, which will be discussed latter in this 
thesis.  
For example, the attacker may have an account in a cloud environment and launches attacks 
from inside in order to compromise the hypervisor and gain access to all virtual machines' data 
[9][10]. Monitoring virtual machines and networks inside the hypervisor and performing 
intrusion detection is an issue for the conventional IDS [11]. However, security policies and 
transparency represent a challenge for deploying traditional IDS in the cloud environment. This 
is because conventional solutions tend to use fixed or static security policies, whereas, in a 
cloud environment, these policies are dynamically changed and updated according to the users’ 
requirements. Despite the existence of advanced cyber-defence systems, attacks and intrusions 
still occur. Defence systems tried to block previously known attacks, stop ongoing attacks, and 
detect occurred attacks. However, often the damage caused by an attack is catastrophic and the 
recovery process from these threats is highly expensive [1][12]. 
1.1.3 Vulnerabilities assessment 
To launch an attack on a system, attackers target the weak points of the system by exploiting 
the vulnerabilities in the software, applications, protocols, etc., to launch a successful intrusion. 
Therefore, for the attackers these vulnerabilities represent the doors to the targeted systems that 
should be searched for and discovered in order to launch successful attacks. For the security 
defence of an IT system, these vulnerabilities should be discovered and fixed before they 
become known to the adversaries. In both cases, the process of discovering these vulnerabilities 
is vital in which different parties try to take the lead.  
Vulnerability assessment is the process of discovering, identifying, and analysing the 
weaknesses, bugs, and faults of the information system in assets, software, applications, 
procedures, and protocols. The vulnerabilities occur in information systems due to performing 
some activities or attaching some assets. Vulnerability assessment results in identifying bugs 
and linking them to the corresponding processes and assets, which enables the analysts to 
recognize the weak points in the system. Furthermore, this process also studies the spread of 
the vulnerabilities in the system, tracking security problems to discover the source of the 
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vulnerability and reporting the weaknesses for the beneficial parties such as stockholders and 
security administrators.    
Different frameworks have been proposed to analyse and evaluate the vulnerabilities in 
computer systems and score them according to predefined criteria. The goal of using such 
systems is to give security administration a comprehensive awareness of the system security 
situation and the weak points that attackers might exploit to haram the system. Different types 
of vulnerabilities assessment has proposed and used according to the purpose and criteria 
employed in the system. Information System-focused Frameworks is a type of vulnerability 
assessment that focuses on assessing the vulnerabilities of the system that relate and affect the 
broad functionalities of the system such as Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation (VAM) 
[30]. Holistic framework is another type of vulnerability assessment systems that evaluates 
different aspects of security including the vulnerabilities such as System Security Engineering 
(SSE) [31]. Finally, cybersecurity-focused Framework is the last type of vulnerability 
assessment  of systems are used only for vulnerabilities that are exploitable using the internet 
such as Cyber Mission Assurance Engineering (MAE) [32], Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System (CVSS) [33]. We will give a detailed overview of these systems in next two chapters.   
1.2 Research Gaps and Motivation 
This research project is motivated by the prevailing and evolving technology of cloud 
computing and the related challenges such as security. Such computing paradigms attracted the 
attention of researchers because of their benefits on the one hand, and the necessity to address 
their challenges that enlarge the number and type of customers. The defence systems that are 
used to secure the cloud environment still need more improvements as attacks continue to occur 
despite the fact that multiple techniques and systems have been employed for the purpose of 
cloud security. As these countermeasures are working on preventing the intrusions or on 
detecting in case the prevention has failed, therefore, providing information about the potential 
attacks improves the ability to prevent the attacks or complicates the attack launched by the 
adversaries. The motivation to address intrusion prediction in cloud computing and such 
paradigms was inspired by the fact prediction systems could significantly enhance the security 
in such environments and hence more reliability and usage. The motives behind this project 
and this direction of research can be summarised as follows:  
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a) Limited use of Intrusion Prediction Systems: the literature showed that small 
number of prediction systems have been proposed for cloud and network-based 
systems [34] [35]. Moreover, most prediction systems in non-cloud systems were 
not designed to consider the weaknesses of the system as a major aspect for 
predictive security evaluation. Such gap motives to study the area and try to 
suggest a feasible system that could perform effectively and cope with the cloud 
nature.  
b) Lack of integrated approach: the absence of solutions that consider multiple 
aspects of the system in the prediction process, and then integrate these aspects in 
robust framework. Most of the solutions depend on analysing the targeted aspects 
separately without meaningful integration among them. For example, analysing 
intrusion detection results and alerts on one hand, or analysing user behaviour or 
system calls and processes faults on the other hand. There is no linkage between 
these aspects in the reviewed solutions, which causes issues in these solutions. For 
instance, in some cases the damage that occurred is not recoverable like leaking 
highly sensitive information [36].  
c) Complexity and diversity of recent intrusions: recent intrusions and attacks 
showed that adversaries use different techniques to perform multiple types of 
attacks [37]. These results in defence systems taking a long time to identify the 
attacks, where the harm has already happened, and in some cases, the harm is 
irreversible such as data breaching. The attacker in the quest for evading detection 
modifies the steps of launching attacks so the signature of the attack is changed as 
well, therefore, previously known attacks cannot be detected by intrusion detection 
systems and a consequence cannot be predicted in advance.   
d) Dynamic nature of services and applications: cloud computing featured by 
being a platform for many third party services that has its own vulnerabilities and 
security configurations, which means unexpected weakness could happen to the 
platform that it is not designed to deal with. Web applications are another port for 
bugs and faults that might affect the whole platform, which the defence systems 
are not weaponized to defend against.    
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1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Project 
The ultimate aim of this research is to propose and develop a new intrusion prediction system 
to predict attacks on cyber-based systems in both virtualized environments such as cloud and 
physical cyber empowered systems.  
Monitoring system security and resistance against intrusion and attacks is a notoriously 
challenging task, particularly in the present cyber world where boundaries and goals of the 
attackers are constantly changing as well as attacks types, vectors and techniques. Dynamicity 
and evolution are essential characteristics for the applications in computing environments such 
as cloud computing, which cause the majority of the challenges for existing security monitoring 
solutions. To address these challenges, the system should incorporate the use of a multi-
methodology approach to achieve an optimal prediction of a cyber-attack, and gather data from 
different sources. The resultant solution should be able to assess the work of other defence 
systems by providing early information about the security intrusions to security 
administrations. 
The key objectives of this research required to overcome the existing limitations in intrusion 
prediction systems are: 
1. Develop an intrusion prediction framework to predict the probable attacks for the 
network-based computing environments, which will be able to operate in real-time 
while preserving the performance and the efficiency of the host system. 
2. Create a technique to analyse network traffic from which IP and Port scans can be 
identified.  
3. Create a technique to quantify detection threshold by analysing network traffic using 
only relevant data.  
4. Present a suitable vulnerability assessment technique that provides an evaluation for the 
weaknesses in the system.  
5. Validate that the developed framework and subsequent techniques are capable of 
effectively predicting intrusion with an appropriate time gap.        
1.4 Research Novelty 
1. An integrated solution that can operate on computational lightweight techniques while 
preserving the performance of the network-based system. The importance of our 
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framework stems from IDSs/IPSs failure to detect or prevent many attacks. In addition, 
our framework does not need training data or depend on historical data, although using 
such data to improve and refine prediction over time.  On the other hand, in some cases 
the harm for the system has already happened when an attack detection is conducted. 
Currently, literature survey has highlighted small number of prediction systems 
proposed for such environments.  
2. A novel use of vulnerabilities assessment and network sensing in an integral approach 
to produce predictions about the target system security. To the best of our knowledge, 
this the first time that a solution combines the vulnerability assessment with scan 
detection to predict potential attacks. As this solution will alarm the security team of 
probable attacks that are near to occur, which gives this team to act against these hazards 
and prevents it.  
3. In-depth exploration of statistical and probabilistic scan detection methods. In order to 
better understand the network attacks prerequisites, we conduct an exploration study of 
the well-known port scan detection methods to test how suitable these methods are to 
work in a prediction system. Our focus was on probabilistic and statistical methods, as 
to our minds, it is most suitable for the research direction of the project. 
4. A new algorithm for scan detection that uses statistical methods to analyse the network 
traffic and detect the IP and Port scan. Our solution works on selected attributes that 
indicate the scanning activity, which means decreasing the amount of data needed to be 
processed and hence lowering the calculations involved.  Does not need to historical 
data, but rather it compares the potential scanner to other sources in the same traffic in 
order to recognize the abnormal access pattern to the system.   
5. A statistical technique that is adaptive in calculating the threshold dynamically, thus 
overcoming the problem of predefined threshold calculation that might miss intrusive 
incidents that are under the fixed threshold. This is because it is difficult to predefine a 
normal behaviour in modern networks that deal with huge amounts of data streamed in 
and out with variant access patterns.       
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1.5 Thesis Structure  
This section will outline the organization of this thesis, it is organised into seven subsequent 
chapters as follows: 
Chapter Two: Background 
This chapter presents in detail the basic information about the three main concepts of this 
research: intrusion prediction in cloud computing, port scan detection, vulnerabilities and risk 
assessment. This prepares the reader to form an insight into the research area in order to 
understand the need for such solutions and the targeted functionality that the solution promises 
to offer. In addition, this chapter provides an overview of the prediction systems that work in 
different computer science fields to give the reader a clear vision of the reality of prediction 
systems not the hype about it.        
Chapter Three: Related Work 
This chapter provides an analytical review to the existing literature with emphasis on the 
benefits and drawbacks of the earlier work, which enthuses the research in this direction of 
security systems. In addition, due to the lack of prediction systems in cloud computing, a 
review of intrusion detection systems that is most related to prediction systems has been 
presented. This review includes a critical focus on the challenges in this field in order to be 
addressed by the proposed work of this thesis.      
Chapter Four: IPFCC Design 
This chapter is dedicated to presenting the design of the proposed Intrusion Prediction 
Framework for Cloud Computing (IPFCC). This chapter provides details of all the novel 
techniques and algorithms that are specifically proposed for this solution. This includes the 
designed framework, the scan detection algorithm, the thresholding algorithm, the vulnerability 
assessments schemes, and the risk matrix for prediction.  
Chapter Five: Implementation 
This chapter shows the software developments and simulations that have been undertaken to 
develop this framework. It provides details of implantation techniques and algorithms and how 
all these parts worked consistently and the way that the framework is evaluated.  
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Chapter Six: Evaluation Proposed Methods and Framework 
This chapter evaluates the IPFCC and the included techniques that are presented in this thesis 
against the design requirements. In addition to the demonstration of how the proposed work 
fulfils the aims and objective set out at the beginning of the research.  
Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter describes the range of the success in overcoming the challenges acknowledged 
beforehand and summarises the findings of this work. Then the second part of this chapter 
focuses on the future work, which specifics the potential research direction, extensions, and 
enhancements that could be carried out based on the results of, or in relation to, this work.  
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Chapter 2  
Background 
The research conducted in this project is covering different aspects towards the proposed 
solution. These aspects are cloud computing, attacks, port scanning, vulnerabilities assessment 
and prediction.  Therefore, this background chapter covers all related aspects.   
2.1 Cloud Computing Security Concerns 
The beauty of cloud computing is that it is built from known technologies such as distributed 
systems, Internet and virtualization, which means customers do not need new infrastructures 
or protocols to benefit from the cloud. On the other hand, cloud computing inherits the 
challenges and issues that its components have suffered from. Despite the rich legacy of 
challenges and issues that the cloud computing facing in terms of adoption, security is the major 
challenge [38]. Demonstrating some significant security issues in cloud computing will draw a 
picture of security needs in cloud computing:  
2.1.1 Virtualization and Multi-Tenancy 
Virtualization is the base technology of cloud computing architecture. Virtualization defines 
the separation of service providing from service-hosting infrastructure by building an interface 
to virtual resources called Virtual Machines (VM). For example, with virtual memory, the 
offered memory is more than the physically mounted, and this is achieved by swapping data to 
discs underlying [39].  The fundamental advantage of virtualization is the capacity to run 
various operating systems on a the same server and using the same hardware resources [40]. 
Virtualization benefit Cloud Computing in load balancing by means of dynamic provisioning 
and relocation of virtual machines among physical servers [41]. Figure 2.1 shows the 
virtualization architecture.  
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Figure 2.1 Virtualization Architecture in Cloud Computing [42] 
Multi-tenancy in cloud computing can be defined as executing multiple VMs that serve 
different parties on the same physical server [43]. Virtualization has been implemented in cloud 
computing on three levels; operating system, application and hypervisor. Each of these 
configurations has its own threats and vulnerabilities. As stated earlier, vulnerability is a 
weakness point that leads to an error in the system or be exploited by an adversary to harm 
cloud data, services, or users. For example, CVE-2014-9718 [44] is a vulnerability that 
discovered in Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) ( which is a software to manage and monitor 
the VMs in the host) and is the reason behind the conflict in function’s return value. This 
vulnerability causes a Virtual Hardware Logical Errors that leads eventually to expose the 
system to Denial of service attack (DoS) [45]. Also, Hypervisor ( which is a type of VMM) is 
exposed to these threats in addition to native coding errors that might make Hypervisor and its 
guests vulnerable to adversaries’ attacks such as side-channel and DoS attacks [46].  Different 
attacks may pose due to virtualization; two examples are presented as following:   
a) VM Hopping: in which an attacker uses a legitimate VM to access and control another 
machine (the victim). In VM Hopping, the attacker can observes the victim machine 
resources usage, adjusts the VM configuration and finally complete control over the 
data that threaten VM`s confidentiality, integrity and availability [47].  
b) VM Mobility : this is an aspect of virtualization that implies storing the components of 
VM on virtual disks in forms of structures that is easy to transfer from one server to 
another in means of portable storage [48]. This beneficial aspect is used as vulnerability 
to target the VM with different attacks such as Man in-the-middle [49], this attack might 
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targeting only to steal sensitive data or maximize the damage by controlling the whole 
operating system. Figure 2.2 present the Man in-the-middle attack process: 
Network
Can modify arbitrary VM OS/
application state
VM Instance
Host VMM A
Man-in-the-middle 
Mallory
VM Instance
Host VMM B
Host A 
migrates VM 
to Host B
  
Figure 2.2 Man-in-the-middle Attack [49] 
2.1.2 Web Application Security 
The cloud computing is deployed over the Internet; hence the medium for providing cloud 
service is the web. The main characteristics that cloud computing offer are the ability to provide 
network-based access and management for the commercial software from remote central point, 
which allows the clients to access that software via the web.  This characteristic is an essential 
requirement for cloud to be accessed and managed over the web [50]. Therefore, the security 
holes in the web browsers and protocols create vulnerabilities to the cloud applications and 
services. This leads to affect the costumers that uses the cloud and their security. Verizon 
Business stated in their report [51] that 39% of the hacking activities were targeting the 
applications, software and services. Such vulnerabilities creates a new type of attacks that 
evade the classical defence at network level ( intrusion detection and intrusion prevention 
systems) and needs an application level defence [52]. Different attacks listed by the Open Web 
Application Security Project [53] as follows:  
a) Cross-site scripting. 
b) Injection flaws like SQL. 
c) Broken authentication. 
d) Insecure direct object references. 
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e) Invalidated redirects and forwards. 
f) Insufficient transport layer protection. 
g) Failure to restrict URL access. 
h) Insecure cryptographic storage. 
Cross-site scripting (XSS) is an example of such attacks that recently targeted cloud computing 
service providers and endangered millions of costumers accounts and data [54]. This attack 
enables the attacker to inject their malicious scripts into an input field in HTML pages that 
enforce host to executes malicious activities at the host like expose hack-related information 
[55]. There are two types of this attack; non-persistent (or reflected) cross-site scripting and 
persistent (or stored) cross-site scripting [56]. In the first type, the user input is reflected directly 
through webpage by a server side coding with no efficient integrity control. The Persistent or 
blind is the second type of XSS that inputs malicious code, stored at the server, and then 
displays at webpage of users who are accessing the page via the infected server. The latter type 
is the most dangerous type because the malicious code remains in the infected page and any 
user visit the page will be infected as shown in figure 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.3 Blind Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Attack [56]  
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2.1.3 Abusive Use of Cloud Services  
 This term refers to the use of the cloud services for illegal actions that serves malicious 
activities and purposes. Offensive use of cloud resources might be committed by different 
customers to serve different intentions.  The first form of abusive usage of cloud is exploit a 
vulnerable VM to insert a malware that infects the users and cloud servers for harm or exploit 
the infected machines. An example of this form is VM-based rootkits [57], which is a software 
that is employed by other malicious code to evade the detection by antiviruses and security 
systems on the infected machines. These malicious software types disguise themselves by 
hiding related operating system objects (such as files and registry entries) from diagnostic 
programs. Figure 2.4 display an example of VM rootkit.  
 
Figure 2.4 Virtual-Machine-Based Rootkit [58]  
The second form of abusing the cloud service is by using an infected cloud machine as a base 
to attack other machines. In this form, the infected machine is not harmed by the malicious but 
it is used to harm other machines. The attacker achieved this form by exploiting a vulnerability 
that enables the attackers to install a backdoor that allows them to install malicious codes on 
victim machines without the owner’s knowledge [59]. The malicious codes that may be 
installed as Botnet turns the infected machine into a ‘Zombie’ and use it as a remote attack 
station. The infected machines might be transformed to be a command and control server 
(C&C) that operates and controls the botnets for nefarious purposes. This form of cloud abuse 
is used in 2009 to attack Amazon EC2’s cloud services by Zeus bot [59].         
 18 
 
2.1.4 APIs and Software Interfaces Insecurity  
Cloud computing providers offer the customers a group of programming interfaces and APIs 
that are used to contact and collaborate with the cloud. The processes of service providing such 
as provisioning, management, monitoring, and orchestration are executed by these interfaces. 
Insecure APIs damage cloud services as the security and availability of these services depends 
on APIs security [60].  
Many issues and flaws may affect the security of APIs and interfaces such as reusable token or 
passwords, fixed access controls, improper authorizations, unknown services or API 
dependencies [60].  A recent example of such attacks is the security violation at Moonpig [61], 
where millions of costumers endangered due to using insecure API. As the latter company used 
an API in their Android application that used a static set of credentials, and by just alternating 
customer`s ID, the attacker will be able to send millions of requests to company. Different 
aspects must to observed to secure the APIs in cloud such as Transport security, Authentication 
and authorization, Code and development practices and Message protection [62]. The cloud 
should use a Transportation protocol that is secure such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), 
especially when sensitive data are transferred. APIs tend to be lightweight programming pieces, 
therefore, when APIs are used in authentication and authorization, they should guarantee using 
a sophisticated practices such as two-way authentication attributes. In Code and development 
practices, any APIs that uses certain languages such as JSON and XML to pass massages or 
receive user inputs should be well tested for vulnerabilities such as XSS.   
2.1.5 Data Confidentiality  
This is an essential security requirement that states that only authorized people or applications 
have the right to access sensitive data. In cloud, the possibilities of data to face the risk of 
compromisation due to multiple access points that result from the multiple parties, devices, and 
software that involve in cloud service providing. As the cloud is responsible for controlling the 
data, the risk of data jeopardize increases due to the number of participated parties that are 
authorized to access the data. Different issues that affect data confidentiality are emerged in 
cloud such as multitenancy ( as discussed in section 2.1.1), data remanence, application security 
and privacy [60]. Data remanence is a form of data that still electronically stored in the cloud 
although it has logically marked as deleted or removed. As object reusability is key aspect of 
the cloud, uncontrolled use of this aspect might lead to serious impact on data confidentiality. 
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The data remanence is occurs due to the lack of physical separation between different users on 
the same server, which is possible in two situations; the first is when a user unintentionally 
retrieve old sensitive data; the second situation achieved by malicious attacker who acquires 
large amount of storage in quest of mining for sensitive data [63].   
Protecting the clients’ account privacy from theft is vital duty of cloud computing, and Due to 
the dependency between data confidentiality and authentication method, it is crucial to choose 
a strong solution because weak authentication leads to major problems such as losing the 
account or been controlled by an attacker. Authentication is the process of building confidence 
in the client identity that is provided electronically to the cloud [64]. Different types of 
authentication are used in the cloud such as [65]:  
a) Username and password:  this is the classical method for granting access to the user 
by using an identifier and password. 
b) Multi-factor authentication (MFA): In this method, a secondary method such as 
biometric authentication in addition to the username / password method, where these 
achieved based on steps according to the number of used factors.   
c) Trusted Platform Module (TPM): This international standard is hardware security 
component built into computers, and consists of machine authentication, hardware 
encryption, signing, secure key storage and attestation [66]. 
d) Single sign-on (SSO): this type of authentication allows the client to use single set of 
credential to access all applications and services on the cloud, which is authorized to 
access. Examples of this type of authentication is lightweight directory access 
protocol (LDAP) directory, Kerberos and the security assertion mark-up language 
(SAML) [67].  
e) Biometric authentication: this method depends on identifying the user using 
physiological or behavioural characteristics [68]. 
Figure 2.5 shows an example of authentication process in the cloud. 
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Figure 2.5 Example of Cloud Authentication Method ( MS Azure) [69] 
2.1.6 Data Integrity 
This is an essential characteristic of cloud security and information systems in general. Integrity 
refers to the modification of data, software, and hardware is only allowed by authorized parties 
or in authorized ways [70]. This is implies data should be protected from unauthorized 
insertion, modification and deletion. Authorization is the process of controlling and assigning 
access levels for each authenticated user to the services it authenticated for, which preserves 
the security of cloud resources. As the cloud computing deals with multiple services and 
massive number of users, managing access control become more complex that each cloud 
service provider has to develop and implement their access control system that comply with 
security policy and service providing pattern. In conventional computing systems, there are 
three types of access control approaches; Discretionary Access Control (DAC) that requires to 
assign permission to users that need access [71]. In DAC, the users could transfer their 
permissions to other users. The second type is the Mandatory Access Control (MAC), in which 
the system restricts the ability of a user (subject) to access or perform operation on data (object) 
or service. This means that the user has no ability to delegate permissions, and only the security 
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administration control the access [71]. Finally, the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) that 
assigns roles to users, then each role is assigned a set of permissions [72].  
In cloud computing, different models and solutions has been proposed for tackle with access 
control in academia and industry. In business field for example, Amazon Simple Storage 
Service  uses a role based access control to manage access to their storage service [73], as 
shown in figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6 Amazon Access Management Overview [73]. 
Amazon in their approach, are assign roles to the users using Identity and Access Management 
(IAM), and then assign the permissions to the resources that refers to as Buckets and objects. 
IAM best practices is a guide that defines the roles for users such as Grant Least Privilege, 
Enable MFA for Privileged Users and Root User Access Keys.   
In academia, different models for access control for cloud computing exist, these solutions are 
an adaptation and modification of the classical models to suit the cloud nature. To adapt access 
control to cloud computing, researchers in [74]  combined the trust relationship and role based 
access control system. Others [75] optimize an RBAC model for cloud by support a Distributed 
RBAC with only one manage role. In [76] a semantic scheme for access control by enriching 
the RBAC model with semantic web technologies. In [77] they merge between role based and 
task based systems to produce a Task-Role-Based Access Control, where additional function 
of activate/deactivate permissions according to process tasks and requirements. Researchers in 
[78] used security tags that are a RBAC enriched with fine-grain information such as 
classification, location, timestamp and unique number.   
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2.1.7 Availability 
Availability refers to the capability of authorized entity to use the system`s  services on demand 
[79]. This implies the ability to provide the services even in cases of misbehaviour conducted 
by malicious parties. The availability is the third pillar of widely applicable security model CIA 
(confidentiality, Integrity and Availability). It is essential for Cloud computing to provide 
adequate availability of their services [80]. This poses an obstacle to use the cloud, as many 
organizations worry about the availability of their service on the cloud that some of these 
businesses worry about using cloud computing. Recent example of availability problem in 
cloud is what was announced by Amazon that their cloud storage service is not working due 
high error rates. This leads to services of different popular businesses such as the travel agent 
Expedia, the learning site Coursera [81] has completely shut down . The error occurred in 
Amazon storage service, and as a consequence, different Amazon cloud services has been 
affected such as Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) virtual machines, RedShift, Simple Email 
Service, Workdocs, WorkMail, AWS Auto Scaling, CodeBuild, CodeCommit, Elastic 
Beanstalk and AWS Lambda [81]. Table 2.1 shows the service outage for major cloud service 
providers:  
Table 2.1. Service Outage In Some Cloud Providers [80] 
Provider Reason Duration Date 
Amazon S3 Authentication service overload leading to  unavailability 2 hours 2/15/08 
Amazon Single bit error leading to gossip protocol explode 6-8 hours 7/20/08 
AppEngine Programming error 5 hours 6/17/08 
Gmail Site unavailable due to outage in contacts system 1.5 hours 8/11/08 
Usually, the management of cloud computing services is performed by single provider, which 
is actually a single point of failure, despite the use of multiple cloud datacentres in different 
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geographical locations and multiple network service providers [80]. Contrarily,  to provide a 
high-availability for computing service, a single point of failure should be avoided [52]. The 
availability is affected by volumetric attacks that lead to exhaust the service resources limits 
such as Denial of Service attacks.    
2.2 Cloud Computing Attacks 
This section will demonstrates some of these attacks as follows:  
2.2.1 Distributed / Denial-of-Service (Dos and DDos) 
Distributed and Denial-of-service attacks are types of hostile intrusive actions targeting online 
servers. These attacks are aiming to damage the availability of the targeted host, router or even 
an entire network. DoS attacks force the victim to perform extensive computations by 
exploiting vulnerability or flooding with massive loads of network noise. This stops the victim 
from providing the service for a while, and hence damaging the hosted services [82]. These 
types of attacks affect and target cloud environment on many levels specifically in data centre 
operations, incident response, application security, and virtualization [83]. An example of 
DDoS attacks is the one that targeted Dyn.Inc ( a major Internet performance management 
company) DNS infrastructure that made a huge distribution of services for major technology 
companies such Twitter, SoundCloud, Spotify, Netflix, Reddit, Pagerduty, Shopify, Disqus, 
Freshbooks, Vox Media, PayPal, Etsy, Github, etc [84]. This attack started at 11:10 UTC US 
(Coordinated Universal Time in united states of America) east and targeting the DNS 
infrastructure that caused DNS query latency and delayed zone propagation during this time. 
The attacked has been mitigated and the services was restored at 13:20 UTC.  
In general, launching D/Dos attacks can be divided into two types of methodologies; 
vulnerability exploiting attacks and flooding attacks. For example, network-based vulnerability 
exploiting attacks exploit the weaknesses or bugs in network protocols or applications at the 
victim machine to cause extreme memory consuming, overload CPU processing, system halt 
or restart, or general system throughput reducing. On the other hand, network-flooding attacks 
are executed by sending huge amounts of network packets that cause legitimate traffic to be 
disrupted and dropped at the victim network [85]. Flooding attacks are the most common forms 
of D/DoS that target the cloud. These attacks can be categorised into three categories; volume-
based attacks, application-based attacks, and low-rate DoS attacks [86]. In addition there are 
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new forms of Dos attacks such as network under-provisioning attacks [87] and Resource 
Exhaustion attacks [88].  
Recently, many types and techniques have been developed and used to launch D/Dos attacks 
in cloud computing that have been studied extensively and methods discussed to counter these 
attacks such as filtering the ingress/egress data, input debugging and hash-based IP trace-back 
[89] [90] [91]. Volume-based attacks are the most popular and basic DDos attacks [86], where 
the attacker typically overwhelms the victim with a huge number of packets or connections, 
flooding the network equipment, servers, or bandwidth resources. Previously, this type of 
attack was launched by many compromised machines that form a botnet. Typically, an attacker 
compromised a machine or server to work as a central control unit (command and Control CC) 
and used this unit to compromise more internet-connected systems (Zombies) that the attacker 
uses to initiate attack against the goal victim. Attackers use different tactics to build their botnet 
such as tricking the system user to drive by downloading, exploiting vulnerable web browser, 
or luring victim to run malicious software. The communication between the Zombies and CC 
then the attacker run through covert channels mostly achieved using internet relay chat. Figure 
2.7 displays the basic bot net architecture.           
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Figure 2.7 Basic Botnet Architecture  
With the advent of the cloud, the same technique is used to launch volumetric attacks from 
datacentres of cloud providers, where the attacker infects cloud-based systems or even rents it 
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legitimately. Cybercriminals take advantage of the massive capabilities that the cloud has to 
offer, as the cloud represents a great inexpensive powerful platform that these criminals use to 
launch illegal activities. Figure 2.8 clarifies this idea:      
Victim`s infrastructure
Cloud provider2
Cloud provider3
Command &
 Control
attacker
Cloud provider1
Compromised clouds 
 
Figure 2.8 Compromised Cloud Datacentres  
The main target for D/Dos attacks is to damage the availability of cloud services. In regards to 
companies and enterprises, this means affecting the business of the attack`s victims and 
harming them financially and on the reputation level. Moreover, affecting all services that share 
the same host of the victim and cause them to be out of service.   
2.2.2 Malwares 
It is an abbreviated term formed from MALicious and softWARE, and refers to any software 
that is programmed to execute malicious activities. This software can be deployed remotely 
using attacks that are hard to expose their sources [92]. These attacks are fast spreading that 
they occur every three minutes in different organizations around the world [93]. Malwares are 
typically used to steal financial information such as account credentials, numbers of bank cards 
and accounts, and intellectual property such as private applications, and technical algorithms 
and secrets [92].  The impact of malwares may be more severe in some advanced types of 
malwares such as Droppers, since in this type of Malwares they download additional malicious 
files soon after they have been installed. To achieve this task, Droppers disable security 
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software at the victim system as well as the updates, and make a list of all files and folders in 
the system [94].  
In the cloud environment, many problems and issues are caused by malwares. A malware attack 
can take the form of injecting malicious services or VMs into the cloud; the cloud system’s 
operator is tricked to execute the malicious code, and then legitimate users’ requests are 
redirected to the malicious service/VM, which compromises the security for the cloud and 
legitimate users [95]. On the virtualization level, a security management requirement is to save 
a virtual machine image, which is why when, infected by a malware, it will preserve and 
propagate the malware every time infected images run [48]. Infecting a folder that is 
synchronized with a cloud-based storage service means infecting all devices that connect to 
this service and it is hard to stop this malware as the source is out the cloud [94].  
2.2.3 Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) 
This term refers to a sophisticated multistage attack that uses multiple techniques and vectors 
of attacking the victim, all these attacks carried out unnoticed to the security systems and 
evading detection in order to maintain control over target systems as long as is possible [96]. 
The steps of APT are normally a sequence of sub attacks that serve the ultimate goal of APT. 
The typical model to describe APT attacks is the kill chain method [97] [98]. Figure 2.9 shows 
an abstract APT attack structure as follows: 
 
Figure 2.9 APT Structure [99]  
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In the cloud, some application level vulnerabilities might be exploited by an attacker during 
the intelligence gathering and lateral movements. These two steps of APT are significant as 
they are key stages for compromising or further compromising the system. An extensive 
security analysis for a leading commercial cloud [100] showed  some serious vulnerabilities 
such as sophisticated Malwares that are capable of  key logging, process monitoring, and 
stealing information. Other serious vulnerabilities that have been found are the presence of 
backdoors and leftover credentials, and unprotected private keys. Attackers can use the latter 
vulnerabilities not only to hack into the cloud but also to maintain a stealth presence in the 
infected VM and develop this existence to other VMs in the same host or even the same cloud.  
Although other studies such as [101] suggested that using mobility-enabled secure cloud might 
theoretically limit or diminish the effect of APT. The latter suggestion depends on the idea that 
the ATP attack surface is restricted to a small impact area that includes the allocated resources 
only. However, the effectiveness of this solution actually depends on how it is applicable to 
public commercial clouds, and is yet to be examined against inherited vulnerabilities.                    
2.2.4 Brute-Force Attacks 
Brute-force attacks had been ranked as the top three threats in cloud computing in 2013 [102], 
while McAfee Labs predicted a massive brute force attack in 2017 [103]. It is the process of 
sending predetermined values to a server and analysing the response [104]. In other words, an 
attack when an adversary tries to guess the victim`s sensitive information (especially the 
password) using a reiterative approach of trial and error [105]. There are three types of brute 
forces attacks; Dictionary attacks, Search attacks and Rule-based search attacks. In dictionary 
attacks, an automatic software tries to predict user name and password from a dictionary file, 
which contains words gathered by the attacker about the user or unique words that are available 
publicly. Search attack checks likely mixtures of character sets and variety of password length. 
These attacks take a long time due to the huge number of variations that could be tried. Rule-
based search attacks use rules to generate potential passwords depending on partial pieces of 
information of the victim or from adjusting pre-prepared mask words in the input [105]. 
2.2.5 Insider Attacks  
The insider attacks are have risen from 8% in 2014 to 10% in 2015 of the top causes of data 
breach [106]. Insider attacks can be defined as a deliberate misuse carried out by a person with 
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a current or former relationship to an organization who owned access to organization`s systems 
and information, for the purpose of affecting integrity, confidentiality, or availability of these 
systems and information [107]. Normally, the insider attacks are accomplished on three aims 
namely Sabotage, theft of intellectual property, and fraud [108]. By sabotage, the insider 
intends to impose damage to the organization or to a hostile individual. In Theft of intellectual 
property, an insider might steal and exfiltrate royalty information for the insider`s benefit or to 
harm the organization by exposing secret information to rivals. With Fraud, the insider 
performs unauthorized data alteration and updating for personal benefit, or identity disguise 
such as identity theft and electronic cards fraud. In cloud computing, insider attacks could be 
launched by three types of insiders [109] namely a hustler cloud administrator, an employee 
that uses vulnerability in the system to gain unauthorized access, or a cloud user that has a 
legitimate account but uses it to abuse the cloud infrastructure.        
2.3 Intrusion Detection, Prevention and Prediction In Cloud Computing   
Although Cloud computing inherits the classical problems of computing, however, the classical 
solutions for these problems do not suit the cloud. Most reasons for the classical solutions 
failure stem from the nature of the cloud that is structured according to the new deployment 
methods and different levels of infrastructure and software that operate to provide the services, 
unlike the classical solutions that tailored based on defined configurations. In addition, the 
responsibility of security administration is splitted between the provider and the costumer 
(service owner); while the cloud provider responsible for securing the infrastructure and 
platform, the costumer is responsible for securing their services or pay for third party to take 
this responsibility. This leads to contradictions in policies and defence systems that supplied 
by different parties. Furthermore, different concepts that contributed into the failure of classical 
solutions in cloud such as Virtualization, multi-tenancy, service level agreement (SLA), cloud 
scalability, etc. In this section we will discuss the intrusion related systems and the reason 
behind the need for intrusion prediction.    
2.3.1 Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDSs, IPDs, IDPSs) 
A recently published survey shows that the second main security concern is intrusion detection 
and prevention in cloud environment [110]. According to  [111], a definition of IDS in cloud 
computing is a software or hardware that automatically detects intrusion and proactively 
discovers potential intrusive points. An intrusion detection and prevention system IDPS is 
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software or hardware that include all abilities of an intrusion detection system, in addition it 
can halt possible events as well [111]. Unlike IDSs, IPSs can act upon detected threats and stop 
them damaging or behaving maliciously in the cloud. IDPS is a mixture of the two types [112] 
and is capable of altering the configurations of the security environment or removing the 
malicious part in order to keep working normally [111], in addition it reports the intrusion and 
action upon it to security administration of the cloud [112].  
2.3.2 Types of IDS/IPS in Cloud Computing   
There are four main types of IDS/IPS that are deployed in cloud environment [110], these types 
are differentiated according to the location where the IDPS is located.  This section will 
demonstrates these four types:   
a) Host based intrusion detection system: this type performs monitoring and analysing of 
the data gathered from the host machine. The detection intrusion process is done by 
gathering data like system files, network events, system calls, etc. and according to the 
abnormal behaviour recognition; a report of attack is issued. Normally HIDS is installed 
on the host machine, virtual machine or supervisor to detect malicious behaviour by 
monitoring and analysing log files, access-control rules, and other related information. 
The effectiveness of HIDS is dependent on the selected host characteristics to be 
monitored. Different detection methods and solutions has been used in this HIDS such 
as behaviour based method [113] to detect known attacks and an Artificial Neural 
Network (ANN) to detect unknown attacks. In addition, algorithmic methodology is 
used for HIDS by exploiting multi-level IDS that analyses user behaviour and log 
management in host operating system (OS) [114].  
b) Network Based Intrusion Detection System NIDS: in this type of IDS is implemented 
on network traffic to detect intrusive events like DoS attack, port scanning, and cracking 
into the computer. The mechanism of detection is to compare the present behaviour to 
an already observed behaviour in real time. NDIS is positioned next to the firewall and 
the network, and in the cloud, it is placed in the cloud server that deals with external 
networks. As an example of NIDS the work proposed in [115] that is a signature based 
IDS to detect the DDoS. The IDS in positioned in virtual switch to log the traffic and 
drop the packets that match a known signature.  Another solution is Cloud Intrusion 
Detection Service (CIDS) [116] proposed using Snort that is a signature based IDS that 
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deployed at the network level. This solution is intended to work as on demand cloud 
service that any host desired to benefit from this service should be subscribe to the 
CIDS.      
c) Distribution Intrusion Detection System (DIDS): Distributed IDS is composed of 
several IDS (e.g. HIDS, NIDS, etc.) across a wide range network that interact mutually 
or to a server where network observing is active. A component of intrusion detection 
collects local host data and modify it to be ready for using by a central analyser, which 
in turn analyses aggregated data using both anomaly and signature based methods for 
analysing. The DIDSs are characterised by the cooperative approach among the 
distributed units that inform each other when an intrusion occurs as in [117]. In this 
solution, an individual NIDS is deployed at each cloud node that act as an agent. These 
agents share information at the occurrence of the intrusion in a specific area of the cloud 
such information that contain the attack signature and severity. In [118] a mobile agent 
based IDS has been proposed to suits the cloud computing environment and fulfil the 
user`s security demands. In each VM, an agent is deployed that sense the traces of 
attacks that on detection sends alerts to central Snort IDS that judge the incident and 
block further attacks.        
d) Hypervisor based Intrusion Detection System: hypervisor is the platform that runs the 
virtual machine (s), hypervisor based intrusion detection system performs monitoring 
and analysing communications in different directions among virtual machines, with 
hypervisor, and inside hypervisor based virtual network [119]. An example of this type 
of IDS is what proposed in [120] that called VM introspection based IDS. This solution 
works by monitors the hardware conditions, activities and software situations of host, 
which provide vigorous view of the system than other types of IDSs. The structure of 
this solution is shown in figure 2.10.  
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Figure 2.10 A View of VMI-Based IDS Architecture [120] 
      2.4 Port Scan Detection 
Before exploring port scan definition and its methods, it is crucial to demonstrate the 
importance of port scanning and its role in the launching of a successful attack, and clarify the 
port scan definition, methods, and detection methods.     
2.4.1 Attack Modelling  
Although the area of cyber-attacks is well studied and investigated, it is hard to find a formal 
model for cyber-attacks that can be applied to all cyber-attacks presented in the literature. This 
is probably because there are different types of attacks comprised of different attack steps, 
surfaces, platforms, and destinations. In [121] the basic steps that an attacker should follow to 
achieve a successful network attack are stated as follows:  
1. Information gathering: In this step, the attacker starts to prepare for attack by 
collecting information about the vulnerability of the victim side via the network. The 
attacker searches the collected information for the vulnerabilities that serve the goal of 
the attack.  
2. Assessing vulnerability: Based on the collected information and what vulnerabilities 
are found in the victim side, the attacker starts to compromise some nodes in the 
network as an initial step for launching the attack.   
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3. Launching the attack: At this step, the attacker performs the attack on the targeted 
machines with the aid of the compromised nodes.  
4. Cleaning up: This is the final step when the attacker completes the attack and tries to 
remove the attack history by eliminating the registry entries and log files from the 
attacked machines. 
The latter steps are basic and focus on networks, and only cover very basic attacks. However, 
to cope with the sophisticated attacks that have recently been launched, a general model derived 
from the military terms called ‘Kill chain’ proposed by Lockheed Martin Corporation [122] 
can be a considered a general model for remote cyber-attacks that all attacks adhere to a number 
of attack kill chains [123][124][125][126].  
The kill chain phases [122] shown in figure 2.11 are proposed to characterise a computer 
network attack as follows:  
a) Reconnaissance: Investigating and exploring the internet to find targets to be attacked. 
Normally, gathering information about the target from different sources to collect 
information such as email, IP, network mapping, social relationships, etc.  
b) Weaponization: A crafted Trojan injected with an exploit forged into a deliverable 
payload using a vulnerable application (weaponizer). Most recently, text files such as 
Adobe PDFs and MS words files have been used as weaponized deliverables.  
c) Delivery: Is the process of transferring the weapon to the target. Some forms of attacks 
use delivery means such as network traffic, file attachments, infected websites, 
removable storage devices.           
d) Exploitation: Is the process of activating the exploitation in the target system. This 
includes targeting specific vulnerability in applications or operating systems that an 
exploit is designed to utilize.  
e) Installation: Is the process of establishing a remote connection by perform the 
exploitation with the victim via backdoor or covered channels that are initiated by the 
Trojan or the exploit. 
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f) Command and Control (CC): A unit plays the role of a commander residing in a 
compromised host, maintains a connection with victim, and performs the orders 
requested by the attacker. CC is an intermediate station between the attacker and the 
victim, used by the attacker to disguise the identity of the attacker and preserve 
connection with the victim. Further reconnaissance is done to explore the valuable 
destination inside the network, and perform lateral movements.   
g) Actions on Objectives: At this stage, the attacker starts to achieve the original goal of 
the attack. Such sophisticated attacks are normally aimed at data exfiltration, which 
involves gathering, encrypting, and extracting information form the target machine. 
This will include data integrity and availability violations to enable data exfiltration to 
be achieved successfully. In some cases, the object of the attacker is only use the 
current victim as a station to intrude into other more valuable targets on the same 
network or environment.  
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Figure 2.11. Attack Kill Chain [98] 
We notice from the two attack models that gathering information is the basic step that any 
attacker intending to launch an attack should perform. Information gathering is crucial because 
how the attack type will be launched is defined according to the found vulnerabilities, and for 
 34 
 
identifying the target availability. Therefore, in the next section we will investigate the port 
scanning.       
2.4.2 Port Scanning Definition 
Port scanning is the first step of reconnaissance that attackers use to locate the target network 
or machines and most prevalent approach to discover the open ports and the associated 
vulnerable services that can be exploited to hack the target system. A port scan is a technique 
of identifying the available services on a host or a network by testing the connections requests 
replies [127]. This definition clarifies the purpose of port scan scanning as a tool for initial 
information gathering. A further understanding of port scanning can be perceived by 
understanding the mechanism of connecting two machines and the way used by the attacker to 
exploit this for port scanning. A three-way handshake is a method used to establish a 
connection between client and server using the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). The 
process of three-way handshake is illustrated in figure 2.12.  
Client Server
SYN
SYN+ACK
ACK
1
2
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Figure 2.12  Three-way Handshake 
To initiate a connection the client sends a TCP packet with SYN set (SYN packet for short) to 
a specific port on the server machine. The server replies with SYN+ACK packet to the client 
(by allocating memory space) on the port specified in the SYN packet. In the third step, the 
client replies with ACK packet, then the connection is set established on both sides. In the 
simplest types of port scan, the attacker sends SYN packets to all ports in the server (ideally 0-
65535) or to well-known ports (0-1024) without completing the third by replying with ACK 
packets. Any responding port with SYN-ACK packet will inform the attacker that this port is 
open and more investigation will done by the attacker regarding the services associated with 
the respondent ports. Next, we will demonstrate the methods and types of port scanning, and 
the methods used to detect them.    
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2.4.3 Types of Port Scanning 
Although port scanning might be used for benign intentions by system administrators and 
network engineers, we are interested in port scans that are the initial step of information 
gathering leading to malicious activities. In this context, attackers launch port scanning in 
multiple manners according to the type of target and the numbers of ports being investigated. 
This could be achieved as follows [128]:  
a) Vertical scans: in this type, the attacker scan several ports in a single destination host. 
This means the attacker is interested in a specific host and in search of open ports on 
that specific host.  
b) Horizontal scan: in this type, the attacker scans the same port on several hosts. This 
means the attacker is interested in a specific port and searches the hosts that open this 
port. Normally this type is used when a vulnerability is discovered on a specific port 
(more precisely in a service listening on this port).  
c) Block scan: this type is a hybrid scan that searches for multiple ports on multiple hosts.  
In order to evade the detection and act in hidden behaviour, the attackers uses different 
techniques in scanning as in follows:    
a) Stealth scan: this type scan is executed when attackers desire not to reveal much 
information about their identity; therefore, they turn to incomplete connections 
such as (FIN, Xmas, and Null). As these scans do not use the three-way handshake 
they are difficult to log and hence to detect. Other stealthy techniques include 
modifying the TCP packets, changing the timing of sending scan packets, hiding 
the scanner IP amongst spoofed IPs, etc. [129]     
b) Distributed scan: this scan is another technique for evading detection by using 
multiple sources to perform the scan. That is rather than a single attacker 
performing the scan, the attacker launches the scan from multiple machines 
(different IPs) or multiple attackers collaborate to scan subranges of the target host 
or network.    
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2.4.4 Port Scan Detection Methods  
The detection of port scanning has been tackled as a problem more network based than system 
based. Many methods are used to detect port scans; these vary according to the aspect of traffic 
used to indicate the scanning, in addition to the computing method that is most suitable to the 
solution model. Port scan detection methods [130], can be displayed briefly as follows: 
a) Algorithmic Approaches: these solutions incorporate different statistical and 
probabilistic methods to evaluate the incoming traffic, where the use of multiple 
methods to form the solution algorithm is dependent on modelling of the system and 
tailored use of these methods. Different algorithms have been proposed to detect port 
scans that use techniques such as graph-based, probabilistic models, statistical analysis, 
network anomaly scoring, statistical profiling, heuristic approaches. The criterion of a 
scan detection varies from one solution to another, as each solution uses a specific 
mechanism to judge if there is a scan.    
b) Threshold-based Approaches: these approaches normally examine the traffic and 
specifically observe traffic attribute values, the detection of a scanning activity is 
detected when these values exceed a certain threshold. Most solutions of this type use 
the statistical data analysis to compare with the predefined thresholds. Other approaches 
might use the validity of packets flag combination, a sequential hypothesis testing, 
customized traffic filters, and behaviour-based techniques. The criterion in all these 
solutions is the use of threshold to judge the existence of a scan.    
c) Soft Computing Approaches: obviously, these approaches uses the fact that port 
detection does not need to be in definite numbers of ports to be considered as a scan. 
Therefore, these methods are used because of their ability to approximate reasoning and 
make decisions from partial truth. Although these algorithms offer reliable solutions, 
the need for training time and the effectiveness for a huge number of connections might 
affect their performance. Many soft computing methods have been used in port scan 
detection such as Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Partheno Genetic Algorithms 
(PGA), Fuzzy Logic, and Bayes Kernel Estimators. 
d) Rule-based Approaches: these approaches work through analysing the incoming 
network traffic to detect the scan in the traffic that has not complied with predefined 
rules. This implies building a knowledge base of the normal traffic patterns, which is a 
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challenging task as network traffic is diverse in nature. Rule-based methods include 
solutions using packet headers information, fuzzy rules, and other signature based 
intrusion detection systems.  
e) Visual Approaches: In these approaches, the traffic is represented visually and the scans 
are detected manually by the security administrators manually by observing anomaly 
in traffic graphs. Most of these solutions depend on plotting traffic data on packet level 
or flow level. Such solutions display graphically the relationships between ports and 
IPs numbers, connection activity, summaries of unique values per protocol, alerts three-
dimension projection, traffic clustering, and data patterns visualization.         
2.5 Vulnerability Assessments  
Vulnerability is a defect in system design or a coding weakness in the developing, operation, 
controlling of information system or one of its modules that could lead to system breakdown 
or damage when the system experiences a threat or hazard, or affect the system’s ability to 
recover to a stable work state [131]. This means that the vulnerabilities represent the spots that 
adversaries exploit to attack the system. Vulnerabilities exist in systems for different reasons 
such as; flaws in coding, faults in protocol designs, incompatibility among the system modules, 
etc,; vulnerabilities might arise when an intentionally created backdoor is exploited 
maliciously.  
2.5.1 Vulnerability Types  
As computer technology becomes more sophisticated and advanced, vulnerabilities being 
discovered are grow in their quantity and severity level. National Vulnerability Database 
(NVD) [132] published statistics related to vulnerabilities showing that the vulnerabilities’ 
severity has fluctuated since 2001, however statistics displayed an incremental pattern of 
severity that reaches the peak in 2017 as shown in figure 3.13. 
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Figure 2.13  Vulnerability Severity Distribution [132] . 
Vulnerability types’ numbers vary according to what types are more prevalent, for example in 
2007 the miscellaneous vulnerabilities were more than 3,500 and all other types were below 
500. While in 2016 vulnerabilities related to miscellaneous vulnerabilities were below 500 and 
vulnerabilities such as input validation, permission-privilege-access control, and insufficient 
information exceeded 500 and buffer error vulnerability exceeded 1,000.  
Network vulnerabilities is related to weakness that could be exploited remotely via the network 
of the target. Mainly these vulnerabilities originate from a bug in protocols used to connect the 
computers or a malfunction in network devices and configuration. Most network security 
problems stem from the fact that network protocols have been designed without considering 
the security aspect. There are many types of network vulnerabilities such as  Authentication 
Bypass By Spoofing , Stack-Based Buffer Overflows , Insufficient Entropy in code segments , 
etc [133].  
Operating System vulnerabilities are such type of weakness stems from a fault in the coding of 
OS software, or a procedural defect in the interaction among OS components that leads to the 
formation of a vulnerability. These vulnerabilities mostly affect the reliability and the 
confidentiality of the computer system. Although the majority of these vulnerabilities are not 
caused intentionally, they can still lead to a security breach that might disrupt the performance 
of the system or threaten the integrity of stored data. Several types of OS weaknesses are exist 
such as Backdoors, Buffer Overflow, Installation vulnerabilities, etc [134].  
 39 
 
2.5.2 Vulnerability Scan Tools 
It is a software application that searches for vulnerabilities in and maps the information systems 
such as in network, operating system, and software applications [135]. These scanners are able 
to identify the vulnerabilities caused by software bugs, incorrect system configurations, or 
misuse of a user. The main goal of using a vulnerability scanner is the detection of known 
security holes in the system. As vulnerabilities are discovered continuously, a regular 
vulnerability scan for the system will facilitate the remedy for these problems that could be 
used internally or externally. Scanners also map the system network that benefits in two points; 
first, it discovers devices or systems that connect to the system without permission. This helps 
to defend the system against intrusive devices or systems that might compromise the whole 
system security. Second, vulnerability scanners produce network mapping that identifies all 
network devices and their details such as device types, working OS version and update levels, 
and other information that is used in security management and monitoring.  Despite the 
important role of vulnerability scanners in security assessment, however, it can only provide a 
description of the current system state. Therefore, a regular scan should be conducted for 
maintaining control over security vulnerabilities. Another shortcoming of the scanners is that 
they are only capable of reporting vulnerabilities according to the database of the scanner, and 
a human verdict is needed for decision-making, and to determine if the reported vulnerabilities 
are actually exist or the scanner failed to identify a present weakness.    
Network-based scanners are used to discover the vulnerabilities that exist in the network 
devices, protocols, and administration risks such as Nessus and NSS. These scanners are 
deployed in single machines to scan other machines in the network, and normally deal with 
critical security weaknesses such as in firewalls configuration, web servers, network industrial 
software. There are many types of Network scanners such as Port scanners [136] Web server 
scanners [137] and Web applications vulnerability scanners [138].     
Host-based scanners are designed to discover the vulnerabilities of the host operating system. 
Therefore, host-based scanners are allowed to test the low-level data such as processes and 
configurations of the OS. These scanners are able to present an insight of suspicious user 
behaviour; an indication of system compromising that appears in suspicious file names, unusual 
system files and privileged programs. Unlike network-based scanners, these types of scanner 
are able to perform system baseline tests. There are two types of host-based vulnerability 
scanners namely; Host vulnerability scanners [139] and Database scanners [138]. 
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2.5.3 Vulnerability Assessments Processes  
Vulnerability assessments is the process of reviewing the system components and processes in 
order to disclose weaknesses in the system. In broader definition it is the search for 
vulnerability in the system. Among the security tools, the vulnerability assessment is more 
focused on revealing the areas that are exposed to attacks. This means more dealing with the 
system infrastructure in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and compliance in the shape of 
evaluating the level of security in the current system state situation.Vulnerability assessments 
comprise of four steps namely; vulnerabilities discovery, vulnerabilities identification, 
vulnerabilities analysis , and reporting. Next, we give an overview of these components as 
follows: 
Vulnerabilities discovery: This process aims at identifying and revealing the number of 
vulnerabilities existing in the system. This process implies actors that participate in 
vulnerability discovery including a detector that finds the vulnerability in the system at the 
owner organization, software vendor detectors that are responsible for finding vulnerabilities 
as a maintenance or quality assurance, or public vulnerabilities disclosure sources such as 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) announcements [140]. The research efforts to 
discover the vulnerabilities have depended on software reliability models, which focus on the 
dependence among fault existence, fault elimination, and work environment. Many models 
have been proposed in the literature such as Anderson Thermodynamic Model (AT) [141], 
Alhazmi-Malaiya Logistic (AML)[142], etc.    
Vulnerabilities Classification : An important part of the vulnerabilities assessment is the 
process of identifying the vulnerability and categorizing it.  Different methods used to classify 
and rank the vulnerabilities; the most common vulnerabilities taxonomy approaches are 
classification according to aspects such as cause, type, severity, impact. As it is diverse, some 
taxonomy tried to describe the vulnerabilities in such a way that is correct but unpractical. On 
the other hand, other types of taxonomy are flexible to the extent that a single vulnerability 
might be fitted in different categories [143].  
Vulnerability scanning: This step can be defined as the attempt to find the vulnerabilities in the 
system software and network [144]. This means the actual process of finding the weakness of 
the system using software called scanners that search for the vulnerabilities in the system. 
Normally these scans are achieved by using a different computer to scan and check the targeted 
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system [145]. Many software packages are proposed as a scanner such as Nessus [146], SAINT 
[147], Core Impact [148], AVDS [148], etc. to automate the process of vulnerability scanning, 
although the automated scan was not able to accurately identify all the vulnerabilities in the 
tested system, as well as the difference depending on the used operating system[149]. 
Vulnerability scanning is normally associated with penetration testing, which is actually 
complementing the work of scanning, although the vulnerability scanning is only focused on 
searching and identifying the vulnerabilities on the contrary Penetration test that focuses 
additionally on weaknesses exploitation and remediation. The vulnerability scanning is a 
knowledge-based process, where the search operation is performed against the content of the 
scanner vulnerabilities database. This explains the difference in results when using different 
scanners, as each scanner has its own database and updates [144].            
Vulnerability analysis: this is not really an independent step of assessment, as analysis and 
assessment are frequently used to express the same process. Therefore; analysis encompasses 
searching, discovering, identifying, classifying the vulnerabilities and ending with reporting to 
relative persons. Some researchers state that the analysis is finding the relationships between 
vulnerability category and severity, and between vulnerability and its surrounding conditions 
[142]. This means, analysis focusing on understating the importance of vulnerability by 
identifying the severity, as more severe vulnerability leads to higher risk. Another aspect of 
analysis is to understand the increasing number of vulnerabilities aggregated over time, model 
the behaviour of these vulnerabilities, and test their impact on system security. Although it is 
very desirable for assessment tools to own powerful analysis capabilities, most of these tools 
have not achieved that yet [142].   
Vulnerability reporting : this is the final step in the assessment process; a documented 
description describes the whole state of the system in detail and depicts the results of the 
assessment process [150]. The report should contain the findings of vulnerability discovery and 
identification such as vulnerability types, numbers, situation, etc. the importance of 
vulnerability reporting is shown in two significant points namely: improvement and prediction. 
Certainly, the direct purpose of vulnerability assessment handling in the current system security 
is for either securing existed vulnerabilities, or testing the ability of the system to be penetrated 
by adversaries [150]. Another benefit of reporting is with regard to system security in future, 
which is the predictive information about potential threats and expected number of potential 
vulnerabilities that might occur in the system depending on the discovery models.       
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2.5.4 Vulnerability Assessment Requirements  
Vulnerability assessment tools share the similar conditions of work with other security systems. 
Here we will highlight some of most relevant requirements to these systems as follows [151]:  
a) Computational capabilities: most tools imply minimum process power to find and 
analyse the vulnerabilities in the system. Although this condition is not that important 
nowadays with computers with powerful abilities, the system software has become 
more complicated and the number of vulnerabilities being discovered has increased on 
a regular basis.    
b) Reporting capability and Knowledge base: all assessment software is based on the same 
concept, which is scanning for Vulnerabilities, however, it differs in how powerful 
these software packages express their findings, as the results of the scanning process 
depend on the quality of the vulnerability database used in the scan, and how 
informative, clear, and robust are the reports.    
c) Performance limitation: Vulnerability assessment software normally produce a security 
snapshot of the system for a specific time point. As vulnerabilities are discovered on a 
frequent basis, scanning the system with every update of the vulnerabilities database 
might affect the system performance. 
d) Autonomous approaches:  Vulnerability assessments have mostly used the approaches 
and methods of penetration test in scanning the vulnerabilities, and as a part of the 
penetration process. While penetration test methods only deal with known and 
documented vulnerabilities, assessment software is focused on these types of 
vulnerabilities rather than finding unknown or inactive vulnerabilities. 
2.6 Summary   
This chapter presented and discussed a background information about the cloud computing and 
the security challenges and concerns about this environment. Such challenges vary from 
concerns that affect the performance of the cloud to attacks that impact the cloud severely such 
as stealing information, affect the availability, and violate the data integrity. The second section 
of this chapter has discussed the attacks that target cloud computing. The third section displays 
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the intrusion detection and prevention systems that are proposed for cloud and non-cloud 
computing environments.    
This chapter has also presented introductory background information that is necessary to 
understand the main concepts engaged to achieve this research work. This chapter gave a 
snapshot of the prediction methods in computer science and other areas, to depict the 
techniques used to obtain information about potential incidents that might occur in the future.    
 It also outlined the challenges facing the intrusion prediction in the research area. The main 
problems discussed in this chapter stemming from cloud computing is not an entirely novel 
scheme but a new paradigm for conventional computing technologies, which is adding new 
challenges to the inherited ones from the current technologies.  
This chapter has presented a background information of port scanning definition, types and  
detection methods, which is the second essential part of the thesis. Firstly, begins with 
clarifying the importance of scanning activities for the success of an attack. This background 
highlighted two important points; the scanning activity step is precedes the harm steps of the 
attack, and the outcome of the scanning activity will define technique and the tools that are 
needed to launch a successful attack. Then the scanning methods were defined, and provided 
information about the Port Scan detection methods.  
The last part of this chapter has provided an introductory information about the vulnerability 
assessments in the computer systems. This section starts with giving a definition of the 
vulnerability, then the types of the vulnerabilities in computer environment, the vulnerability 
assessments processes, and the vulnerability scanners, and finishes with the requirements that 
should be in any efficient vulnerability assessment system.        
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Chapter 3  
Related work 
3.1 Introduction   
Prediction is used in many areas such as the stock market, weather forecasting, Health sector, 
and many others. Although plenty of research has been produced by academia, however, 
intrusion prediction systems are still not widely used in the cyber industry. In this section we 
will clarify the importance of intrusion prediction from related terms namely; detection and 
prevention. Intrusion detection is ‘the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer 
system or network and analysing them for signs of intrusions, defined as attempts to 
compromise the confidentiality, integrity, availability, or to bypass the security mechanisms of 
a computer or network’[152]. Intrusion prevention is the process of detecting intrusions and 
trying to stop them [153]. Therefore, according to these definitions, prevention is dependent on 
detection and both are relying on monitored and identified security incidents, which implies 
that security incidents have already happened or are in the course of happening. It is important 
to note that detection and prevention systems need direct information to raise the alarm of 
security violation or prohibit known attacks. Furthermore, these systems failed to identify 
multiple step attacks, because the detection concept is to capture a single incident at a time not 
the whole series. In this context, the need for prediction systems appeared as a tool to support 
both detection and prevention systems. The basic idea behind the Prediction concept is the 
attempt to provide information on events that have not happened yet depending on historical 
information and gained knowledge of similar or identical events, which have happened in the 
past. Figure 3.1 shows the relationship among the three concepts.   
 45 
 
Figure 3.1 the Relationship among Prediction, Detection and Prevention. 
Prediction as theory implies a lack of information about what might happen, therefore, security 
systems use the small amount of information that is available for processing and producing 
knowledge about potential future incidents. The more data that is available the more accurate 
prediction can be produced and the certainty of future incidents becomes more realistic. The 
prediction role stands where there is not enough information to consider incidents as an attack. 
This is because detection depends on solid information to capture security violations, this 
information might be signatures or noticeable anomalies in status of the system or network 
[153]. Therefore, the hierarchy of prediction, detection, and prevention will be in the form as 
shown in figure 3.2.    
 
Figure 3.2 Information in Intrusion Related Systems. 
Cyber-attacks are normally identified as single and multi-stage attacks, according to the 
number of steps that are required for achieving the attack successfully. In case of multi-stage 
intrusions, prediction is playing a significant role, as the probability of producing correct 
predictions is far higher than other attack vectors. This because multi-stage intrusions involve 
many steps and attacks in order to achieve the intrusion goal, so there are more likely chances 
to predict the ultimate attack by observing the initial steps or prior attacks before the attack 
achieves its goals and harms the system.   
Prediction 
Detection 
Prevention
Information Volume
Degree of Certainty 
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3.2 Intrusion Prediction Methodologies in Computer Security 
Research into the prediction of cyber-attacks and intrusions area has been enriched by many 
solutions and models over the last few years [35], [154]–[167]. In this section, we will review 
some of such solutions to draw a picture of the possible methods, which could be exploited. 
Prediction systems use different methodologies to infer future potential threats. Methodology 
means the main concept of work that the system is built upon to achieve prediction. 
Methodologies are varying according to the type of data and source of data. Most prediction 
methodologies can be classified as follows:       
3.2.1 Alerts Correlation   
This methodology can be defined as  ‘interpretation of multiple alarms so as to increase the 
semantic information content associated with a reduced set of messages’[168]. The goal of alert 
correlation is identify the causal relationships between alerts [169]. Alert correlation is 
achieved in the context of grouping alerts from intrusion detection systems, processing them 
to put in unified form, and preforming correlations to find causal relationships between them. 
In the literature, alert correlation is used to build different types of models such as Alert 
Optimization [167], Attack Scenario [170] [159], Attack Strategies through finding 
connections between causes and consequences of attack [171], Attack Track using suffix tree 
[172], and Attack Plan [159].  
3.2.2 Sequence of Actions  
 This methodology depends on detecting the abnormality in ordered sequence of elements. In 
such case, security incidents that are reported by IDSs or system calls that monitored by calls 
monitor are put into an ordered set to reflect the causal or temporal relationship among them. 
The serial sort of the set will make prediction relatively clear, as breaking the chain or the 
emergence of malicious acts in the series will be considered as intrusion. This concept  is used 
in models such as System call sequences [158] [173], network packet sequences [174]. 
Although the alert correlation concept can be classified as a sequence of actions, however, this 
subsection is dedicated to the methods other than alert correlation. 
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3.2.3 Statistical Methods   
The literature showed that statistical methods are widely used for prediction and forecasting in 
computing and other areas. Statistical analysis tries to investigate and present the collected data 
to reveal the underlying patterns and trends [175].  Although statistical analysis might not be 
suitable for all cyber related problems because of the linear nature of statistical analysis [176], 
however, these methods have been used effectively in many fields of cyber security such as in 
data mining [177]. The criteria for using statistical models are data nature, attack mechanism, 
and system architecture. Therefore, the literature showed the use of different statistical models 
such as time series analysis, linear regression, moving average, weighted moving average, 
exponential smoothing, reliability analysis, etc. [178] [179].         
3.2.4 Probabilistic Methods  
 Normally this methodology is used when the way of processing the collected data does not 
lead to clear predictions, so probabilities are assigned and calculated for processing outputs. 
Another use of this method is to compound with other models in the same system in order to 
improve the prediction result. Literature showed that Hidden Markov model (HMM) and 
Bayesian network are the most probabilistic methods being used. HMM is ‘a tool for 
representing probability distributions over sequences of observations’ [180], and has been used 
in many solutions such as in [181] [167] [182],etc. Bayesian network is ‘ a graphical model for 
representing conditional independencies between a set of random variables’[180], and been 
used in many solutions such as in [155] [173] [183].          
3.2.5 Feature Extraction  
This method is used when the system focuses on a specific piece of information out of the 
gathered data. Feature Extraction is ‘a set of techniques that transform and simplify data so as 
to make data mining tasks easier’ [184]. Feature extraction can be decomposed into two parts; 
feature constructions that standardize, normalize, filter, and extract local features from data. 
The second part is feature selection that selects relevant and informative features [185]. 
Although this methodology is embedded in all data mining based solution, it has been used as 
a key methodology such as to build Cyber Attacker Model Profile (CAMP) [186], and real time 
intrusion prediction in [157].           
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3.3 Intrusion Prediction Systems  
Cyber-attacks have the ability to disrupt or destroy computer systems and networks, or the 
information stored on them [187]. Using various degrees of sophistication, an attacker can 
access a system remotely by the Internet to gain unauthorised privileges or misuse its 
privileges. This is known as an intrusion and is the attempt to manipulate the confidentiality, 
integrity or availability, of security methods [188].  
In recent years, cyber-attacks have increased rapidly in volume and diversity. In 2013 for 
example, over 552 million customers’ identities and crucial information were revealed through 
data breaches world-wide [189]. This growing threat is further demonstrated in the 50,000 daily 
attacks on the London Stock Exchange [190]. It is predicted that the economic impact of cyber-
attacks will cost the global economy $3 trillion on aggregate by 2020 [191]. These immense 
effects and implications have urged the United States Department of Defence to categorise 
cyber-attacks as an act of war, meriting physical military force in response [190]. Such a 
categorisation depicts the severe view countries around the globe now have of cyber-threats.  
Two of the main methodologies applied in IDS include; signature-based and anomaly 
detection. Signature-detection functions by identifying intrusions through correlating real-time 
data with a known malicious behaviour database. The anomaly-based approach detects 
intrusions by comparing the current behaviour to a profiled normal behaviour [192]. 
In cloud computing for example; intrusion detection and prevention systems are used in 
different levels and technologies, where each of these technologies has its own limitations and 
issues [110]. Despite the advantages like the possibility to use resources remotely and huge 
volumes of storage, the growth in cloud computing has further exacerbated the threat posed by 
cyber-attacks, as critical infrastructures and digital service providers now have multiple access 
points to protect [193]. Hence, intrusion detection systems in a cloud environment are in need 
of significant research efforts to enhance performance and overcome the challenges and issues.  
Regardless of the existence of advanced cyber-defence systems; attacks and intrusions still 
occur. Defence systems try to block previously known attacks, stop ongoing attacks, and detect 
occurred attacks, however, often the damage caused by an attack is catastrophic [187] [194]. 
Consequently, the need for improving intrusion detection systems is more urgent these days. 
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We argue that proposing a robust prediction system will help improve detection and prevention 
capabilities of defence systems.   
The next subsections will demonstrate the research done to predict intrusions classified 
according to the method used as main concept of the work. 
3.3.1 Hidden Markov Model  
HMM is a probabilistic method that is widely used in many applications such as voice 
recognition and medical diagnostics. HMM offers a solid mathematical structure that could 
effectively shape a robust theoretical foundation for problem modelling. In HMM, it is easy to 
translate theoretical ideas to a mathematical model, which is an advantageous point over other 
modelling methods such as neural networks. This is reflected in practice through successful 
applications that use HHM [181].  
In their research, Haslum et al., [195], propose a distributed intrusion prevention system. This 
system is composed of many IPSs spread over networks, which communicate through a central 
controller. The system uses an HMM to identify intrusion and prepare for the prediction 
process. In addition, a Fuzzy Inference System, for online risk assessment, is employed. HMM 
functions by passing a set of system states and probability indicators to the fuzzy inference 
system to assess the risk simultaneously. Whereas, a Fuzzy inference system analyses the risk 
using threat level, vulnerability, and asset values.  
Continuing the investigation into prediction methodologies, specifically HMM, we identify 
that Sendi et al., [167] propose a framework for intrusion prediction, again using the HMM and 
alerts correlation to predict Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. In their research, 
HMM is used to derive the interactions between the attacker and the network. The alerts 
correlation is modified as alert severity (using three parameters namely; frequency of alert, 
acceptable number of alerts per day, and alert effect), to generate prediction alarms of the 
effective steps of the attack, and to enhance the accuracy. The results showed an accurate 
prediction of DDoSs and a capability to detect other multi-step attacks.  
Lai-Cheng  proposed a solution that can predict intrusion based on the Markov Chain [182]. 
Their research claims to function with high-efficiency in real-time by using a load-balancing 
algorithm and statistical prediction model. The heavy network traffic is divided into smaller 
segments using a balance-paralleling architecture to overcome the problem of handling heavy 
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traffic loads. When considering the prediction, a series of states of the traffic is checked if it 
occurs in the order of the Markov chain model, and the probability of this occurrence is 
computed using the following equation:  
                                          𝑃𝑖,𝑗 =  
𝑁𝑖,𝑗
𝑁𝑖 − ∑ 𝑁𝑖,𝑘−1,𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=2  
                                    (1) 
Where 𝑁𝑖,𝑘−1,𝑘 is the element number of intersection of the state space, 𝑁𝑖,𝑗 false negative 
analysis.  
Zhengdao et.al., investigated host-based intrusion prediction system, in this case using the 
hidden semi-Markov model (HsMM) [158]. Firstly, in their research, they define the intrusion 
detection using the HsMM. Secondly, a case study using a prediction model using HsMM was 
put forward. This model depends on a differentiation between the normal system calls 
sequences from the intruder.  
3.3.2 Bayesian Networks  
Bayesian networks are powerful graphical methods for modelling and reasoning under 
uncertainty and complexity of information. It comprises of a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) 
enabling smooth representation of the domain knowledge as an influence network, and 
conditional probability table (CPT) that allows us to specify the uncertainty related to the 
relationships among domains variables [196].       
In their research, Wu et al., proposed a model to predict Cyber-attacks using a Bayesian 
network [155]. Specifically, an attack graph is used for vulnerability representation, as well as 
for detecting possible attack paths. The main aim of their research is to consider environmental 
factors that influence the probability that an attack might be launched by calculating the 
vulnerabilities. The factors, which are considered in their research, include the value of the 
assets in the network, the attack history of the network and the usage condition of the network. 
Using the attack probability algorithms employed by a Bayesian network, Wu et al., claim to 
achieve accurate results, although no experiments or results are put forward in their paper.  
Continuing the investigation into Bayesian Network for IDS, Feng et.al., propose a method to 
predict the abnormal events using the plan recognition approach [173]. This approach uses 
dynamic Bayesian network theory to predict the intrusion by monitoring the system call 
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sequences. The goal of the system call sequences is to classify data into both normal and 
intrusion with a high level of accuracy. By using this classification technique, system calls are 
represented by the states of Bayesian network. The main challenge of their work is scalability; 
in a big data environment, the performance and efficiency is questionable. 
Ishida et.al., propose an algorithm which is able to forecast the increment or decrement of 
attacks levels using Bayesian inference [183]. The idea behind this research is to predict 
whether the attacks will increase or decrease based on patterns of daily or weekly activities. 
Their research claims to achieve good prediction results, however, their approach is primitive 
and is unable to predict attacks’ type or time. 
3.3.3 Genetic Algorithms 
Genetic algorithms are mathematical procedures used in artificial intelligence applications to 
learn the natural process of things. In this subsection, the focus of our investigation is on the 
use of genetic algorithms for enhancing intrusion prediction. The aim, again, is to identify 
techniques that can influence our methodology. 
Sindhu et al., proposed a framework for intrusion prediction in networks using an Artificial 
Neural Network (ANN) and genetic algorithm combination [197]. A genetic algorithm is used 
to train the ANN, where the ANN is structured according to weight optimization. The results 
showed that this technique could speed up the learning process, and perform better than 
traditional back propagation networks in prediction accuracy. However, the proposed system 
functions by checking alarm rates rather than vulnerabilities, which is still a statistical 
prediction and not actual vulnerability testing. The framework itself is an intrusion detection 
system that uses the neural network to classify network traffic as normal or abnormal 
behaviour. This approach could automatically improve the detection ability. The neural 
network is trained using the KDD99 data set (which is a widely used dataset for experimental 
intrusion detection prepared by MIT Lincoln Labs [198] ), and the features used in training 
were selected by the genetic algorithm. The genetic algorithm is used to select the most 
important features (from the KDD data set such as Duration, Protocol type, Src_byte, etc.) of 
the network traffic for detection and to adjust the neural network parameters. The results 
showed an effective outcome of detection.  
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3.3.4 Artificial Neural Networks 
Artificial Neural Networks are defined as parallel and distributed processing systems 
constructed of a huge number of simple and enormously connected processors [199]. ANNs 
enhance intrusion prediction systems’ ability to generalize data and classify it into normal or 
abnormal [110]. This means ANNs try to overcome the uncertainty of data by attempting to 
identify multiple shapes of data.   
Zhang and Sun [174] propose a novel network based model to predict intrusions using a fuzzy 
neural network and coefficient correlation. In their research, the focus is on a back propagation 
algorithm in the fuzzy neural network, to train the network on KDD99 knowledge dataset. The 
key focus of their work is on a solution to predict the intrusion by analysing the network traffic 
information and forecasting the intrusion attempts. In their research, they claim to produce 
acceptable levels of prediction to detect different attacks such as DoS, probing, U2R and R2L. 
However, the network traffic features selection (such as duration, service, flag, src_byte, 
wrong_fragment, num_access_files, etc.) should be more specific, such that, the selected 
features might not be an indicator of an intrusion, and the prediction probability could be 
accounted for more specifically. 
Continuing the case study, we focus on the work by Tang et al [200], who proposed a method 
for predicting network security situations based on based on back propagation neural with 
covariance. The aim this research is dependent on the concept of state sequences and 
identifying suitable values for quantified parameter self-learning adjustments.  The prediction 
process was done by use of an historic and current values situation of the services and host fed 
to BP neural network.  
3.3.5 Data Mining 
Data mining is another approach to identifying data and relationships among them to produce 
information for prediction approach. Data mining is defined as a method for investigating data 
from multiple perspectives and summarizing it in useful information [201]. Li et al. [160], 
proposed an approach for intrusion prediction using attack graphs generated by data mining 
techniques. The data mining association rule generates several scenarios for the attack graphs, 
depending on multi-step attack patterns that are built using previous intrusion alerts. This 
algorithm computes the probability of attack incidence in each attack graph, which indicates 
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all potential attacks. Ranking the attack scenarios according to predictability scores, correlating 
with real-time intrusion alerts can assess the future attack and predict intrusions.  
Kim and Park [170] proposed a model to predict the network based advanced persistence 
attacks (APT). This model depends on extracting intrusion detection events, analysing the 
correlation among events, and then predicts the intrusion according to the context. First 
intrusion data is gathered and treated to extract information about attack threads and sessions. 
Subsequently, correlation analysis was done by creating sequential rules of detected intrusion 
events. The correlation is achieved by use of a continuous association-rule mining algorithm 
(CARMA). At this point, the researchers suggest two equations to predict the attempted time 
of intrusion and events occurring. By analysing and correlating intrusion detection events, their 
research uncovered an association between some specific attacks. Therefore, they could predict 
the ATPs according to the existence of some attacks. The results showed the possibility of 
predicting ATPs attacks depending on the intrusion detection events. 
Cheng-Bin  [157], proposed a method for intrusion prediction based on feature extraction. The 
researcher`s method depends on a proposed algorithm that first filters the relevant data, then a 
support vector machine (SVM) is used to classify the data into normal or abnormal. The 
researcher claims the ability of this method to predict intrusion online. The proposed method 
exploits a machine learning method that is a point of power. However, this method actually 
detects already existing attacks rather than forecasting potential attacks, in addition to its 
moderate accuracy.          
Continuing the investigation, we identify that Onolaja et.al  propose a conceptual framework 
for monitoring the trust dynamically and the prediction of behaviour of network nodes [161]. 
Their framework employs the paradigm of Dynamic Data-Driven Application Systems 
(DDDAS) and a trust-based model. The framework consists of two parts, a physical system 
representing the actual network and its nodes, and a controller representing a simulation of the 
entire network. The controller contains components, which collect data relating to nodes’ 
behaviour within the network. In addition, it collects a trust value calculation and performs a 
data mining and prediction service. A trust value (TV) is attached to each node. Initially this 
value is neutral and it changed according to node behaviour. Nodes are distributed according 
to trust value to conceptualise three levels of trust: high-risk, medium-risk and low risk in the 
network. The prediction was achieved in the controller by comparing the actual behaviour of 
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the node with previous behaviour stored in the controller, which changes the trust value and 
detects the misbehaviour. 
Jayasinghe et.al [154] proposed an approach to predict drive-by download attack in web 
browser environment using a memory-friendly dynamic analysis. The approach depends on 
monitoring the bytecode stream produced by the web browser engine to render the web page. 
This is achieved by extracting features (Opcode return/getthisprop/not, setlocal/moreiter/ifne, 
forlocal/getarg/getlocal, etc) from the stream and then predicting the attack by a data-mining 
algorithm. The process of capturing and analysing the data stream depends on extracting the 
intermediate call trace by using Opcode function (a java built-in function) into n-grams 
keywords. These n-grams represent an individual feature and are fed into a data mining 
algorithm, which is a support vector machine (SVM), to predict the attacks. The prediction is 
performed by the SVM to detect new traces that do not exist in the vector space (hyper-plane). 
Results showed this approach’s efficiency and effectiveness. However, this approach is not a 
universal solution since it is limited to a java library and is affected by the code complexity, in 
addition to training time used for training the classifier.             
3.3.6 Algorithmic Methods 
In this sub–section the focus is on the use of algorithmic methodologies and various research 
areas, which employ these techniques to enhance intrusion prediction systems methodologies. 
For example, Kannadiga [163] proposed an event-based system for predicting network 
intrusion. This system depends on the idea that some attacks could lead to or be the start of a 
more severe intrusion attempt. The system they propose operates by distributing the attacks 
into categories, each representing a penetration level of the network. The proposed system 
collects information from databases about new and previous attack events, hardware, software 
events information, and other attack reports based on the external network. An intrusion 
prediction engine is employed to store information and predicts future attacks by mapping the 
attack events into relevant categories. A network penetration scenario from correlating attack 
categories is also built up. The prediction engine calculates the probability of future attacks 
that belonging to the next category of attacks 
Another approach, which uses algorithmic methodologies, is proposed by Feng et.al. [173], 
who detail an approach to predict the abnormal events using the plan recognition technique. 
This approach uses dynamic Bayesian network theory to predict the intrusion by monitoring 
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the system call sequences. System call sequences are classified into normal and intrusive, with 
a clear definition for both. According to this classification, system calls are represented by the 
states of the Bayesian network.  
Pontes et.al [171] proposed a two stages system to forecast cyber-attack in computer systems. 
First stage comprises of an Event Analysis System (EAS) that performs a multi-correlation 
process by analysing and correlating alerts and logs of operating system and intrusion detection 
and prevention system`s logs. Researchers suggested a standard principle of causes and 
consequences within PC-correlation method, such principle based on the connections between 
the factors contributing to the attack (causes) and the effects of this attack. The second stage of 
the proposed system is the forecasting stage, where researchers employed the Exponential 
Weighted Moving Average (EWMA), which is a probabilistic technique to forecast the attack 
according to the output of stage1. Researchers present a definition for causes and consequences 
via the PC-correlation method. 
Pontes and Guelfi proposed an architecture for forecasting intrusion using collaborative 
architecture [202]. Researchers did not mention any forecasting methods or techniques, but 
reference their other Portuguese written work. The basic idea of this research is to divide the 
process of analysis into four levels; every level is specialized in a specific part of the network; 
sensing, analysing, and forecasting all over the network and sharing the forecast results. 
Theoretically, collaborating among different resources is an effective principle to improve 
prediction and detection of intrusion. However, doing analysis and forecasting on multilevel is 
computationally infeasible. In addition to the ambiguity of the collaboration process, this 
solution depends on sensing multiple network variables that   produce multiple formats of data 
in different system levels, which is an inefficient approach in terms of resources management.           
Grunske and  Joyce [203] proposed a risk-based approach to forecast attacks on components 
of the system. The idea of this method is to construct attack trees for every system module, 
with module vulnerabilities. These attack trees are used to measure the probability of successful 
system security breach. Within each attack tree, researchers defined constraints and metrics. 
The predefined metrics are; attacker motivation and ranks, attack risk and cost, and the 
information to calculate these metrics is collected from the proxy. This approach used the 
concept of attack profile, where every possible attack is predefined along with system status 
and environment factors that enable the attack. Prediction is done by comparing the calculated 
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probability with the attack profile to decide whether the risk of an attack is at an acceptable 
level or considered intrusive. 
Park et al [179] proposed a mechanism (FORE) for forecasting the cyber weather. FORE 
predicts worms attacks by analysing the randomness in incoming network traffic. The random 
connections are those connections that made to non-frequent or not normally used ports. The 
basic idea behind this mechanism is that the incremental nature of worm propagation produces 
more randomness in the network traffic, which is intrusive if exceeding a certain threshold. 
Researchers showed that this mechanism is faster than the previous method [204].  
Fachkha et al [178] proposed a model for forecasting the short term future impact of the current 
distributed denial of service attack and its features. This model aimed to predict the intensity 
of the attack (number of packets) on rate (period in seconds) from what number of 
compromised machines (size of the attack). The basic idea is collecting backscattered data and 
session flows from darknet traffic [205], then applying DDoS detection parameters on collected 
data to anticipate the DDoS attacks. The anticipation result determined if the DDoS data is 
predictable and hence to apply the prediction methods.  
Abdlhamed et al [206] proposed a system for intrusion prediction in cloud computing. 
Researchers employed the concept of using multiple sources of data to produce the prediction. 
They incorporated multiple powerful techniques that form an efficient system such as game 
theory concepts, behaviour profiling, risk assessment, and statistical methods. These concepts 
were integrated in component based framework system to perform prediction. Each concept 
represented one or more component in the framework for example components of data 
acquisition, game based behaviour builder, dynamic risk builder, historian. 
3.4 Port Scan Detection 
In [207]  the researchers tried to propose the best method to detect the port scanning using a 
minimum amount of analyzed data. The research studied the use of IP header data only in the 
analysis process, and based their algorithm on using the network layer header data. As most 
port scan methods use the concept of fail connection to test if the port is open, where the 
connection has not been acknowledged by the initiator (the scanner), the research suggests 
network traffic will contain a high amount of fail connection data. The method proposed in this 
solution is a statistical method that focuses on detecting horizontal scans by observing the 
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amount of fail connection attempts. The traffic monitoring is focused on packets or packet 
segments of specific size, although the researcher concluded that the size of packet or segment 
cannot be used as an indicator to detect port scans. However, they stated that there is a linear 
relation between number of ports and size of packets in traffic that contains a scan.  
Jung et al [21]  has developed a probabilistic solution based on the sequential probability ratio 
test called Threshold Random Walk algorithm (TRW) to detect a port scan activities local 
network. The algorithm basically depends on the history of connections to a destination 
according to the hypothesis that previously connected is more likely to be benign, and hence 
novice connection is more likely to be malicious. The algorithm starts by categorizing the 
source IPs in the traffic into two groups; malicious addresses, and unknown addresses. A 
further detailed classification is performed upon the data by splitting the malicious into 
Scanner, HTTP worms, and other. To identify the malicious IPs the TRW exploits an 
observation accompanied with Horizontal port scans that is the connection to a closed or idle 
port, which is an intuitive logic. The TRW examine each source probability using the sequential 
hypothesis testing proposed by Wald [208] in conjunction with the two thresholds; upper 
threshold and lower threshold. All these calculations will be updated for repeated source IP till 
the upper threshold, in the case of scanner, is exceeded. The researchers examined the 
performance of the algorithm against SNORT and BRO, and they were confident of the 
performance and the efficiency of TRW.       
Yousra et al [209] proposed an algorithm to enhance the on-line port scan detection based on 
Bloom filters. This algorithm depends on a concept that a flow (stream from specific source) 
from an attacker will be abnormally larger than normal flows that have not exceeded the 
predefined threshold. The detection process is achieved in two steps; the counting step which 
uses bloom filter to analyse traffic, and the decision step that detects suspicious behaviour in 
the filtered data. These two steps are performed for a specific time window that, as well as the 
threshold, is set manually. Here the flow is considered a stream of data sent from the single 
source, therefore, the flow size is considered then the number of different destination ports 
contained in that flow. At the end of each time window the counter will reset itself to zero to 
prevent data overflow. The algorithm has been successfully tested against real traffic trace with 
no false positives. Because of the manually assigning time window length there is a tradeoff 
between the size of the window and the accuracy such that if the time window is set too long, 
it may give a lot of false positive outcomes because it combines small flows together. On the 
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other hand, if it was set too short, it may not detect the attack because it divides the big flow 
into smaller flows by the time window’s counter reset.  
Xu et al [210]  proposed a technique to remotely identify a local host in an internal network 
that is protected by a firewall and restricted to local access only.  The primary objective of this 
research is to find machines that have hidden behind firewalls without causing an attack to the 
target. To do this, the researcher had developed a technique using side channel in zombie 
machine to learn information about the network. Because a Firewall normally blocks outside 
IP addresses from sending packets to the internal network, the idea is to send packets from the 
internal network into the same network to avoid firewalls. Therefore, they tried to use zombie 
in the same subnet where the hidden machine is located. As a principal requirement researchers 
had to study the way to avoid ingress filtering because it will block incoming packet if it has 
source address from inside the network. Researchers proposed a novel TCP/IP SYN backlog 
side channel technique called backlog scan. The SYN backlog is a buffer to hold uncompleted 
connections (destination replied with SYN-ACK but the source did not reply with ACK) till 
they are completed with the three way handshake. By using a third machine (zombie) the 
researchers measure the size of the blockage by sending multiple SYN packets. Then by 
sending different TCP segments they call it canaries and probes with spoofed SYN packets 
they could infer how many hosts are alive. The result of the scanning show that their own direct 
scan found more hidden machines than Nmap. 
Matthew et al [211] studied various types of detection models to find the best model to detect 
the anomaly traffic that an attacker might produce. Packet Header Anomaly Detection (PHAD) 
has been proposed for identifying hostile network traffic by learning the normal ranges of value 
for each packet header field only, without the need for IP addresses and ports values. 
Researchers stated that intrusion detection systems suffered a shortcoming in their inability to 
discover the attacker intent. PHAD proposed to cover this point based on the hypothesis that 
the probability of event occurrence has a reverse relationship with the level of anomaly of the 
event. In other word, the lower the occurrence of an event the higher probability this event is 
anomalous, and vice versa. PHAD depends on calculations learned from training data to 
estimate the probabilities to detect the anomalies in online data. Because this solution depends 
on a learning phase, not only normal states of the packet header values should be learned, but 
also PHAD should have a-priori knowledge of potential attacks and a certain amount of  a-
priori knowledge of protocols. Researchers stated that this method performed better than the 
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compared method in detecting four complex attacks, although they also mention that this 
method is not a standalone intrusion detection but rather is a support technique for existing IDS 
to enhance their performance.           
In [212] the researchers aimed to detect port scan attempts and reveal important information 
about the scanner such as geographical location. Researchers stated that most IDSs focus on 
detecting port scanning only, therefore, took a step ahead and tried to identify the attempts of 
scan that would help to trace an attacker in future. Their experiment is divided into two parts: 
scan detection and information gathering. For scan detection, researchers searched the packets 
sniffing information for access patterns that match the stealth port scans in the incoming 
packets and classified them according to the threshold. The important information gathered 
from the captured packets such as the IP address of source, operating system, windows size, 
maximum fragment sizes, timestamp, etc. Other ways to gather information are finding 
probable locations from IP addresses from the public databases. The results from their 
experiment show success in the first step, which is scan detection at different time intervals. 
They can detect both brute force scanners and stealth scanners based on the types of flag of 
incoming packets. The result from another part of experiment gives the crucial information that 
can identify the operating system by using TTL parameter.  
The researchers in[213] proposed a new method for detecting slow port scanning. Their method 
depends on analysing the traffic and selecting features of IP addresses that help to classify the 
IPs’ three groups: normal IPs, suspicious IPs, and scanner IPs. Researchers monitored the 
traffic on short time windows, so the collected data amount will not affect the performance of 
the system. For classification, they depended on predefined thresholds rather than machine 
learning algorithms to evade the training time needed and choosing a representative training 
dataset. The researcher showed the correctness of their method in scanning detection 
heuristically.         
In  [214], the proposed scanning detection method depends on exploiting the concept of the 
dynamic bit sharing. The later concept is a novel storage optimization method that combine 
probabilistic sampling with bit-sharing by evenly divide the available bits among the sources 
randomly such that the memory space is optimally used. The  main objective of proposing this 
solution is to increase the speed of a scan detection that consume small memory in static RAM 
or SRAM through dynamic bit sharing, and to ensure the false positives/negatives ratios are 
bounded. Their problem statement depending on report any sources whose spread is larger or 
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smaller than threshold by using probabilistic performance that they defined. Then, they 
presented the new method called Efficient Scan Detection (ESD) to meet the objectives above. 
ESD is the combination of probabilistic sampling that stores the incoming contacts, and bit-
sharing storage that estimates the number of contacts depending on the counts of remaining 
zeros. To find scanners in this method, it states that if an estimated value of the true spread of 
source exceeded a threshold value, then ESD identify that source to as a scanner. The results 
from their experiments compared to other existing works states that ESD performs less than 1 
bit for each source, while other solutions require much more than that. Moreover, in terms of 
memory requirement, ESD does consume a small area in memory since it does not store the 
source and destination addresses in the contacts. In terms of false positives/negatives ratio, 
there is only their method that can provide low rates of both FNR and FPR. 
Gates et al [215] proposed an novel method for scan detection for very large networks that only 
provide information on unidirectional flows using logistic regression modelling. Researchers 
focused on such networks such as internet service providers (IPS) where it is difficult to 
comprehend of all their characteristics, or packet level information is hard to provide due to 
the huge amount transmitted. Therefore, the researcher found logistic regression suitable for 
such a setup because the model will return a probability of a scan that security administration 
can select limits for defining the scan rather absolute decision, and uses multiple sources of 
knowledge such as expert point of view and monitored data. The model depends on analytical 
variables calculated from the flow information that fed into an equation that produces major 
value that fed into the logistic regression, where variables are weighted according to expert 
opinion. This method has been evaluated against adjusted threshold random walk (TRW) [21], 
they stated that TRW outperformed the proposed method, however, the results were 
comparable they stated.  
Mai et al [216], studied the effect of packet sampling on the performance of port scans detection 
approaches, which data sampling uses as a network monitoring optimization technique. The 
researchers clearly address the question to achieve their objectives of the research that “Does 
packet sampling distort or lose pertinent information from the original traffic profile that 
affects the effectiveness of existing anomaly detection techniques? If so, by how much?”, since 
it is unclear that how packet sampling impacts anomaly detection. They use three well-known 
algorithms which are threshold random walk (TRW) [21], time access pattern scheme (TAPS) 
[217], and entropy-based method [218] to evaluate the impact of sampling. The evaluations 
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conducted by this study conclude that packet sampling has negative effects in both changing 
traffic and the performance of detection algorithms. Researchers observe that packet-sampling 
impacts the inference from single-packet flows and the invariance in address range distribution, 
therefore, they proposed a hybrid method based on TAPS to detect port scanning called TAPS-
SYN. The proposed method depends on the hypotheses being tested on network flows that 
consist of single SYN-packet during specific time windows. Researchers stated that TAPS-
SYN evaluation results showed the lower false positive rates than original methods and 
preserving sufficiently high success rate for detection in sampled data.  
Joanne Treurniet [219] proposed a port scan detection method depending on the use of packet 
level information to detect arbitrarily slow port scans, that is hard-to-detect scans. The method 
does not need prior knowledge or training data to operate. The method comprises of two steps; 
1) a connection identification called “session” using a finite state machine that models the TCP 
connection,  2) activity pattern that is a classification of network activities into four categories: 
productive, scanning, unproductive, and ambiguous. This method is an extended work 
proposed previously by adding UDP and ICMP in addition to the original solution for TCP 
protocol. The results showed that the system was able to classify the connections in the traffic 
successfully according to suggested patterns at a ratio of 98.6% of the whole traffic. 
Surprisingly, a minimum of 78.0% of traffic came from reconnaissance activities, and most of 
these activities, about 80.9%, were slow scans. Results also showed that this method is capable 
of detecting distributed scans but works better with single source scans. The researcher 
assumed that most of the reconnaissance activities caused by worms spread, as it normally 
sends huge number of probes to random IPs and ports at random periods.    
In the work which appeared in [23] a probabilistic solution has been proposed to detect network 
scans in real time. In this research the detection depends not only on TCP sockets, but also 
whether the sources of connections are frequently connected to the network or not. The method 
starts with classifying the access patterns of remote sources to the targeted destinations; this 
process is called access indexing. Then, the sources rating process is initiated based on two 
assumptions, the first assumption is: it is unusual for a source to connect to a destination that 
has rarely been accessed. By monitoring access patterns, a prior probability for a given 
destination to be accessed randomly by a source, can be estimated. The second assumption: 
how suspicious a source is, is defined by the number of destinations and ports that are 
communicated by it. A consequence of this research suggests that a source that contacts few 
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destinations is more likely to be normal, and the source that contacts a large number of 
destinations is more likely to be an attacker. The researchers have demonstrated the 
effectiveness of the solution based on qualitative analysis, also they state that the approach 
obtained feasible false positive rates and throughput.             
Sridharan et al [217] suggested a new method for scan detection called Time-based Access 
Pattern Sequential hypothesis testing (TAPS). This algorithm combines Sequential Hypothesis 
Testing technique with access patterns to detect sources that showed malicious access to 
destination. The algorithm studies the access behaviour for an IP address through a time slice 
and focuses on the proportion of unique destinations and ports accessed. Then it performs the 
sequential hypothesis test on the collected access patterns during different periods to detect the 
port scanning. Researchers stated that TAPS achieved maximum detection rates and minimum 
false positive rates compared to SNORT [129] and TRW [21].         
In [220] the researchers use the concept of anomaly detection in port scan detection. Their main 
principle of detection is to use the statistical techniques to calculate the changing point of 
normal traffic into an anomalous. For volumetric scans such as SYN flood researchers used 
some statistical tests such as the Newton method and z-test for traffic analysis, while for slow 
port scans, they used two dynamic chi-square tests. The results have been demonstrated as 
numerical results without commenting on the method performance.       
3.5 Vulnerability Assessment  
Cyber-attacks are mostly based on exploiting the weaknesses in computing systems and as 
those attacks become more sophisticated continuously, the need for assessing these weaknesses 
becomes more urgent. The Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) defined the 
vulnerability assessment as “Systematic examination of an information system or product to 
determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security deficiencies, provide data from 
which to predict the effectiveness of proposed security measures, and confirm the adequacy of 
such measures after implementation” [221]. 
A number of frameworks have been proposed in the literature to tackle the emerging field of 
Vulnerability assessment, and new methods will be proposed in order to improve the 
understanding for the security situation and hence improve the system security. Most of the 
methods applied in vulnerability assessment are inspired by the related field of risk analysis 
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such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Failure Mode & Effects Analysis (FMEA) [222]. In 
this section, we investigate the work accomplished for assessing vulnerability in computer 
systems as follows:  
3.5.1 Holistic Frameworks  
In this type of solution, there is a comprehensive framework for assessing the security of the 
system including the vulnerability. Such solutions are normally proposed and developed by an 
expert team belonging to governmental agencies. For example, System Security Engineering 
(SSE) that is a specialised engineering branch of systems engineering applies the methods, 
concepts and measurements of mathematics and engineering in producing an integrated 
evaluation of system vulnerabilities [223]. This framework is employed by major government 
agencies to protect the systems, mission-critical jobs, and improve the cyber technologies. SSE 
has the ability to identify sophisticated cyber threats, a variety of critical security risks, and 
presents a significant taxonomy of threats.         
3.5.2 Information System-focused Frameworks  
These frameworks are proposed to be more focused on the information systems and the core 
critical functions and processes, which differ from the previous frameworks that focus more on 
the system as a whole and on system interaction with the environment. For example, 
Vulnerability Assessment & Mitigation (VAM) provides an understanding of the interactions 
among the system functions and objectives, simplifies the identification of vulnerabilities, and 
suggests appropriate mitigation practices. VAM classifies the system weaknesses based on four 
system objects categories; cyber, physical, human/social, and infrastructure.  
3.5.3 Cybersecurity-focused Frameworks 
The Internet is becoming more integrated into the daily life of humans on governmental, 
organizational, and personal domains, therefore, the exposure of information systems used in 
these domains to the cyber world has increased continuously. Consequently, the more exposure 
to the cyber world the wider threat space for the system. Therefore, a vulnerability assessment 
methodology that is dedicated to measuring how vulnerable a system is to the cyber work, is a 
security requirement these days. The MITRE Corporation has proposed an approach to assess 
vulnerabilities in the cyber-security of information systems [32] that is called the mission 
assurance engineering (MAE) approach to address the cyber challenges. Cyber MAE is a risk-
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based system that concentrates on risks to system missions that originate from cyber resources, 
and threat-informed that collaborates and integrates threat information from different sources.   
3.5.4 Service-oriented Architecture-focused Frameworks 
In service-oriented architecture (SOA), the business processes are designed to provide a 
flexibility in composition and interoperability among remote and local services. Consequently, 
vulnerability discovery and assessment become more difficult and urgent. ATLIST [224] was 
proposed as an answer to the urgency of a vulnerability assessment methodology that is 
specialized to work in service-oriented architecture.  ATLIST was designed to exploit the SOA 
standards and essential concepts such as reusability and flexibility. As such, this method 
enables the detection of known vulnerabilities and facilitates the construction of vulnerability 
patterns for application support.  
3.6 Discussions 
As stated earlier, modern system environments needs to be equipped in advance for attacks and 
intrusions, which have increased and become more sophisticated in techniques. Intrusion 
prediction systems should be the solid base that any proactive defence plan can rely on. This is 
because of the promising performance that prediction systems achieved on both directions; the 
number of attacks that have been predicted successfully and the false alarm rate that has been 
decreased [196], [197], [167].    
Variety of methods are used to implement the prediction process, as seen in the literature, and 
this because of many factors such as which attributes and variables of the system used to make 
the prediction. Another factor is the degree of certainty, where a high degree of certainty means 
that there is a lot of information available and a low degree of certainty means there is a lack 
of information. In the case of a low degree of certainty, we notice that prediction systems 
depend on Hidden Markov Models, while with a high degree of certainty they tend to use 
Bayesian Networks. Furthermore, the type of prediction is an important factor in whether to 
use one particular method rather than others. For example, solutions dedicated to predict attacks 
normally use HHMs, while those devoted to forecasting intentions or abnormal events mostly 
exploit the Bayesian networks. Other factors might be the simplicity of the theoretical system, 
and HHMs’ ease in translating the well-planned system into a mathematical model.     
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Performance is one important factor, where any defence system (including prediction) should 
not decrease the performance of the protected system and the usage of its resources. There is 
an efficiency trade-off dilemma; in other words, the main goal of prediction system is be as 
efficient as possible, whilst preserving the high level of performance. To achieve an efficient 
solution, a complex prediction method should be used along with analysing historical data and 
extensive calculations to produce optimal predictions, which decreases the system 
performance. Vice versa, to achieve high performance, the prediction solution tend to use 
inaccurate methods that affect the prediction efficiency. Therefore, preserve the availability 
and performance of the protected system is a condition when choosing the optimal prediction 
method that suite the target system.  
To enhance the predictability of prediction systems, these systems should be able to recognize 
attacks in their multiple shapes and variations. At the same time, these systems should have the 
ability to classify the data into normal and abnormal (intrusive). This takes the research interest 
into a different area of computer and mathematical techniques and methods such as data mining 
and soft computing techniques.  
Prediction philosophy is based on work in the situation of uncertainty of intrusion. This means 
there is a lack of information that prediction systems can use and rely on. The basic idea behind 
the prediction concept is the attempt to provide information on events that have not happened 
yet, depending on historical information and gained knowledge of the same or events which 
have happened in the past.  
Artificial Neural Networks are used because of the various benefits for the prediction process. 
ANNs have the ability to generalize data and identify multiple shapes of data, their ability to 
produce more than one single output; which gives the prediction system a wider space of 
choices, and finally the ability of ANNs to train and improve its performance over time. Data 
mining contributes to the prediction systems by its ability to summarize data and find relations 
among data to produce new information that bridges the gap of information deficiency.       
There are many contributions in the field of intrusion prediction and detection systems, whether 
it is on the methodology or technique levels. However, the literature showed very few solid 
solutions for a holistic intrusion detection system and hence prediction system. This is because 
of the limitations and shortcomings of each model; neural networks suffer from the time 
required for training, data mining and the issue of computational complexity, and so forth. We 
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discussed intrusion detection systems because the vast majority of proposed prediction systems 
are actually dependent on IDSs. This is why any improvements achieved on IDSs are reflected 
consequently on the prediction system.   
Detection systems also pose problems such as false alarm, which researchers are working on 
to decrease to the minimum. Anomaly Intrusion detection systems adopt the threshold 
technique as the unique mechanism when it comes to making decisions, which means that these 
systems are static, since they rely on a fixed threshold. The process of defining a threshold is 
ambiguous and most researchers depend on experts to define and measure the threshold. On 
the other hand, signature based detection systems are not capable of detecting new or unknown 
attacks, since attacks should be discovered and known, then a signature of the attack details 
should then be made to prevent future attacks of that signature. In addition, all scan detection 
systems and methods work on the principle of twofold solution, one part to identify, index and 
classify the traffic packets, and the other is to quantify the likelihood or give a judgement of 
what was identified in the first part. 
As a result of these discussions, we reach to a comprehension that most suitable the research 
approach of this project is to use a statistical method for intrusion prediction along with 
predictive analysis. In this approach, efficient predictions will be made while preserving the 
performance as an outcome of using lightweight statistical method. This will discussed in 
detailed in the design chapter of this thesis. 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter presented the related work proposed to predict the intrusions that targets the 
computing systems. It started with an introduction that showed the importance of intrusion 
predictions and justified their usage along with detection systems to secure the computer 
systems. Then, the literature of intrusion prediction solutions that proposed for securing 
computer systems has been demonstrated and discussed thoroughly. This part of the chapter 
also presented a brief classification of the methodologies that has been used in intrusion 
prediction solutions.     
This chapter also presented a detailed demonstration about port scan detection methods that 
are used primarily for identifying a remote scanner. The last part of this chapter has discussed 
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the vulnerability assessments methods and frameworks that were proposed for identifying the 
weaknesses of computer systems.    
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Chapter 4 
Intrusion Prediction Framework for 
Cloud Computing (IPFCC) 
4.1 Introduction  
Cloud computing poses many challenges to existing security techniques and solutions, which 
were adopted from the traditional computing solutions. Currently, there is a need for prediction 
systems to work with massive data volumes and high-speed networks.  
Previous chapters clarified that there is a need for new and capable prediction solutions to cope 
with challenging structure, uncertainty, and complexity of cyber-based systems. The literature 
review has shown the difficulty of working of an entirely suitable solution for such a 
challenging environment, and it reviewed the shortcomings of many existing popular 
techniques used in similar environments. Such problems like the dynamic nature of cloud 
computing of adding, removing, changing virtual machines that differs from the classical 
defence systems that normally designed to protect static systems with specific configuration. 
The structural concepts of cloud computing such as virtualization and multitenancy contributed 
into the failure of classical defence systems to cope with the cloud environment. Therefore, a 
novel approach is required to predict potential intrusions and attacks in advance by proposing 
a new feasible approach to sense the pre-intrusion situation, and analyse system exposure to 
external attacks.  
This chapter proposes a novel framework for intrusion prediction. The framework proposed 
aims at overcoming the limitations of existing solutions for intrusion prediction in cyber-related 
systems and provide an efficient and effective prediction system.  
4.2 IPFCC Framework 
In order to bridge the gap of lack of intrusion prediction systems, a novel solution has been 
devised in [206]. The framework is a statistical-probabilistic solution that has been specifically 
developed to monitor system vulnerability and the effect of the network situation on the 
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security of the systems. It focuses primarily on protection against intrusions and attacks that 
uses the networks as a medium.  
The framework proposed in [206] is broader than IPFCC, which incorporates behavioural 
monitoring and game theory concepts along with historical information analysis to produce the 
prediction. IPFCC focuses more on producing prediction and minimizing the dependency on 
historical information to an amount that does not slow the performance of the framework nor 
delay the decision making of the tested state of the system. 
 The idea of incorporating a scan detection functionality into IPFCC derived from the role of 
scanning activities in network based attacks, where scanning represents the initial step of the 
reconnaissance and information gathering. Scanning techniques in essence are not intended to 
be attacks as they were originally used by network and security engineers, to map and maintain 
the network, and included hosts and services. However, the capabilities they offer attract the 
attacker to use them as scout tools that identify targeted hosts and map networks for launching 
attacks. Therefore, not all scanning activities found in the network traffic are hostile, but a 
possibility that scanning activities are intrusive also exists. Moreover, some research indicates 
that a port scan followed by a vulnerability scan is a good indicator for preparation of an attack 
to be launched [25], which means detecting scan activities can be used effectively in a 
prediction system. The use of scan detection for predictive purposes stems from the time gap 
separating each stage of multistep attacks (which is the nature of network-based attacks).                
IPFCC is an autonomous framework that is bases and operates on the host system, but also 
utilize a collaborative feature by using information about vulnerabilities from trusted sources 
in the outside world. The automaticity of IPFCC is an important aspect to sustain system 
independence and security by not disclosing system vulnerabilities. This will eliminate the fear 
of the extent of trust of a third party control or knowledge of shared information.     
IPFCC uses a statistical approach to calculate the score of the vulnerabilities of the host system, 
utilising data of different levels of host system and outsourced data. The framework is located 
on the top of the host operating system, yet IPFCC is weaponised with the ability to obtain data 
from different OS levels, as showed in figure 4.1.      
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Figure 4.1 IPFCC Location in the Computational Environment. 
The IPFCC framework operates by evaluating the situation of the system exposure, and 
monitoring live traffic to observe the changes and deviations in the incoming network streams. 
It monitors various OS-level and network-level metrics and makes the prediction of potential 
intrusions accordingly. These metrics and the mechanisms of both IPFCC`s parts will be 
discussed in details consecutively.  
4.3 IPFCC Framework Design Overview 
This section presents an overview of the architecture and information flow among the 
framework components. Here, this section only demonstrates the interaction between 
components, the components design and contents will be discussed in detail later on in this 
chapter.  The figure 4.2 demonstrates the components of IPFCC:  
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Figure 4.2 IPFCC Framework Architecture 
Initially, the information about all vulnerabilities are collected from the system by scanning 
and from the public databases on the web, then reside in the Knowledge Module databases. 
Then, this information proceeded to the vulnerabilities analyser that evaluates the information 
of the weaknesses in the system such as severity and exploitability. The analyser interact in 
regards to the output in two ways; the first one is with the Prediction module to calculate the 
risk and make predictions, and the second one is with the knowledge module to save 
vulnerabilities information for passive prediction mode and for achieving. Scan detection 
module is responsible of sensing the network for scanning activities that is forwarded directly 
to the Prediction Module to act accordingly. The second interaction of the Scan Detection 
Module is with the Knowledge Module to store the scanning activities that launched against 
the system. The Prediction Module interacts primarily with scan detection and vulnerabilities 
analysis modules to produce predictions, then output the prediction results as reports and 
alarms. The other interaction of the Prediction Module is with Knowledge Module for storing 
prediction results and risk quantifications for archiving. The scan detection engine interact with 
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the network by monitoring the traffic, and interact with Prediction Module by forwarding the 
monitoring outcomes. The intrusion prediction process preformed in the following flow:  
start 
Vulnerabilities 
evaluation  
Risk 
quantification
Scan detected ?
Traffic 
monitoring 
Predict an 
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Figure 4.3 Intrusion Prediction Process. 
4.4 Scan Detection Engine 
This is a dynamic and active part of our solution, which senses the anomaly in the network 
traffic, and informs the prediction of the results of the network situation. As network traffic 
contains different types of anomaly, we focus on anomalies that could be used in a predictive 
manner. Therefore, this module is suggested to be a selective scan detection that monitors the 
surveillance traffic. The latter type of traffic normally precedes any attack that is launched via 
the network; therefore, our detection method focused on sensing the scanning traffic. By 
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relating to traffic, this engine is working directly on the network to calculate and analyse the 
traffic statistically, then send the results of this analysis to the prediction module for decision-
making.      
The scan detection engine is based on a selective anomaly detection algorithm that uses a 
counting method to calculate the number of certain packets that relate to scan activities (as 
discussed in details in 4.4.1). The counting mechanism is applied on the whole traffic (for time 
window) based on the source of these packets, so the output will result in the number of specific 
packets sent by each source. After counting the number of packets sent by each source, we then 
test these numbers to isolate the odd number of packets that is potentially sent by a malicious 
source. To this point, we will have two sets of sources; normal set and odd set. We calculate 
the threshold of the normal set and compare the odd set to the threshold then decide if the odd 
is a scanner or not.  
In order to achieve the first part of the algorithm, we count the number of surveillance packets 
sent from each source (remote hosts). Because the classic counting method does not fit for 
cloud and modern network traffic that transmit huge amounts of data, we use the data streaming 
methods for accounting. In data streaming methods, approximations methods are used rather 
than counting exactly due to performance and memory implications, as approximation methods 
consume considerably less memory than counting methods. Sketches is a recent technique for 
unique values estimation for streaming data. Sketches summarises the observed data in order 
to estimate the frequency or the distinct values in the data set [225]. Therefore, concerning scan 
detection, the algorithm will count the unique ports accessed (scanned) on a host or the IPs 
contacted on a specific domain.      
After counting the streams flowing into the system, we differentiate between normal and 
abnormal streams by the amount each stream carries. This implies choosing a mechanism that 
differentiates the abnormal observations and at the same time preserves the statistical fashion, 
the way we tackle the whole detection process. We chose to perform the outliers` test (Grubbs` 
test  [226]) that will isolate the streams with abnormally volumetric streams. The output of this 
process is two sets; the normal set that contains the streams that lie in normal use frequencies, 
and the other set that contains streams that lie an abnormal distance from the normal set. We 
then calculate the standard deviation of the normal set and then calculate the detection threshold 
from the standard deviation.      
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Here, we would like to refer to the methods of choosing the threshold, as the literature showed 
that the majority of thresholding is fixed and defined before starting the detection work, which 
in our opinion, is the reason behind the false positives. On the other hand, setting a threshold 
for network traffic behaviour is not an easy task as in modern networks, defining normal use 
behaviours is challenging task, as the modern networks are versatile and interconnected with 
other broad networks. For example, a predefined malicious pattern of access (hence network 
traffic) could be a benign access in special events or specific access time such as in peak time. 
We adaptively select the detection threshold by examining the normal set that is produced after 
eliminating the outliers, and compute the standard deviation for that specific subset. Then we 
compute the distance to a central point that represents the centre of the normal set, which will 
be a reference point. The decision of detection is made if the distance between an outlier and 
the central point exceeds the threshold.            
4.4.1. Selective Dynamic Scan Detection (SASD) 
Launching attacks for any reasons is a staged process comprising of a sequence of different 
steps. The number and type of these steps depend on the type of attack and the intended purpose 
that motivates launching it. However, surveillance activities are involved in all attacks as a 
crucial initial step of identifying victims, victims’ open ports and vulnerabilities. Based on 
surveillance outcomes, the attacker can establish an appropriate strategy for attacking the 
potential target. Therefore, detecting surveillance activities is a crucial step in predicting a 
forthcoming attack. As surveillance is essentially comprised of scanning activities, this chapter 
is dedicated to explain our solution for scan detection.  
In this section, we give an overview of our detection solution that is meant to work on the 
system-network interface or network nodes to sense and detect the scanning activities. We 
detect the scanning activities by counting the increment in specific traffic attributes, then check 
if this increment is anomalous or not by using the resulting counts. The figure 4.4 shows our 
proposed solution:   
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Figure 4.4 Overview of Scan Detection Solution. 
The counting module reads the traffic from the network and focuses on counting specific 
attributes in the network stream that reveals the scanning activities. Then the results of counting 
are produced to identify anomalies to check if there is any values that spikes among the set 
values, which are called outliers. Then, the distance between the outliers and the rest of the 
values is calculated. A scan will be detected if the distance exceeded a threshold. Figure 4.5 
shows the algorithm steps as follows:   
Figure 4.5 the Proposed Method for Scan Detection. 
The algorithm works in the fashion of analysing the network traffic based on a single time 
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achieved for every given subset of traffic. By working in this style, our solution eliminates the 
dependence on historical data that might be problematic in some cases, and is adaptive to the 
network situation. In addition, our solution does not need training data or training phase, as it 
works directly on the network traffic and produces results simultaneously. On the other hand, 
the length of the time window may affect the accuracy of our solution; therefore, the length of 
the time window should be tuned to cover scanning activities periods. In each single window, 
we do the following:  
 4.4.2 Traffic Analysis and Scanning Models   
Analysing all the data streaming ingress and egress of the targeted network is a highly 
complicated and expensive process, especially nowadays with the huge amount of data 
transmitted every day with the outside world. Investigating this data in favour of security might 
be conducted in reliance on different types of indicators such as data content, network 
information, domain and URL, etc., that relies on different levels of viability and reliability 
[227]. Network information that resides in IP packets headers provides valuable statistical 
information that could be used to gauge the network current situation, and predict the malicious 
intentions and future actions. Monitoring all variants and abundant information contained in 
the IP header might distort the monitoring outcomes and confuse the security administration. 
Therefore, we will observe some attributes in the traffic packets that are related to scanning 
activities. We are focusing on analysing the access attempts that are similar to the surveillance 
activity that aims at network and host mapping, which are actually scan attacks.  
We consider network scanning as many access attempts from a source 𝑠𝑖 to host ℎ𝑖  on the 
same network n as 〈𝑠𝑖  , 𝑛, ℎ
∗〉. Usually the attacker sends packets of the same type to all hosts 
in the network and waits for responses to check which host is alive. The host scan is an access 
attempt from 𝑠𝑖 to multiple ports 𝑝𝑖 on the same host ℎ𝑖 such as〈𝑠𝑖 , ℎ𝑖, 𝑝
∗〉. Usually this is the 
next step after the network scan and then the attacker sends an access attempt to all/many ports 
on the same host. These two steps comprise the surveillance activity that the attacker takes to 
gain information about the targeted network and machine.  
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Figure 4.6 A - Network Scan      B - Host Scan 
Figure 4.6 displays the basic idea of the two types of scan. The source IP, source port, 
destination IP, and destination port are basic information used to check scan activity, although, 
we need more information to make a decision of current and future situation. In port scan, the 
attacker sends many TCP/IP SYN packets to many ports in a single host and waits for a reply 
(TCP/IP ACK), and any port that responds with (SYN-ACK) is means this port is open. 
Therefore, the traffic that containing a scan activity will in most cases contain a high volume 
of SYN and SYN-ACK packets. In network scan (also IP scan), the attacker exploits the 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), which is a mechanism for network problem 
reporting, to check which host is connected to the network and accessible. The attacker sends 
ICMP echo request to a network or range of IPs, as a response all alive IPs will send back 
ICMP echo reply. Therefore, traffic that contains a network scanning will have a high volume 
of ICMP packets.      
4.4.3 Feature- based Traffic Counting  
Our method is based on observing the network traffic variables that indicate a surveillance 
activity is undertaken. To achieve this goal we focus on counting the changes in specific traffic 
variables. These changes will be recognized by a means of calculating the increment of the 
number of destination ports or IPs that originated from specific sources more than other 
sources. Our practical investigation showed that normal traffic might contain large numbers of 
connections that come from the same source to the same destination with multiple ports. In a 
typical port scanning calculation, this normal activity will be considered a scan attack. 
Therefore, we adopt a technique of considering only unique ports that have been contacted at 
the time window on a specific destination. When it comes to online detection of scan attacks 
 78 
 
nowadays, a huge amount of data is being transmitted across the internet amongst plenty of 
addresses back and forth. This causes the counting process to imply a considerable amount of 
memory that is not available to be allocated for the detection function, especially when this 
function is intended to be in the network nodes or routers.     
Unique Values Estimation: As a solution for the counting problem, we decided to apply 
Cardinality estimation methods that can produce near optimum estimation with a trivial amount 
of memory required. Cardinality Estimation is the process of approximating the number of 
unique elements in multisets huge data streams [228]. In the case of scan detection, we 
approximate the number of distinct source IPs that contact unique destination ports or IPs. The 
more destination ports/IPs are contacted by the same the source counted in the traffic, the more 
likely this source is a scanner or attacker. In our counting section, we adopt the HyperLogLog 
algorithm [228], which currently stands as the state-of-the-art method for cardinality 
estimation, the rest of this section will display this algorithm.     
Counting distinct elements in large datasets is an important process in many fields for different 
purposes such as counting the distinct customers using a service of a company is economically 
beneficial for the company [229].  In database systems, this concept is used for performance 
optimization, when these systems perform complex operations such as joins of tables. For 
example, the complexity of table joining stems from the number of distinct rows in involved 
tables, that is: more distinct rows means a more complex join operation. Security is another 
major field that uses the counting process in many aspects such as web activities logging, 
network anomaly detection, etc. For example, counting the distinct requests that have been 
made to a server within a time slice is a way of identifying volume attacks such as Denial of 
service attack (Dos) [230].  
The reason behind using counting distinct elements for detecting scanning activities is that the 
normal number of ports used in normal web and network activities is a limited set of ports; 
these ports are used continuously hence appears repeatedly in the traffic as shown in figure 4.7. 
Therefore, the appearance of many new (unique) ports in the traffic form outside the normal 
ports set is abnormal and needs to be drawn to the attention of the security monitoring team; 
the following figure displayed this concept.                  
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Figure 4.7 Usual and unusual ports. 
Despite the aforementioned advantages of cardinality counting, this process becomes infeasible 
for counting the exact number of the distinct elements due to the increase in the memory 
required. The insufficiency in memory might occur in the case of a huge number of distinct 
elements to be counted, or in the case of limited memory available for counting when intended 
to be placed in network apparatus such as routers. To clarify how “huge” is the number of 
distinct elements that might cumulatively exceed the available memory, consider the brute 
force approach of counting. For dataset D that has d distinct elements, each new distinct 
element should be saved in memory directly on arrival (appearance in the traffic), if each 
element needs log
2 
(element) bits to save the element in the memory. Counting for big datasets 
that d contain billions, will soon reach a need of  log2(element) Gigabytes memory [230].   
 To overcome the problems of counting; many statisticians proposed different methods and 
algorithms to estimate rather than counting the exact number of distinct elements, where this 
estimation is memory friendly and near to optimal with acceptable error ratio such as in  
[231][232][233] [228][234] [235] and many others. Because of its memory efficiency and very 
low error ratio we will adopt the algorithm proposed by [228] in our solution for estimating the 
counts of traffic variables that are used for scan detection.   
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HyperLogLog (HLL) algorithm is proposed as near-optimal cardinality estimation algorithm, 
as shown in figure 4.8.  
 Figure 4.8. The Hyperloglog Algorithm. 
The accuracy of this algorithm is claimed to reach optimal estimation with the error ratio of 
2%, where the error is caused by the randomness used by HLL (as in all efficient cardinality 
estimators). This algorithm input is a stream of a multiset T of data items. The output is the 
cardinality estimation of T elements. Choosing an appropriate hash function h, every element 
in the T has been hashed. After hashing and saving the resulting values in memory (in binary), 
the algorithm checks a specific bit-pattern that arrives in a stochastic averaging fashion. For a 
string n ∈ {0,1}∞, let 𝜌(𝑛) indicate the location of the leftmost 1 ( the number the initial string 
of zeros in addition to1). The data stream T is divided into substreams T1… Tt, according to 
the beginning bits b of the binary-hashed values of substreams elements, that is t = 2b and all 
substreams are handled individually.  
For any given substream N ≡ Tk, we observe:  
                    𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑁): =  max
𝑛∈𝑁
𝜌(𝑛),                                                                    (2) 
The Hyperloglog algorithm  
Input: T multiset of items from domain O. 
Suppose t = 2b where b ∈ W> 0; 
Initialize a set of t registers, T[1], …, T[t] 
    For a ∈ T do  
 Set d := h(a); 
 Set k := 1+ 〈𝑎1𝑎2 … 𝑎𝑏〉 ; {the binary address of the first b bits of a} 
 Set n :=𝑎𝑏+1 𝑎𝑏+2 … ; 
 Set T[k]:= max (T[k], 𝜌(n)); 
Compute  
Q = (∑ 2−𝑇[𝑘]
𝑡
𝑘=1
)
−1
 
Return R ∶=  𝛼𝑡𝑡
2𝑄 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝛼𝑡 as given by equation (4)  
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The algorithm scans (and store in registers T[k]) the values of Tk of the Max(Tk) for k= 1…t. 
then the algorithm computes the harmonic mean as following in equation 3 :  
                                                      
Q = (∑ 2−𝑇[𝑘]
𝑡
𝑘=1
)
−1
                                                                                        (3) 
Finally, return a normalization of (2) as following:  
                     𝑅 ≔  
𝛼𝑡𝑡
2
∑ 2−𝑇
(𝑘)𝑡
𝑘=1
                                                                                       (4) 
Where  
𝛼𝑡 ≔  (𝑡 ∫ (log2 (
2+𝑢
1+𝑢
))
𝑡∞
0
 𝑑𝑢)
−1
. 
The algorithm is based on the following understanding. Assign t as the unknown number of 
distinct values in the multiset stream T. each subset of this stream (e.g. packets to specific 
destination from the whole traffic) will contain an approximation of t/m elements. The 
maximum memory needed to be allocated to the process of approximation is close to log
2
(t/m). 
The harmonic mean (here is tQ) of the subsets is likely to have a value close to t/m. therefore, 
t2Q will approximately equal t. normalization to the multiplicative bias produced by t2Q is then 
applied using the constant 𝛼𝑡.  
To simplify and summarise the mechanism of the algorithm; each element in the stream will 
be encoded into a binary string using a specific hash function to form an ideal multiset, where 
the elements are equally distributed over the domain. These binary strings are then grouped 
into approximately equal size buckets (memory registers), the grouping process is 
accomplished according to an index representing the first b bits of the hash value. At this stage, 
each bucket contains a subset from the stream and has similar or identical elements (hashed 
values), and all buckets contain approximately equal number of elements. The algorithm now 
calculates the harmonic mean of all buckets, and returns a normalization of the harmonic mean. 
The normalization step is achieved to remove the systematic bias produced by multiplicative 
operations.        
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Selective Feature Estimation: As the targeted networks are dealing with increasing data 
volumes, security solutions that analyse network traffic will reach the point of non-feasibility 
due to many features to be tested that need increasing memory and processing powers. On the 
other hand, when we are focusing on scan detection statistically, many packet-level traffic 
features will be irrelevant to the process; that gives us more freedom in choosing the most 
relevant and effective information to the detection. Therefore, for detecting port scanning we 
choose to select one aspect that is the number of new session packets (or first in session) sent 
from a source to a destination over a time window, hence we monitor the sequence field in the 
TCP packet header. The use of the later technique is inspired by work proposed by [207] with 
difference in the featured used, as we depend on the sequence of the packet rather than the size 
of packet in the mentioned work.  For IP scanning we select to focus on the type field of the 
ICPM packet header that is associated with IP scanning. Analysing only the fine-grained 
information rather than analysing the whole packet header information will significantly 
decrease the amount of information to be analysed and hence decrease the needed resources as 
shown in figure 4.9.  
  
Figure 4.9 Packet-header Selective Feature Monitoring  [236] 
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4.4.4 Anomaly Identification  
In this step, the calculations performed in the Feature- based traffic counting will be used to 
identify the odd elements in the stream. Many methods and models have proposed to tackle the 
problem of anomaly detection using different parameters and aspects of the network traffic. 
Our focus is to sense the network for any attack or attempt to attack signs. Surveillance and 
information gathering is the initial step that precedes an actual attack, IP/Port scanning is the 
main activity for surveillance. To identify anomalies, we will focus on the scanning activities 
and the type of changes that this scanning made to network traffic. We based our assumption 
about the anomalous traffic contents on the basis of IP and Port scanning, that is sending a 
request to multiple ports on a specific host or multiple hosts on a specific network and in both 
types there will be an increment in the number of requests to a specific host or network. In the 
case of port scanning, we will focus on the abnormal requests to a specific host that exceeds 
the average (normal) traffic to other hosts in the same traffic. 
Defining the abnormality in a network is a challenging task as networks nowadays are so 
versatile and no such traffic can be considered “standard”, so it can be the benchmark to check 
the abnormality of tested traffic. Therefore, many and different methods and algorithms such 
as statistical [237][238], classification-based [239][240], soft computing [241][242], 
knowledge based [243][244] and many others are proposed to identify the abnormality in traffic 
according to the perception of anomaly, and what and when a traffic could be considered as 
anomalous. In our work, we focus on statistical methods as it computationally feasible, no prior 
knowledge is needed nor training time; that enables the solution to perform sensing and 
detection scanning activities online in different spots even those that have moderate 
computational capabilities such as network routers.  
To identify the scanning activities, we will use the outlier detection to isolate the element that 
receives a spike in requests over the other elements in the domain. For this reason, we use 
Grubbs Test to identify the IP or network that receives an abnormal number of requests. Grubbs 
Test [226] is used to detect a single outlier in a univariate data set that follows a near normal 
distribution. Here we are using the same group to define normal and abnormal numbers of 
requests as depicted in figure 4.10, as the outlier of this group will be considered the abnormal. 
Using the same data instantly is hugely beneficial as there is no need for test dataset and 
training, and this method is adoptive to the situation of the network, rather than depending on 
previously set settings of what normal and what is abnormal.    
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Figure 4.10 Identify the Source IP Connecting to Abnormal Number of Destination Ports. 
We adopted a modified implementation of the Grubbs Test that tests single value at a time. In 
our implementation, multiple outliers can be detected according to the significance level.     
Grubbs test in essence is a statistical method for detecting a single outlier in a univariate dataset 
that closely follows Normal Distribution. For a sample of b observations, the outlier will be 
calculated as follows:  
   Gr = 
max|𝑛𝑖−?̅?|
𝑠
                                                                                                                        (5) 
Where 𝑛𝑖 is the value under test, ?̅? is the mean for the whole set, while s is the standard 
deviation as follows:  
 s = {
∑(𝑛𝑖−?̅?)
2
𝑏−1
}
1/2
 = {
𝑏 ∑ 𝑛𝑖
2−(∑ 𝑛𝑖)
2
𝑏(𝑏−1)
}
1/2
                                                 (6) 
Equation 6 is an estimation of standard deviation for the sample set with b-1 degrees of 
freedom.  
Dynamic Threshold Quantifying:  the purpose of threshold is to separate between the normal 
and abnormal for a given point of data. Defining the threshold is a sensitive and important 
process as it is the base to judge if tested data is normal or anomalous. This means security 
administrators will make different arrangements based on the judgment of the threshold, these 
arrangements might be escalated to halt the system operation in severe cases. Therefore, 
choosing a suitable threshold is a challenging issue to satisfy the trade-off of not affecting the 
 85 
 
performance of the system by choosing a strict threshold, or jeopardizing system security by 
choosing a permissive verge.   Therefore, many methods in the literature have been proposed 
according to the view of researchers with regards to system security and system situation. For 
example, in [245] researchers consider the highest point from the mean of normal data as a 
threshold. In [246] they depend on the Mahalanobis distance of the training set to define the 
threshold as well. While in [247] the threshold is set at − 3𝛿 to + 3𝛿 ( where 𝛿 is the standard 
deviation), and researchers claimed that 99% of the normal sample is lying beneath.   
Based on the last claim in [247], they adopted the threshold for scan detection to be greater 
than 3𝛿, which appeared to be suitable for our system after many tunings made to choose the 
most suitable threshold. Although defining a fixed threshold may be a bit risky as many attacks 
might be successfully accomplished under this threshold, in our system analysing the test data 
itself makes our threshold semi-dynamic as it changes according to tested data rather than a 
fixed threshold built according to training data and fixed for all data sets. In addition,  this 
specific type of scan attack is approximately subjected to normal distribution, that is amongst 
the whole traffic of the network, the anomalous traffic will exceed the 3𝛿.  
Dynamic Decision-making: Our algorithm can be used to operate and make decisions of 
scanning detection in an online fashion. This could be achieved as a consequence of using a 
statistical method, which is light in calculations and can be performed to produce results in 
very short times. The process of making a decision is executed in a periodically repeated 
process, choosing and calibrating a reasonably short time-window will lead the processes of 
estimating, scan detection, and decision making to be rapidly consecutive, that this near to 
concurrent working fashion is giving the online results. In any fashion of our algorithm, the 
core of the decision-making process is to receive the calculations from the anomaly 
identification process, measure the anomalous values in regards to the rest of the traffic, and 
decide upon the threshold calculated from the same examined set. Those sources that sends 
anomalous numbers of requests (S) are isolated from the rest of the other sources in the traffic 
(N), and then we calculate the mean μ and standard deviation 𝛿 for the normal set. Then we 
calculate the distance between S and C the central point of N using Euclidian distance. C is a 
virtual point representing the middle of the normal values, and calculated from μ of number of 
requests per source and μ time. C was proposed as a reference point to be used to measure the 
Euclidian distance between C and S. Then the resulting distance is compared to a threshold that 
can be defined as 3𝛿 of N, and is considered a scan when (𝑆 𝐶 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) is greater than 3𝛿. The 
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dynamicity of our algorithm stems from the fact that it compares the number of connections 
from a source to other connections sent from other sources for the same time window, rather 
than setting a threshold before the work of the algorithm as in other different solutions.  
4.5 Knowledge Module 
In this part of the system, information is stored from different sources for different purposes. 
Two databases are contained in this module; a database for registering the scanning activities 
and a database for vulnerabilities. The first database is the ‘scanning database’ that stores all 
scanning activities that are launched against the system along with sources of these activities, 
and the risk associated with those sources. The second database is the ‘vulnerabilities database’ 
that contains information about the system vulnerabilities from different sources. This 
information will be used in the prediction process by analysing the current vulnerabilities of 
the system. The information about vulnerabilities in the system comes from two primary 
sources; host vulnerability scanners and public vulnerability databases. These data are collected 
from the sources and prepared for processing by select features in the data that will used to 
compute the properties related to the vulnerabilities such as severity and exploitability.   
In conceptual design of the vulnerability database, the most suitable model for this purpose is 
an entity-relationship model that could clarify the interaction among vulnerabilities, attacks, 
and risks. The data is gathered from the public vulnerability database that contains recent 
information about the discovered vulnerabilities such as National Vulnerability Database 
(NVD) and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). These databases contain detailed 
information about the vulnerabilities; we are only interested in the information related to 
severity and exploitability of the vulnerability that is used to calculate the exposure level. 
Information gathering will includes data cleaning that unifies the format of data to be further 
processed.     
4.6 Vulnerabilities Analyser 
This module is responsible for analysing and evaluating the vulnerabilities is the system, where 
vulnerabilities scanners search for discovering the security bugs and faults using the 
information of the vulnerabilities from the knowledge module. This module performs the 
processes related to vulnerability namely; the severity and exploitability of each vulnerability. 
The output of this module would be introduced to the prediction module for calculating risk 
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and then making prediction. First, we give a formal definition of the concept’s vulnerabilities, 
severity, exploitability, and Degree of exposure as follows:      
Vulnerabilities: are the weaknesses in the system that could be exploited by an adversary to 
attack the system. The set of the system vulnerabilities can be denoted as V = {v1, v2, …vn}. 
v(hα)  V is the set of vulnerabilities that could be exploited to launch the threat hα..  
Degree of exposure: this is a mechanism to gauge the amount of the system exposure to 
intrusions. This mechanism can be defined by the number of the vulnerabilities in the system; 
however, we adapt two defining factors that control these vulnerabilities that are the severity 
and the exploitability of the vulnerabilities. The severity factor relates to how critical this 
weakness is, which means how severe is the impact on the system if this vulnerability is 
exploited and the type of harm to the organization which could result consequently. The 
severity of a vulnerability vi is denoted by S(vi), and may take any value in the range {1, 2, 3}. 
The exploitability factor refers to the ease of exploiting the vulnerability, the level of skill 
needed for the process, and the availability of the exploit code. The exploitability of the 
vulnerability vi can be denoted as X(vi) and the value for this factor is in the range of {0, 1, 2, 
3}.  Although exploitability as well as severity could take any quantitative value, as proof of 
concept we choose specific ranges of numeric values. Thus the exposure that a vulnerability vi 
could cause is:          
𝐸𝑥(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑆(𝑣𝑖) ×  𝑋(𝑣𝑖)                                                                (7) 
In (7) the calculation is to measure the impact of a single vulnerability on the system. As 
different vulnerabilities could be used to harm the system, the total exposure will be:   
                                              𝐸𝑥(𝑡∝) = ∑ 𝑆(𝑣𝑖) ×  𝑋(𝑣𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                               (8) 
Where 𝑡∝ is the time of measuring the exposure, n is the total number of vulnerabilities. 
However, the greatest impact on the system occurs from the vulnerability that leads to 
maximum exposure. Therefore, the level of exposure can be computed as follows:  
                                            𝐸𝑥 = ∏ max  ( 𝑆(𝑣𝑖) ) 𝑋(𝑣𝑖)                                                          (9)
𝑛
𝑖=0
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Equation (9) laid the base to calculate the level of exposure for the system in general.  However, 
to compute the two attributes of 𝐸𝑥 precisely namely the severity and exploitability, we exploit 
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [33]. In this system different attributes 
such as impact, temporal, and environmental are considered to score the vulnerabilities. As we 
focused in our calculation on the most important attributes that we think have more effect on 
the on the system, especially when the network is used as medium of the attacks, therefore, the 
severity of a vulnerability is determined by the impact of this vulnerability on the 
Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A) of the system. The exploitability is 
influenced by three factors that are determined by how exposed the system is to the adversaries, 
these factors are Attack Complexity (AC), Attack Vector (AV), and Exploit Code Maturity (E).  
4.6.1 Severity Metrics  
Confidentiality Impact is the first metric that we account for in the severity of vulnerability. 
This metric measures the harm to the confidentiality of the information that is stored in the 
system, as confidentiality implies restricting the access and disclosure to information to only 
authorized persons, and preventing unauthorized people from accessing or reading the 
protected information. The potential values that the confidentiality impact could take are 
displayed in table 4.1 as follows:  
Table 4.1. Confidentiality Impact Values  
Value Effect 
High 
There is a major damage to the confidentiality that results in the information 
being exposed to the attacker, or highly restricted information is revealed 
causing a broad harm to the system such as an adversary gaining administrator` 
password or encryption key. 
Low 
There is minor damage to the confidentiality that results in some information 
being exposed to the attacker with no control for the attacker to attain specific 
information to expose.  
None No countable effect on the confidentiality 
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Integrity Impact metric measures the effect of the integrity in case a related vulnerability is 
exploited successfully. This term is concerned with the trustworthiness of the information, so 
it is a vital metric in our calculations. The value of this metric is increased according to the 
consequences of a successful exploitation of related vulnerability. The potential values of the 
Integrity impact are displayed in as follows: 
Table 4.2 Integrity Impact Values  
Value Effect 
High 
There is major damage to the Integrity or a whole damage of protection. This 
results in attacker being capable to make changes to encrypted data in targeted 
system. Another scenario of damage might occur to the system is that attacker 
might only able to change specific data, but these changes affect the system 
severely. 
Low 
Attacker might be able to perform changes to the data to some extent, but 
limited minor damage might occur to the system.  
None No countable effect on the Integrity 
The last factor that contributes to the severity of vulnerability is the Availability Impact. This 
metric measures the effect on the availability that could result when related vulnerability is 
exploited. Availability refers to providing the desired service on time by the functional part 
whether it is software or hardware. While the two latter metrics were targeting the data itself, 
this metric targets the functionality of the vulnerable part not what is contained inside it. Based 
on that the attacks that target the availability are aiming to block or minimize the accessibility 
to the system by consuming the network bandwidth, processing capacities, disk spaces limits. 
Table 4.3 clarifies the levels of the availability impacts and their potential values:  
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 Table 4.3 Availability Impact Values  
Value Effect 
High 
Complete blocking of service availability, causing the attacker to get a full 
access denial for legit customers or resources beneficiaries to the vulnerable 
part of the system. This condition could last for different periods such as only 
during the time of attack launching, or for a longer time even after the ending 
of the attack.   
Low 
There is a partial interruption in the performance of the resource availability. 
This be in the form of the resources in the vulnerable part being even partially 
available any time or fully available for discrete periods.    
None No countable effect on the Availability 
4.6.2 Exploitability Metrics 
As mentioned earlier, these metrics rate the vulnerability based on the methods required in 
exploitation, the type of potential attackers in regard to their location to the network, and the 
facilities available for a successful exploitation. The first metric that contributes to the 
exploitability of a vulnerability is the Attack Complexity, is the conditions and requirements 
to accomplish successful attacks and normally these conditions are out of the attacker`s control. 
This means how easy or difficult it is to launch attack in regard to programming skills, the 
preparations prior to the attacks such as information gathering and target scanning, the current 
system configurations, etc. Table 4.4 lists these values regarding the Attack Complexity: 
 Table 4.4 Attack Complexity Values  
Value Effect 
High 
A successful exploitation of the vulnerability requires a measurable amount of 
effort to prepare and execute the code and approach of exploitation. For 
example, target-specific information gathering must be done, special 
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preparation to the targeted environment to guarantee a successful attack, 
gaining a valid logical position in the network, etc. 
Low 
No special exploitation conditions required, and the attacker might repeat the 
exploitations to the same vulnerable part with high probability of success.  
The second metric contributing to exploitability is the Attack Vector, which is the different 
paths and means by which exploiting the vulnerability is possible. This factor defines the 
logical and geographical areas in which the vulnerability is accessible and possibly exploitable 
in an attack.  This metric is based on an intuition that the number of potential attackers from 
the internet for a specific vulnerability is bigger than the number of potential attackers in 
smaller networks. The values of this factor are displayed in table 4.5: 
 Table 4.5 Attack Vector Values  
Value Description 
Network 
Potential attackers could exploit the vulnerability from remote distances at wide 
range networks, which is called a “remotely exploitable” vulnerability. An 
obvious example of this type is exploiting the vulnerability CVE-2004-0230 to 
launch a denial of service attack.  
Local The vulnerability could be exploited with local access using a path that provides 
read/write/execute capabilities.   
Adjacent 
In this type, the vulnerability could be exploited from a machine that is 
connected to the same network stack. An example of this is ARP scanning or 
flooding that could lead to DoS on the shared segment. 
The last metric that contributes to the extent of exploiting a vulnerability is the Exploit Code 
Maturity, which determines if there is a code written to exploit the vulnerability or not and how 
complex is it to use that code if it is available. This in turn reflects the probability of attacking 
using this vulnerability, estimated by considering state-of-art exploiting techniques, exploit 
codes availability, and active exploitations. The probability of exploiting a specific 
vulnerability will increase with the public availability of exploiting codes that are easy to use, 
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because there are a wide range of attackers even those who are less skilled. The values for this 
metric are shown in table 4.6 as follows:  
 Table 4.6 Exploit Code Maturity Values  
Value Description 
High 
Active and automatic exploitations are presented and available to use, or the 
vulnerability exploitation could be achieved manually without code. Another 
situation is when the exploit is active in different conditions or is delivered 
using worms or viruses.    
Low 
Exploitation is available in very limited ranges and needs sophisticated skills to 
work successfully. In addition, when the exploitation is theoretical and no 
known exploitation is available.  
None No exploitation is available. 
CVSS does not consider the last metric as a part of factors that contribute to exploitability; 
rather they account for it as a temporal metric. On the other hand, we believe that this metric 
directly affects the ability to exploit a vulnerability, because a vulnerability will not be 
considering an exposing point unless it can be used in malicious action. The latter in turn cannot 
be achievable without an exploitation code or facility. Therefore, we consider that a 
vulnerability with no exploitation has a minor or negligible effect on exposure level for the 
system.       
To compute equation (9) in detail, we substitute the variables with their contributing factors, 
and clarify the amount of effect each factor (or metric) impacts the related variable. In severity, 
it is obvious that the more the vulnerability impact on the security aspect the higher severity 
this vulnerability will take. For example, a bug that impacted the confidentiality and integrity 
is more severe than one that has a single effect. Therefore, it is suitable to suggest that the 
severity of vulnerability is the product of the values of severity factors, this can be displayed 
as follows:  
𝑆(𝑣𝑖) =  𝐶𝑣𝑖 × 𝐼𝑣𝑖 ×  𝐴𝑣𝑖                                                        (10) 
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Where C is the confidentiality, I is the integrity, and A is availability of the system. These 
factors should always have positive values as long as the vulnerability has an effect on the 
security aspect. On the other hand, a factor with null value is not influencing the severity, and 
hence should not considered in the calculations. The same process can be used with the 
exploitability metrics; however, different values of attack complexity and attack vector can 
escalate the value of exploitability only in the presence of usable exploit code. Therefore, we 
forged the value of exploitability to take the form:  
𝑋(𝑣𝑖) = (𝐴𝐶𝑣𝑖 +  𝐴𝑉𝑣𝑖) × 𝐸𝑣𝑖                                                   (11) 
Where AC is attack complexity, AV is attack vector, and E is exploit code maturity. Although 
E could take numerical value of null as no exploit code available, however for the sake of 
prediction, we consider there is probably an exploit code in private sources, which always has 
a positive value.     
4.7 Prediction Module 
The process of making predictions about the future state of the system is performed in this 
module. The prediction of the future state of the system is dependent on the current level of the 
system security and the network situation. To form a prediction of the probability of the system 
to be targeted by a malicious activity, we incorporate two of the main concepts of system 
security that is how insecure the system and is there any intention to target the system.  
To measure the insecurity of the system we evaluate the risk level of the system. The literature 
showed that computer systems risk level comprises three main factors; threats, vulnerabilities, 
and assets. Threats are those malicious acts that the system is subjected to such as causing harm 
to the system, stealing information from the system, using the system as a platform to attack 
targets that are more important, etc. Normally, the occurrence of these threats is uncertain and 
subject to likelihood. The second contributor in risk level is the vulnerabilities of the system 
and associated probability of discovery and exposure. The last factor of risk is the assets of the 
system and the consequences of a successful attack on these assets.  
Risk factors are controlled by an external party, that is the attackers, and an internal party, that 
is the defenders of the system. Because attackers are unknown until attacks are detected, risk 
factors relating to the attackers can only be quantified by calculating the probability of threat 
occurrence. On the other hand, the defender can derive information about the system by 
 94 
 
evaluating the vulnerabilities and their consequences. While the assets of the system represent 
a main pillar in risk assessment, we discard including the assets in our predictive risk 
assessment because we focus on predicting the potential network based attacks where the 
system assets are not yet known to the adversaries, and hence not taken to be such a major 
contributor to the risks in the system.  
4.7.1 Risk Model     
The risk model we suggest depends on essential aspects, which will be discussed along with 
the adapted methods to calculate the risk efficiently. Our model is analysing the risk that the 
system faces, this analysis is based on factors that will be discussed as follows:  
Threat: is a potential source of harm that occurs to the system by targeting the system software, 
applications, hardware, or functionality. Therefore, any type of attack is considered a threat, 
the set of threats is denoted by Th = {h1, h2,…hn}, where Th is the threat produced by a set of 
known attacks. hα is known attack that is composed of sequence of events E(hα) = {e1, e2, …}. 
The attack is detected when all these events occurred in sequence.  
Likelihood: the likelihood of a threat is the probability of occurrence when related attacks are 
launched, receiving a specific type of traffic in a specific sequence, or when a security alert is 
raised indicating an attack in preparation. We use the term attack in preparation as an indication 
for the reconnaissance stage, where the attacker collects information about the target by 
locating and mapping the victims using scan techniques. As the probability of a threat depends 
on malicious events to occur and these events preceded by information collection, we associate 
the probability of a threat with information gathering. The initial probability of a threat Th 
denoted P(Th) can be calculated proactively depending on factors such as type of defence 
software used, sensitivity of system data, system assets values, etc. P(Th) increases when  any 
events of E(hα) of related attacks hα have been detected. We use the notation P(Th | hα) to 
express the conditional probability of threat occurrence when an attack has happened. This 
leads us to infer that the probability of Th is also increased when a security incident ei has 
happened; we can denote this probability in the form P(Th | ei). We will use P(Th | hα) to 
represent the conditional probability between threats and attack/event. The probability of the 
system to be under a threat will be as follows:  
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𝑃(𝑇ℎ𝑗) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑇ℎ𝑗)  ×  𝑃(𝑇ℎ𝑗|ℎ𝑖) 
𝑚
𝑖=1
                                 (12) 
Where 𝑃(𝑇ℎj) is the overall probability of threats, 𝑃(𝑇ℎ𝑗) is the initial probability of the j
th 
threat, 𝑃(𝑇ℎ𝑗|ℎ𝑖) is the conditional probability of the i
th attack leads to jth threat. In equation 
(12), we calculate the total probability of threat that could occur to the system due to different 
attacks related to that threat. As we calculate the probability of the system to be under the 
danger of any threats that could affect the system, this will make the probability of the absolute 
threat the accumulation of all possible threats probabilities. The probability of the absolute 
threat then can be expressed as follows:  
𝑃(𝑇ℎ∝) = ∑  
𝑛
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑃(𝑇ℎ𝑗)  ×  𝑃(𝑇ℎ𝑗|ℎ𝑖) 
𝑚
𝑖=1
                    (13) 
Where 𝑗 = 1. . 𝑛 is the number of different possible threats, 𝑖 = 1 . . 𝑚 is the number of all 
attacks related to that specific threat. 
4.7.2 Risk calculation:  
The risk to the system represents the accumulative risks stem from all threats that the system 
might face. The risk will then be calculated by the product of threat and the exposure level as 
follows:  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 =  𝐸𝑥 ×  𝑃(𝑇ℎ∝)                          (14) 
Where 𝐸𝑥 is level of exposure. As we stated earlier that the start of gathering information is 
intuitively referred to as an interest in the system that will probably be malicious. Therefore, 
we increase the risk value each time the system is scanned, which will applied to equation (14) 
and expressed as follows:  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = ∏ 𝑆𝑘  × (
𝑥
𝑘=1
∑  
𝑛
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑃(𝑇ℎ𝑗)  ×  𝑃(𝑇ℎ𝑗|ℎ𝑖) 
𝑚
𝑖=1
)  × ∏ max  ( 𝑆(𝑣𝑖)) 𝑋(𝑣𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=0
                (15) 
Where 𝑥 is the number of different sources, 𝑆𝑘 is the scan activity that targets the system. In 
equation (15) the risk is calculated numerically that is suitable for further calculation, however, 
we aimed to classify the risk value to qualitative levels. Therefore, to convert the risk into 
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qualitative indication, we project equation (15) into a Risk Matrix that output the risk as 
qualitative value. The Risk Matrix will result three levels of risk: Low, Medium, and High as 
shown in the next table.  
 Table 4.7 Risk Matrix with Absolute Threat 
          Level of Exposure 
Absolute Threat   
Low 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
Low Low Low Medium 
Moderate Low Medium High 
High Medium High Critical 
To apply equation (13) with Risk Matrix, we consider the output of table 4.8 into second stage 
Risk matrix in regards to network situation. We retain the same level of risk as long as the 
network traffic is behaving normally; raise the risk to next level with port scan and vulnerability 
scan. With this risk matrix, we proposed a new level of risk that is the ‘Critical’ level, where 
we predict that an attack is in preparation to be launched against the system. The next Table 
shows the risk matrix for the effect of the network situation on risk level:    
 Table 4.8 Risk Matrix with Scanning Activities 
          Risk 
Network Situation  
Low Moderate High 
Normal Low Moderate High 
Port scans Moderate High Critical 
Vulnerability scan High Critical Critical 
4.8 Reporting Module 
In this module the output of the prediction module, which is the outcome of the whole system, 
will be informed to the security administration. The informative notifications that will be sent 
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to will give the security team the time they need to countermeasure the attacks while the 
attacker still in the preparation stage. This will happen before the dangerous parts of the attack 
being commenced. The security notifications will contain level of the current of system 
security, type of network preparation (IP scan, Port scan, vulnerability scan).      
4.9 Summary  
This chapter presented an overview of the IPFCC framework and a detailed explanation of the 
framework design in section 4.2. This section provided details and justifications for the 
framework modules and design choices.    
A novel scan-detection technique specifically developed for the IPFCC framework has been 
presented in this chapter, in order to overcome the limitations of other techniques found in 
literature. This technique uses statistical and probabilistic methods to detect the anomalies in 
the network traffic, the type that indicates the presence of attack preparation. It combines the 
statistical analysis of selected attributes of the traffic, as well as undertaking comparative 
outlier analysis of tested traffic slices. 
This chapter presented an adaptation of risk assessment that includes a customization of the 
well-known Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) in order to analyse the 
vulnerabilities in the system and score it according to the impacting attributes. This method 
uses vulnerabilities scanners and global vulnerability databases to discover the system security 
holes.   
 Finally, this chapter illustrated our method of decision-making to predict intrusions by using 
risk matrix technique that incorporated two levels to give the final verdict. The first level 
defined the risk value according to the level of exposure and the absolute threat to the system, 
and the second level checked the resulting risk to the network situation and produced the 
prediction of potential intrusions.    
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Chapter 5  
Implementation 
In order to test the success of the techniques used to propose the IPFCC framework, it is crucial 
to produce a working implementation. This validates the claims of the thesis and verifies that 
IPFCC meets the aims, objectives and requirements that were defined initially. This chapter 
provides the implementation details of the proposed IPFCC framework in chapter 4, all the 
included techniques, evaluation approaches and the testbeds. This thesis conducted an 
exploration study of statistical and probabilistic Ports-scan detection methods, a preview of the 
rebuilding, the explored methods and the tools and simulations used to achieve re-generation 
of the other methods. These two parts of implementation will be covered by the two main 
sections of this chapter.    
5.1 Preliminary Analysis and Experimental Testbed  
Prior to propose our solution, the extensive exploration of the network based attacks done 
throughout the literature review and background produced a solid certainty to us that the best 
way to predict the attacks is to identify their indications. Based on that, we conclude that the 
IP scan and port scan are the best indications to predict the potential attacks. Therefore, we 
launched practical investigation to identify the traces of scan activities in network traffic when 
the traffic contain scanning packets or normal traffic. The investigation includes launching a 
real scans from machine A that contains a scanner software against machine B that contains 
packet sniffer software in subnet via universal server, as shown in figure 5.1.        
Local server
PC  A PC  B
Scanner - nmap TcpDump - wireshark
 
Figure 5.1 Testbed Settup 
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A- The first machine represents the attacker machine, and running windows 10 64-bit OS, core 
i7, 3.40 GHz CPU, and 16 GB memory. To avoid any damages and complications, we installed 
the Oracle VM VirtualBox [248] that is virtual environment allows to create virtual machines 
with the ability to host fully functional guest operating systems. To launch the scan, we create 
a virtual machine and install the Kali Linux [249] that used for penetration test, which contains 
different tools and facilities for testing the network and host such as Nmap [136] as shown in 
figure 5.2.    
 
Figure 5.2 Kali Linux and Nmap 
The Nmap is a security scanner that used to discover hosts on a network and the applications 
running on each host, hence structure a "map" of the network. The initial aim of using Nmap 
is to generate the scan packets that are embedded in normal traffic.  
B- The second machine is the one that been scanned (the victim), where the traffic will be 
collected. This machine is a separate physical machine with its own IP address and running 
services and applications. This machine runs Windows 10 64-bit operating system, Core i7 3.6 
GHz CPU, and 8 GB of RAM memory. For the purpose of collecting traffic we used the 
TcpDump [250], which is a well-known packet analyser that operate under command line and 
working as background application.  For deep and thoroughly analysing the traffic that contain 
scan packets, we used the Wireshark [251] that is a world standard application for analysing 
network traffic that offers a graphical user interface and different analytical and statistical 
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options for deep traffic analysis. We launched a port scan against the second machine while 
using the machine for normal internet access, so the collected traffic contain both normal and 
abnormal traffic that captured by TcpDump and analysed by Wireshark as shown in figure 5.3.          
 
Figure 5.3 Scan Traffic Analysed by Wireshark  
C- The experiments were done by recording traffic in the victim machine for 50-minute time 
window and the scan activity launched at known time from the attacker machine. The initial 
analysis for the traffic showed that during port scan, every port is scanned by a TCP request 
packet that its sequence is either 0 or 1, and the for the IP scan is the big number of ICMP echo 
request packets (normally referred to as type 8) that is send to the network. We identified these 
types of packets, as these packets are sent as the initial packets of the communication session 
between two machines. As a session is the communication between source IP and source port 
to destination IP and destination port, therefore, for each destination port there will an 
individual communication session with it. The normal communication between two machines 
is one session that includes establish the link between the machines to use a specific service, 
and then multiple sending and receiving of packets until completing the service providing. 
Observe multiple initial packets means establishing multiple sessions from the same source to 
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the same destination, which is either the source requests different service from the destination 
(that is rarely occurred) or there is an abnormal behaviour.            
5.2 IPFCC Framework 
Initially, the IPFCC requires having a system snapshot of vulnerabilities that will be used as a 
basis to operate in real-time. This initial vulnerability snapshot will be used to calculate the risk 
of the system in the current state, in addition to the vulnerabilities information gathered from 
public websites. Due to the difficulties of writing and applying a monitoring system for such a 
huge environment like cloud computing and targeting the network-based attacks, we build our 
proof of concepts implementation in a simulation environment. All the constituted methods 
and algorithms have been programmed and incorporated in a framework that worked 
successfully and consistently.              
The implementation and evaluation of the framework is conducted using MATLAB 
environment. This environment enables developing IPFCC and conduct the evaluation 
framework performance easily and clearly. In addition, the simulation environment provides 
us with the opportunity to proof the concepts of the thesis and ability to avoid the complications 
of licencing or proprietary issues of real clouds centres. Another important reason for 
depending on the simulation environment is the difficulty of obtaining the security information 
of organizations, as this type of data is very sensitive and valuable information. 
The IPFCC is split into three separate yet integrated processes that are the detection module, 
knowledge base, and predictor. The detection module is responsible for probing the network 
for scan activities that include quantifying, thresholding, and decision-making as regards 
potential scans. The second part of the implemented framework is the knowledge base that was 
built to contain the information about the vulnerabilities in the system as well as the history of 
scanned sources. The third part of IPFCC is the vulnerability analyser that calculates the 
vulnerabilities’ attributes in order to evaluate them. The last part of the framework is the 
prediction model that plays a central role in the framework by processing the information from 
the other modules and producing a prediction about potential intrusions. 
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5.2.1 Data Collection and Data Sets 
As the framework is implemented in a simulation environment, the data collection depends on 
a public dataset collected by Lincoln Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) [252]. This set is called the DARPA dataset, which is a well-known dataset that used to 
train and evaluate the performance of intrusion detection systems. DARPA intrusion detection 
data sets have been gathered and distributed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology – 
Lincoln Laboratory in corporation with Air Force Research Laboratory in the United States of 
America. Dataset collection carried out in 1998, 1999, and a scenario-specific dataset collected 
in 2000. All these versions contain labelled attacks along with normal traffic and background 
traffic.  Labelled attacks means all information about the attacks are mentioned such as types 
of attacks, source machine (attacker), destination machine (victim), timestamp, duration. The 
dataset has been saved in pcap files that is all packets information is readable by any traffic 
analysis software [253]. The dataset contains many different attacks including the surveillance 
activities that include IPSweep scan and PortSweep scan as mentioned in the dataset 
documents. We focus on the two latter scan types in evaluation of our scanning detection 
algorithm evaluation. Many researchers have stated the usefulness of this data set and clarify 
the reasons such as the unavailability of better alternatives, evaluation oriented nature of the 
data set [254] [255]. To test our solution we used the 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection 
Evaluation Dataset that was specifically designed for testing and evaluating the intrusion 
detection systems, as it contains data collected over three weeks with labelled attacks in a 
specific week. These attacks are injected in the network traffic along with normal activities 
traffic.  
5.2.2 Scan Detection Module  
This module is based entirely on the Selective Dynamic Scan Detection (SASD) algorithm that 
was proposed in 4.4.1. This module implemented all the methods and algorithms proposed in 
SASD, which are namely; the counting method, outliers detection method, thresholding 
algorithm, Euclidian distance. The serialization of the processes is shown as follows:  
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Figure 5.4 The Process Sequence In Detection Module. 
 For counting the targeting attributes we used the Hyperloglog algorithm [228] that gives a near 
optimal estimation for the unique ports numbers or IPs, figure 5.5 shows a segment of 
Hyperloglog implementation.   
 
Figure 5.5 Code Segment of Hyperloglog Algorithm. 
For the outliers test we use a modification of Grubbs` test [226], this algorithm will classify 
the data into normal and abnormal, the mechanism of the test is depicted in the code excerpt 
shown in figure 5.6.  
Counting
Outliers 
tests
Thresholding
Calculate the 
distance
Compare 
and decision 
making
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Figure 5.6 Code Segment of Outliers Test Algorithm. 
The separation of data for this test is performed according to a significance level that defines 
the limit of normal set of data, which is referred to as α. In Grubb test, the significance level 
used to decide if an observation is an outlier. If the probability of the observation is less α, then 
this observation is considered an outlier. Normally the recommended value of significance 
level for Grubb test is 0.05 with a range of possible values 0.001 to 0.2. In our implantation of 
the outliers, we found best results could be obtained at α = 0.005, as this value gives us best 
separation between normal network activities and malicious ones. At this point, we will have 
two separated sets of data; one contains the normal data and the other the abnormal.   
In the thresholding, the classical method investigated in the literature is to test normal data then 
calculate the standard deviation σ, and threshold then will be a quantity multiply σ such as 3σ. 
We proposed our threshold mechanism so that instead of depending on normal sample data 
tested prior to the work, rather we suggest applying the standard deviation on the resulting set 
after applying the outliers test. In this mechanism, we ensure that our calculations for the 
thresholds adapt dynamically according to the current data set, which is adjusted to a network 
situation. This means a different threshold is calculated for every time window.  
After calculating the threshold, we check how far the outliers are from the normal data, for that 
reason, we use the Euclidian distance to measure the distance between the outliers and the 
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centre of the normal data set. If the resulting distance is bigger than 3σ, then this outlier point 
is a scanner, otherwise it is benign traffic.         
 5.2.3 Knowledge Base 
In this module, we created two databases that represent the sources of information to rely on in 
the process of decision-making. The first database will contain the benign IPs that contacted or 
scanned the system such as external IPs used by the security team to investigate the system. 
The role of this database could be further developed to contain useful information about the 
traffic such as sources, destinations, volumes, etc. this however, will need Artificial 
Intelligence algorithms that are beyond the scope of our thesis. The second database will 
contain information about the vulnerabilities that are found in the system, where this 
information is collected from specialized public sources. The vulnerability scanning listed the 
vulnerabilities that existed in the system in the vulnerability database, a detailed information 
about each vulnerability collected from the public vulnerability databases. For the 
implementation purpose, we build these databases using MS Access 2013, which is easy to use 
and suites our system setup.  
Although, the previous table displayed a group of vulnerabilities that might occur in the system 
with descriptive information and potential usage (attacks), however, more detailed information 
is fundamental to analyse the system weaknesses to the level that sufficient to calculate the risk 
factors and the vulnerabilities metrics.  Such information produces in the form shown in the 
figure 5.7.  
 
Figure 5.7 Detailed Information about CVE-2012-1516 Vulnerabilty [256]  
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After collecting raw and detailed information about the vulnerabilities in the system, the 
vulnerabilities entered in the database and are ready to be analysed by the vulnerability 
analyser. Then, the vulnerabilities names and corresponding metrics values are form the 
vulnerability database as shown the figure 5.8.   
 
Figure 5.8 Vulnerability Database 
5.2.4 Vulnerabilities Analyser  
This module is designed to evaluate the vulnerabilities and assign their scores according to the 
proposed method described in the design chapter. First, this module retrieves the collected raw 
information from the public vulnerability databases, analyse these information to assign metric 
values for each identified vulnerability, and calculates the severity and exploitability values. 
The resulting values after calculation is directed in two directions, the first the vulnerability 
database where the related information should be stored and the second fed to the prediction 
module to produces predictions according to the current system and network situation. Figure 
5.9 shows a segment of the vulnerability analyser implementation as following:  
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Figure 5.9 The implementation of vulnerabilities analyser. 
The calculation the severity and exploitability values produces the exposure level that define 
the amount each vulnerability affect the system, as mentioned in sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 
respectively. However, the severity and exploitability metrics has been given a qualitative 
values in the design phase, but to calculate an exact value of the exposure level, these metrics 
will assigned to numeric values that reflect the equivalent qualitative values. After the 
collection process is completed, the process of analysing the vulnerabilities is begins to assign 
a numeric values for the selected metrics and calculate the exposure level variables. Then the 
results will fills the database as shown in figure 5.10.   
 
Figure 5.10. Analysed Vulnerabilities in the Database. 
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5.2.5 Prediction Module 
The prediction module proposed in chapter 4 is meant to be the central module that is 
responsible for decision-making about security incidents and raising the security level of the 
system. As shown in Figure 5.11, this module receives the vulnerability assessment from the 
vulnerability analyser by calling the module function ‘ExposureLevel’. Then calculating the 
total threat using the function ‘AbsPTh’ that also gives the threat probability from 0 to 1. Based 
on the latter two functions, the risk matrix is constructed and the risk level is produced. This 
module predicts the threat level according to the type of traffic and alters the level of threat 
accordingly using the final prediction function.   
 
 
Figure 5.11 The Implementation of Prediction Module. 
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5.3 Regenerated Methods 
In our quest to propose a method for scan detection, we investigated different statistical and 
probabilistic methods. These methods have been examined and evaluated in order to come up 
with a novel one that we think will be most appropriate to the cloud-computing environment 
and network-based attack. In this section, we will display the implementation of the regenerated 
methods that comprise our explorative study of port scan detection.   
5.3.1 Threshold Random Walk (TRW) 
As mentioned in chapter 4, we started with this method as it is the gold standard for port scan 
detection [215] and most solutions for scan detection compared their efficiency to the TRW. 
We uses the same simulation environment that we used to implement our solution. Due to the 
limitation in some programming aspects, we incorporated code from Java to implement 
dynamic codes as shown in figure 5.12. 
     
Figure 5.12. Java Code Segment from TRW. 
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We applied the TRW on the same dataset that was divided into time window slices, where we 
used a time window of about 50 minutes. We used the same set-up of the initial values in the 
algorithm, where 𝜃0 = 0.8 , 𝜃1 = 0.2 , 𝛼 = 0.01, and 𝛽 = 0.99.  
5.3.2 Probabilistic Methods 
For these methods, we chose to implemented the proposed work of Gates [215] as a 
representative of probabilistic approaches. This is because their solution is based on a proposed 
analytical suite that monitors the traffic and analyses different attributes of incoming data. This 
method was developed according to a specific configuration of traffic that is called a ‘data 
flow’, where these flows are unidirectional streams. Unlike these flows, our datasets have been 
collected on configurations of bidirectional data streams; therefore, we modified the dataset 
from unidirectional to bidirectional using a utility in the suite to convert unidirectional flows. 
The suite is SiLK [257] that is a collection of traffic analysis tools mainly implemented in C, 
Perl, or Python.  
 
Figure 5.13 Analysing Experiment Dataset Using SiLK  
As SiLK is a command line suite, we installed it on Linux Ubuntu OS and analysed our dataset 
using a single direct instruction at a time as shown in Figure 5.13. After completing analysing 
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all the requested attributes, we exported the results to MS Excel to perform the calculations of 
the probability of port scan. The probability of scan according to the researchers was impacted 
mostly by six variables with weights for each variable as shown in figure 5.14. 
 
Figure 5.14 Excel Calculations of Probability of Port Scan  
In the previous figure, we see the results of the network sniffer that collects information of the 
network traffic in both direction; send and receive. This shown in figure 5.14 from column A 
to column L. then in column M represents the title of the method variables and column O 
contains the values of these variables. The main collective variable Y and its value highlighted 
in red, and the P(Y) represents probability of the port scan that calculated after applying 
Logistic Regression of the value of Y, and highlighted in red as well.    
5.3.3 Statistical Methods 
The intended meaning of the statistical detection is an approach that depends entirely on 
statistical methods for measuring and judging malicious activities. For this purpose, we chose 
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to rebuild the work of Chabchoub et al [258] as a sample of these methods that are lightweight 
computationally and efficient in performance, which suits cloud computing and big data 
environments. The first component of their solution exploits the HyperLogLog algorithm for 
estimating the number of unique ports (as counting mechanism) in the IP traffic, a code 
extracted from the algorithm implementation shown in figure 5.15. 
 
Figure 5.15 Code of HyperLogLog Implementation  
Then the solution detects the intrusive contacts using the Exponentially Weighted Moving 
Average (EWMA), with a time window of 5 minutes. A source is considered malicious if the 
EWMA of the incoming number of unique ports exceeds the predefined threshold.  
5.4 Summary  
The chapter starts with the research initial testbed and traffic analysis that enable us to examine 
the traffic and observe the changes and effects that poses in the traffic before and during the 
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attack. We focus on the changes in the traffic that happens before the real attacks, which called 
the reconnaissance stage. Therefore, our analysis results in verdict to monitor scan activities as 
attack indicator.       
This chapter then demonstrate the implementation of the framework that proposed in Chapter 
4 and all included modules. Starting with the data collection, the dataset used, and the port scan 
and IP scans included. Then a demonstration of the scan module and the included algorithms 
that used to sense the scan activities. Then, the Knowledge base implementation and the 
collected data, in addition to databases used in this module. The analyser module 
implementation is also presented and the way of analysing the system vulnerabilities. Finally, 
this chapter provide the prediction module implementation, which is the central module that 
sums all the work achieved by the framework and presented it to security administration.    
The last part of this chapter provides an overview of the implementation of the comparable 
methods that regenerated to be used to measure our solution performance. These methods 
included the hypothesis testing, probabilistic, and statistical approaches. 
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Chapter 6  
Evaluation 
Our framework works through two independent parts, namely; the vulnerability part and 
network part. The vulnerabilities part is standardized, which means calculating the impact on 
the system security will not differ drastically from one approach to another, as the severity and 
importance of vulnerability will be evaluated similarly in different solutions. Therefore, a great 
part of this research focus is toward the impact of sensing network situation on the system 
evaluation process. This chapter provides evaluation of the proposed system.  
6.1 Dynamic selective scan detection (SASD) evaluation   
In this part, we present details of the evaluation of the scan detection method that proposed in 
our solution. We test our method against the selected dataset and observe its ability to detect 
the two types of surveillance as follows:  
6.1.2. A Port Scanning Detection:  
 In this type of scanning, the attacker sends connection requests to many ports in the same 
machine (IP destination) this means a high increment of connection requesting packets during 
a short time window. As port scanning mainly depends on TCP/IP protocol, where every packet 
should have a sequence number from 0 to 4294967296, in this protocol connection requesting 
packet is labelled with 0 or 1. Thus, in the port scan detection we count the increment in the 
packets with sequence 0 or sequence 1. Three port scanning has been launched on two different 
destinations at different times as clarified in table 6.1.           
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 Table 6.1 Labelled Port Scans Attacks. 
No  Date Start_Time Destination 
1 03/09/1999 08:44:17 marx.eyrie.af.mil    
   
2 03/11/1999 10:50:11 marx.eyrie.af.mil 
3 03/12/1999 17:13:10 pascal.eyrie.af.mil 
All these attacks have been successfully identified by our algorithm and recognized as attacks. 
The algorithm first counts the connection requesting packets and highlights the source IPs that 
have sent high numbers of requests by detecting outliers as shown in figures 6.1-3. The reliance 
on connection requesting packets has made the scan related packets more obvious in the traffic 
statistics that enable the decision of scanning to be much easier.   
 
Figure 6.1  Port Scan Attack No.1 Identification. 
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Figure 6.2  Port Scan Attack 2 Identification. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Port Scan Attack 3 Identification. 
The previous figures show the distinction between the number of connections requested by a 
potential attacker and the connections requested by normal sources.  Despite the previous three 
figure has shown clearly distinguishing results of specific traffic packets examination (marked 
in red colour), however, this is alone is not sufficient to make a decision of intrusion as no 
detection threshold involved. Therefore, the algorithm continues to check how far this 
abnormal measurement is from the accepted limits represented by the detection threshold.      
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6.1.2.B IP Sweeping Detection    
 In this type of scanning as mentioned earlier, the attacker sends connection requests to many 
machines (IPs) in the same the network or domain. IP scanning is a surveillance technique that 
scans a network or a domain and returns the live machines (IPs). This process performed by 
sending an ICMP ECHO request to all machines in the network, and the live machine will 
respond by sending ICMP ECHO reply. Therefore, to detect this type of scan we focus on 
counting ICMP ECHO requests during a specific time window. DARPA dataset contains three 
IP scanning that has been launched at different times as clarified in table 6.2.           
 Table 6.2 Labelled IP Scanning Activities. 
ID Date Start Time Target Score Name 
14 03/09/1999 13:05:10  172.016.112. 
001-114.254 
1 ipsweep 
20 03/10/1999  20:17:10 172.016.112. 
001-114.254 
1 ipsweep 
30 03/11/1999 16:36:10 172.016.112. 
001-254 
1 ipsweep 
The same technique used to identify port scans previously, has been used to detect the IP 
sweeps attacks. Our algorithm has successfully identified the three IP sweeps in the dataset.      
 
Figure 6.4 IP Sweep Attack 1. 
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Figure 6.5 IP Sweep Attack 2. 
 
Figure 6.6  IP Sweep Attack 3. 
In figures 6.48-50, the number of ICMP ECHO requests sent from the same source IP is 
represented by a star in the graph in accordance with the average time it arrived. The graphs 
also show visually the number of echo requests that the normal IP sent and the abnormal 
number of requests.  
6.2 Comparisons to Other Methods   
Although SASD has been able to identify all IP sweep and port sweep attacks that are labelled 
in the dataset, however, in order to evaluate the detection capability of our algorithm we tried 
to rebuild some other solutions that depend on statistical and probabilistic methods. SASD is 
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related to statistical methods as it uses statistical methods in cardinality estimation, outlier 
detection and computing the threshold. On the other hand, SASD is related to probabilistic 
methods such as the Hyperloglog algorithm that use randomness and probability in the hashing 
process. Therefore, we will compare SASD to probabilistic and statistical methods. We apply 
the rebuilt solutions on the same dataset to observe the results of detection of the same IP/Port 
sweep attacks and compare with the results of our solution. In this section, we will demonstrate 
the rebuilt solutions and the results as follows:  
     6.2.1 Threshold Random Walk (TRW)  
We choose to regenerate this method as it represents the gold standard for port-scan detection 
methods [215]. The researchers proposed online detection algorithm [21] to fulfil the 
requirements of port scan detection namely the promptness and accuracy in detecting malicious 
scanners. The method is developed based on the theory of sequential hypothesis testing by 
applying this theory to the access patterns to the local hosts that modelled as a random walk 
(RW). The by analysing the traces between the source (scanner) and the destination (host), the 
methods classify the source into malicious and non-malicious depending on the percentage of 
the failed connection to the local hosts. The failed connections as defined by the researchers 
are the connection that made to inactive hosts or requests of invalid services on active hosts; 
as such connections are more likely to be requested by malicious parties. Hypothesis testing 
method is binary hypothesis testing that considered only two hypotheses, H0 that the source is 
benign and H1 where the sender is malicious. This process is performed for each individual 
observation by assigning either H0 or H1 for any given connection. The connection is 
represented by an independent random variable Ri, and the conditional relationship between 
the random variable and the hypothesis Ri|Hi i= 1,2,… is modelled according to Bernoulli 
distribution of Ri as following:  
Pr [Ri = 0| H0] = θ0,   Pr [Ri = 1| H0] = 1− θ0 
    Pr [Ri = 0| H1] = θ1,   Pr [Ri = 1| H1] = 1− θ1                                  (16)  
A source is considered ‘benign’ if fulfil the following condition:  
θ0 > θ1 
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As there are only two hypotheses, there are four results produces by the hypotheses testing. 
When H1 hypotheses is true, then the ‘detection’ is occurred and the H0 represents a ‘false 
negative’. Vice versa, when H0 is true this result in H0 represent a ‘nominal’ and H1 represents 
the ‘false positive’. The detect criteria is specified using the detection probability PD and the 
false positive probability PF against user-selected sensitivity values α and β as following:  
        PF ≤ α and PD ≥ β                                                           (17) 
As a result, the TRW is an algorithm that depends on observing the variance in frequencies of 
connections made by benign and frequencies made by malicious hosts. Based on that, the 
algorithm detect malicious host with very few attempts to connection that make this algorithm 
is the faster than the predecessor methods.    
     6.2.2 Probabilistic Methods  
In these methods, a statistical analysis is done to the traffic and an observation on specific 
attributes of traffic and then a probability is assigned. We tried to rebuild the work [215], where 
the researchers suggested a scan detection approach for very large networks. This solution was 
proposed under certain constraints and requirements such as the collection of the traffic will be 
on flow level only, at multiple collection points, at multiple geographical domains, and on base 
of single direction traffic. The researchers stated that the current scan detection approaches are 
not working under those conditions. Therefore, they adopted a probabilistic approach to adapt 
with the specified constraints. Based on that, they first defined the event as a set of flows 
originated from single IP address to single destination that this set lies between inactivity 
periods (at least 32 flows preceded and succeeded by 5 minutes of inactivity).  Then each event 
is analysed to determine if contains a scan or not. The scan analysis consists of computing 
attributes values of unidirectional data flow (the flow contains multiple packets travelling 
towards a single destination such as Cisco Net Flow setup) and then calculates the probability 
of the result using Bayesian logistic regression. First, the solution computes a global variable 
that consists of a summation of the most important variables that are most influential in scan 
detection as follows:  
?̂? =  −2.83835 + 3.30902 𝑣1 − 0.15705𝑣2 − 0.00232𝑣3 − 1.04741𝑣4 + 3.16302𝑣5 −
3.26027𝑣6                                                                                                                               (18) 
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Where 𝑣1 the ratio of flows that ACK flag set to 0 to all flows, 𝑣2 the ratio of flows that has 
two packets or less to all flows, 𝑣3 the average of source ports for each IP destination.  𝑣4 is 
the ratio of flows that contain packets size 60 bytes or greater to all flows, 𝑣5 is the number of 
unique destinations to total number of flows. 𝑣6 the ratio of flows that contain backscatter 
combination to all flows. Although the researcher listed 21 variables that they believed indicate 
the scan activity, they stated that the last six variables have the most influence on the scan 
detection. Then the probability is computed by applying the logistic regression on the global 
variable ?̂? is as follows:  
?̂? (𝑋) =  
𝑒?̂?
1+𝑒?̂?
                                                                                      (19) 
Where X is a traffic slice that contains a scan. The result from equation 7 is a probability of 0 
to 1 that the tested traffic contains a scan.  ?̂?(𝑋) is then compared to a threshold equal to 0.5, 
if the value of  ?̂?(𝑋) is greater than the threshold then the traffic contains a scan otherwise the 
traffic is normal. The researchers have stated that they had a classification accuracy of 98.5% 
during the training phase, and 99.3% during the test phase.  
     6.2.3 Statistical Methods  
In these methods, a statistical analysis is performed on the traffic and measurements are applied 
to check the change or deviation in traffic attributes values. We tried to rebuild the work in 
[258], where the researchers proposed an algorithm to detect port scan in IP traffic using 
Hyperloglog algorithm and Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA). As mentioned 
earlier, Hyperloglog is used to estimate online the number of distinct ports in the IP traffic. The 
researchers adopted a sliding window version of Hyperloglog, and they claimed that this 
technique does not affect the accuracy of the original algorithm.  The counting process is 
achieved using a window W equal to 60 s, and the sliding leap is every 30 s. While, the EWMA 
is used to sense the change point when it exceeds an Upper Control Limit (UCL) as threshold, 
and defined as:  
                                UCL = EWMA(0) + m * √
𝜆
(2−𝜆)𝑑0
2                                                        (20) 
Where EWMA(0) is the average of the whole dataset, m is an factor whose value is set to 3 or 
selected from specific calculation in [259],  𝜆 is multiplicative factor (0 < 𝜆 ≤ 1) and set during 
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implementation at 0.3 , d is the standard deviation of the whole dataset. The results approve 
the performance of Hyperloglog and EWMA in regard to accuracy, memory exploitation, and 
time response.   
       6.2.4 Results of Scanning Detection   
We run three separate experiments, one for each solution on the same data slice that contains 
the surveillance or scanning activity. As mentioned earlier, DARPA was used as the dataset 
and it contains six scanning activities denoted as surveillance. As the whole dataset is collected 
over three weeks, we only apply the experiments on the data subset that contains what is 
denoted as surveillance in the DARPA documentation. The probabilistic solution was able to 
identify only one of the scan attacks, while the statistical solution was able to identify five out 
of six attacks listed. Finally, our solution was able to identify all the scans successfully. table 
6.3 displays the results as following:        
 Table 6.3. Results of Scan Detection of All Experiments. 
Solution 
Port 
Scan1 
Port Scan 
2 
Port Scan 3 
IP Scan 
1 
IP Scan 2 IP Scan 3 
TRW * * * - - - 
Probabilistic - - * - - - 
Statistical * * - * * * 
Our solution * * * * * * 
- not detected                       * detected 
6.2.5 Detection Performance  
The essential characteristics of IPFCC that requires to be supported by robust evidence are the 
detection capabilities and false alarm rate. In this section, we will evaluate the proposed system 
ability to detect scanning activities by focusing on the detection accuracy, detection Speed, 
High Performance, Real-Time and Scalable. 
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IPFCC is designed to detect the anomalies in the network traffic, focusing on the anomalies 
caused by the scanning activities. In the conducted experiments, IPFCC`s capability to detect 
different scanning activities is examined. Varying the type of scan activity and the time of 
launching the activity enables us to measure the detection, and false positive and false negative 
rates. Details of the experiments and the results are presented in table 6.4.  
 Table 6.4 IPFCC Detection Performance. 
Attack Threshold 
Malicious 
value 
Detection 
rate 
False 
negative rate 
False 
positive rate 
IPsweep1 1.7500 764.1863 100 % 0 0 
IPsweep2 1.0000 255.4227 100 % 0 0 
IPsweep3 1.0000 764.9263 100 % 0 0 
Portsweep1  2.1667 5000.8 100 % 0 0 
Portsweep2 3.0000 998.3329 100 % 0 0 
Portsweep3 1.4000 568.0433 100 % 0 0 
  
IPsweep is a scan activity that is aimed at scouting the whole network and identifying the online 
hosts. Portsweep is the port scanning that is aimed at identifying open ports on a specific host. 
Note that these two scans activities names are taken from the original dataset. The results from 
the experiments verified that IPFCC is able to detect scan activities at a high rate on the test 
dataset, while preserving the false alarms at very low rates. This fulfils the accuracy criterion 
in our evaluation. This performance is achieved due to the selective detection algorithm used 
and dynamic thresholding used to make a decision of intrusion. Choosing a selective detection 
algorithm means that we focus only on analysing specific data that is directly related to 
intrusion preparations. This in turn means a huge decrease of the amount of data that the system 
needs to analyse in order to detect attacks. This reduces the computational and memory 
resources required to operate the system. In the selective detection, rather than checking all 
packets information in a session, we focus only on the first packet of that session. This will 
lead to discarding many packets in the traffic and focusing only initial packets. This concept is 
based on practice followed by the attackers that they only send a single packet to check the 
port`s state, which is normally the initial packet of the session. Therefore, we monitor this type 
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of packet by checking only the packets that are labelled with sequence number of zero or one. 
Using fine-grained information of TCP/IP protocol, we managed to reduce the amount of data 
needed for experimental computations as shown in figure 6.7. 
 
Figure 6.7 Computational Loads in Size Kb. 
The selectivity attribute has empowered IPFCC to achieve high performance and outperform 
existing methods of the tested datasets. Table 6.5 shows the results of the performance 
experiments.  
 Table 6.5 Tested/Proposed Methods Detection Performance  
Method 
Network 
situation 
Detection 
rate 
False negative rate False positive rate 
TRW Port 
scanning 
94 % 6% 2 % 
Probabilistic Port 
scanning 
16 % 84% 1 % 
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HLL Port 
scanning 
83 % 13%  20 % 
IPFCC Port & IP 
scanning 
100% 0 % 50% 
 
As shown in the previous table, IPFCC scores the highest detection of the attacks on the tested 
data, which contains labelled attacks. IPFCC was successful in detecting all the labelled attacks 
and identified the attacker with no false alarms. On the other hand, IPFCC acted perversely 
when testing normal data in that half of the samples from the dataset were found to contain 
scan activities, where they should have been clear. In other words, IPFCC scored a high rate of 
false positives, where normal instances were (wrongly) considered malicious. Two potential 
factors could have contributed to this situation; the datasets contained unlabelled benign scan 
activities, and the threshold might need more calibration to remove these false alarms.           
The second criterion of the detection performance of IPFCC is the detection time that is 
attributed to the use of HLL for the main part of the detection process, which is counting the 
number of unique connections from remote sources. As mentioned in chapter five, HLL is an 
estimation algorithm that is well known for using a trivial amount of memory to operate, which 
makes this algorithm an optimal solution to handle online a huge amount of data at high-speed 
networks. Because the detection depends on analysing network traffic, the detection time is 
determined by the length of the time window and time of detection execution. Figure 6.8 
display the counters creation and execution for time windows of equal sizes.      
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Figure 6.8 Creation and Execution Time for Detection Counters. 
Considering the relational stability of detection performance and the type of analysis results 
shown in figure 6.8 execution time, the High Performance requirement can met. When it comes 
to the real-time requirement of IPFCC this can be met due to the small amount of data that is 
presented for analysis, which results from the selective attribute of the detection algorithm. 
Figure 6.53 showed the amount of each time window that was presented for analysis as follows:  
 
Figure 6.2  Traffic Slices Sizes in Kb  
By combining the two previous figures, it shows the scalability of the proposed system; that 
means the performance has been preserved when analysing different data volumes. It is 
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important to notice that there is a trade-off between the detection time and the window size. 
The time window should not be too short that the outliers would miss the malicious behaviour, 
nor too long that would increase the detection time and therefore the response to that malicious 
activity. Depending on the natural traffic loads, the security administration can calibrate and 
balance the time window sizes to optimize the detection performance.  
6.3 Intrusion Prediction Scenarios 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, we will use some terms and specifications from Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [33] to calculate the two pillars of the exposure, namely; 
the Severity and the exploitability, which we incorporate to estimate the Risk. As mentioned 
in chapter four, for the exploitability we use three factors that we thought most affected the 
exposure level, which are Attack Complexity (AC), Attack Vector (AV), and Exploit Code 
Maturity (E). Likewise, we used the following factors as having the most influence on the 
Severity; Confidentiality Impact (C), Integrity Impact (I), and Availability Impact (A).  
In Chapter 4, we stated that these factors take three qualitative values for each variable, and for 
the sake of the implementation, we will replace these qualitative values with quantitative values 
as high takes numeric value of 2, low takes the numeric value of 1, and none assigned to 0.      
 Table 6.6 Severity Attributes Numerical Values  
Value 
Factor 
High Low None 
Confidentiality Impact (C) 2 1 0 
Integrity Impact (I) 2 1 0 
Availability Impact (A) 2 1 0 
Likewise, we set numerical values for the exposure level factors, as follows:  
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 Table 6.7 Exposure Level Attributes Numeric Values  
            Value 
Factor 
High Low None 
Attack Complexity (AC) 2 1 0 
Attack Vector (AV) 3 2 1 
Exploit Code Maturity (E) 2 1 1 
The method of public databases is to assign values and weights for different vulnerability 
attributes by analysis conducted by experts, and normally manually evaluated and rated. Based 
on that, it is safe to some extent to assign assumed values in our implementation to each of the 
factors that control the selected attributes of the vulnerabilities. We will use the synthesized 
vulnerabilities listed in table 6.8 in different security scenarios and conduct the prediction as 
follows:  
 Table 6.8 System Vulnerabilities and Their Controlling Factors  
No Vul Id 
Severity attributes Exploitability attributes 
C I A AC AV E 
1 Vul-1 1 0 0 1 2 2 
2 Vul-2 0 1 0 1 1 1 
3 Vul-3 0 0 1 2 3 1 
4 Vul-4 2 0 0 1 2 2 
5 Vul-5 0 2 0 1 1 1 
6 Vul-6 2 0 2 2 3 1 
7 Vul-7 1 0 1 1 2 1 
8 Vul-8 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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9 Vul-9 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Using the equations from chapter Four, we calculate the exposure level by calculating the 
severity and exploitability each vulnerability could cause. As mentioned in the design chapter 
we will only use the positive values in calculating the severity. For the sake of implementation, 
we choose to put equation (3) in the form:  
 Ex = 0.25 × Severity × exploitability                                                                                   (21) 
Where 0.25 is a procedural regulator that keeps the value of exposure degree at the selected 
range of values. Then the results analysis of the collected vulnerabilities will be as follows:  
 Table 6.9 Analysis of the Collected Vulnerabilities. 
No Vulnerability ID Severity Exploitability Exposure 
1  Vul-1 1 6 1.5 
2  Vul-2 1 2 0.5 
3  Vul-3 1 5 1.25 
4  Vul-4 2 6 3 
5  Vul-5 2 2 1 
6  Vul-6 4 5 5 
7  Vul-7 1 3 0.75 
8  Vul-8 1 2 0.5 
9  Vul-9 4 8 8 
The last analysis in table 6.18 showed a variety of exposure levels for the collected 
vulnerabilities. A computer system initially might have any combination of these potential 
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vulnerabilities; therefore, we suggest different scenarios where the system contains different 
types of weaknesses as follows:   
6.3.1 Low Exposure Scenario   
In this situation, the system contain the vulnerabilities; Vul-1, Vul-5, Vul-3, Vul-8, Vul-2, Vul-
7. The calculated exposure levels of these weaknesses all lie under the low exposure area. On 
the other hand, the current absolute threat value might take one of the three probable values, 
and hence in conjunction with the exposure level we get the following probable risk matrix: 
 Table 6.10 Matrix of Absolute Threat at Low Exposure Level  
Level of Exposure 
Absolute Threat  
Low 
 
Low Low 
Moderate Low 
High Low 
As all possible Risk values refer to the ‘Low’ value, then we apply the network situation 
monitoring result to the current risk value as following:    
 Table 6.11  Matrix of Network Situation Affect at Low System Risk  
Risk 
Network Situation  
Low 
Normal Low 
Port scans Moderate 
Vulnerability scan High 
6.3.2 Medium Exposure Scenario 
In this situation, we assume the system contains the vulnerabilities; Vul-1, Vul-5, Vul-3, Vul-
8, Vul-2, Vul-6. The calculated exposure levels of these weaknesses lie under the low exposure 
area except for Vul-6 that lies under the ‘Medium’ risk level. In this case, Vul-6 will lead the 
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level of exposure that faces the system, which means in this case the exposure level for the 
whole system will be ‘Medium’. The risk level will be affected accordingly and considering 
the absolute threat to be as in the table 6.12.  
Table 6.12  Matrix of Absolute Threat at Moderate Exposure Level  
          Level of Exposure 
Absolute Threat  
Moderate 
 
Low Low 
Moderate Moderate 
High Moderate 
Then the final risk level will be determined according to the network situation bearing in mind 
that despite the absolute threat taking three potential values, the risk will only take two values 
with greater possibility than the value ‘Moderate’. Therefore, the greater possible value of the 
risk level will only be considered as a precaution as follows:   
 Table 6.13  Matrix of Network Situation Affect at Moderate System Risk  
Risk 
Network Situation  
Moderate 
Normal Moderate 
Port scans High 
Vulnerability scan Critical 
6.3.3 High Exposure Scenario 
In a system that contain the vulnerabilities; Vul-1, Vul-5, Vul-6, Vul-8, Vul-3, Vul-9, according 
to the analysis these weaknesses lie on different levels of exposure. The hardest vulnerability 
is Vul-9 that lies under high exposure area, therefore, it raises the level of exposure of the whole 
system to high exposure and the pairing with absolute threat will produce the following risk 
matrix:  
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 Table 6.14 Matrix of Absolute Threat at High Exposure Level. 
          Level of Exposure 
Absolute Threat  
High 
 
Low Medium 
Moderate High 
High Critical 
The previous risk matrix showed the base risk level that could be done offline, which means 
when the system is isolated from any outer interaction. At this step, our framework will update 
the risk level according to the network situation, as follows:  
 Table 6.15 Matrix of Network Situation Affect at High System Risk. 
Risk 
Network Situation  
High 
Normal High 
Port scans Critical 
Vulnerability scan Critical 
 
6.4 Thresholding Evaluation  
Monitoring the network to predict attacks is a contentious task because these attacks occur at 
an unknown time. This involves analyzing vast volumes of data to detect different clues of 
intrusions that become more complicated and challenging to manage and perform. This section 
will discuss the thresholding process with particular focus on the following requirements: 
Dynamic, Adaptable, No Prior Knowledge, and Autonomous. 
Our scan detection method depends primarily on monitoring the network traffic for anomaly 
traces in the traffic. The efficiency of such a methodology is determined by the threshold and 
the method of defining the threshold, for the targeted environments, where the normal loads of 
the network are volatile and vary non-linearly during the work time. Therefore a dynamic 
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thresholding method is more suitable for such environments. Our thresholding method is 
designed to calculate the threshold for each traffic slice online and regardless of the previous 
traffic thresholds. This threshold will only be applied to that traffic slice and does not affect 
the successor threshold. This allows the detection method to compare the data sources against 
each other rather than against a predefined fixed threshold. Table 6.19 clearly displayed the 
threshold for each traffic slice and obviously appeared varied according to the size of the tested 
data, which provided the evidence for the dynamic requirement. All the regenerated methods 
and other reviewed methods in the literature depend on fixed thresholds that are defined 
previously whether by learning data or calculated manually by an expert statistician.      
Another key aspect of the detection method and hence the IPFCC is the ability to make 
decisions automatically without involvement of human intervention. This actually achieves one 
of the main goals of designing the IPFCC. Quantifying the threshold online directly from the 
investigated data and then using that obtained threshold at the same time for decision making 
(as explained in section 4.4.3.2) fulfils the Autonomous criterion. The only human intervention 
is represented by designing the template of the threshold during the development stage and 
calibrating the threshold rule to get best results, but the numerical value of the threshold is 
calculated each time a time window lapses as shown in table 6.19. This leads us also to claim 
that the Adaptable criterion has been met, because the same table showed the performance does 
not change when different work conditions change. The No Prior Knowledge criterion is 
obviously met because the thresholding mechanism does not need any information acquired 
from previously detected incidents.           
It is important to re-emphasize that all investigated methods define the threshold values initially 
before the detection process is launched, while our method calculates the threshold during the 
runtime. 
6.5 A Case Study of IPFCC 
The previous sections evaluate our solution modules solely, in this section, we present the 
holistic walk-through the modules functions and the dataflow using a case when supposed 
vulnerability exist. Before starting a system evaluation using real data, it is important to refer 
to that the system risk and security level is vary from time to time according to the 
vulnerabilities existed in the system. This means that the system risk may increase after 
discovering new vulnerabilities or decrease after patching the discovered vulnerabilities. 
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Therefore we will conduct our evaluation on a base of assumed vulnerabilities are exist and 
scans are occur. Another important point to be considered is that although the vulnerabilities 
are been patched after they been discovered and publicly been announced, and therefore, not 
represent a threat to the system. However, the average time to close a vulnerability is 62 days 
[260], which is a comfortable period for a malicious parties to develop an exploit code and use 
it against vulnerable system for malicious purposes.  
Another important point to be considered is that the risk and the conditional probability of each 
individual attack or security incident is normally quantified manually be experts who assess 
and produce these values.           
6.5.1 Database State 
In order to apply our framework, we evaluate real-world vulnerabilities that discovered and 
announced publically that been collected in section 5.2.3. As in the table 6.16.     
Table 6.16 Real Evaluated Vulnerabilities. 
Vul ID AC AV E C I A 
CVE-2012-1516 1 3 1 2 2 2 
CVE-2012-0384 1 3 1 2 2 2 
CVE-2014-0160 2 3 2 2 0 0 
CVE-2014-6271 2 3 2 2 2 2 
CVE-2008-1447 1 3 2 0 1 0 
CVE-2012-1342 2 3 1 0 1 0 
CVE-2013-6014 2 1 2 2 0 2 
CVE-2011-1265 2 1 2 2 2 2 
CVE-2014-0224 1 3 2 2 2 0 
CVE-2016-1645 2 3 1 2 2 2 
CVE-2016-2118 1 3 1 2 2 2 
CVE-2003-0352 3 3 2 1 1 1 
We suppose that the database inventory is contain only the evaluated vulnerabilities, and based 
on that we will nominate vulnerability to evaluate its effect on the system security. We select 
to undertake the assessment on the vulnerability ‘CVE-2003-0352’ with a detailed information 
about the vulnerability mentioned in the table 6.16.  
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6.5.2 Vulnerability Description  
The vulnerability under the evaluation is the vulnerability named ‘CVE-2003-0352’. This 
vulnerability affect the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) in some version of Microsoft windows 
that uses specific version of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) interface [261]. 
This vulnerability allow a remote attacker to execute a malicious code via crafted packets.     
6.5.3 Potential Attacks and Attacks Attack Vector 
This vulnerability enables a buffer overflow attack; the first attack discovered is a worm known 
as ‘Blaster’ (known also as ‘Lovsan’) and other variations that follows such as dcomrpc.c and 
DComExpl_UnixWin32.zip [261]. The attack vector for this vulnerability is the ‘network’ and 
DCOM-RPC is listening to port 135, therefore, the attacker should target the port 135.         
6.5.4 Threats, Risks, and Probabilities   
As defined in section 4.6.1, the threat is a type of harm that could occur to the system by 
different attacks that targeting or using system vulnerabilities. Different threats might occur to 
the computer system such as destruction of information, corruption of information, Theft and 
loss of information, illegal usage, data disclosure, denial of service, privilege escalation, etc 
[262]. Each threat occur to the system according to the type of the service provided or the 
importance of data contained. Therefore, a system providing multiple services is liable to 
encounter multiple threats, each threat is resulted by multiple attacks, and each attack might 
achieved using different vulnerabilities and techniques. These tangled and divergent 
relationships among the threats and vulnerabilities results in a complicated calculation for such 
system. For concept proofing, we suppose that the target system is a personal computer PC that 
contain encrypted credentials and personal information. An attacker to such type of systems 
might desire to harm the victim or steal their credentials or sensitive data, which exposed the 
system to threats of destruction of information, and Theft and loss of information. All related 
details are demonstrated as following:  
A. The target system: a personal computer.  
B. Potential threats: destruction of information, and Theft and loss of information 
C. The Absolute Risk : the initial risk might face the target system is quite low we assign 
it the value of 0.1 
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6.5.5 Monitoring-Driven Predictions    
Having all of those base information as the de facto of the system is the initial state that our 
solution start with to predict the system security situation. As summary of the de facto facts, 
information collected and then calculated using the equations from section 5.6.1, and presented 
as following:  
Existed vulnerabilities: CVE-2003-0352 
Affected services: DCOM-RPC 
Affected ports: 135 
Potential threat: buffer overflow 
Potential attacks: dcomrpc.c, DComExpl_UnixWin32.zip, Dcomrpc.c.  
Vulnerable services and protocols: TCP, X server virtual frame buffer service, I2P HTTP/S 
proxy, krb524 Linux Service, NV-Video. 
System vulnerabilities evaluation:  
Vul ID AC AV E C I A 
CVE-2003-0352 3 3 2 1 1 1 
Vulnerability Severity = 1 
Vulnerability Exploitability = 12 
Probability of the threat = 0.3   
The supposed probability of the threat caused by a single attack is 0.1, and due to there are 
three potential attacks, therefore, according to equation (12) the total probability of threat is 
0.3.  
Risk:  
The current risk for such system is calculated using equation (13) as following:  
Risk = exposure level × probability of absolute risk 
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        = (1×12) × (0.3) 
        = 12 × 0.3 
        = 3.6  
This is the risk that the system faces in normal cases, which lies in ‘Low’ level of risk. In this 
case, table 6.12 is applied as following: 
                        Risk 
Network Situation  
Low 
Normal Low 
Port scans Moderate 
Vulnerability scan High 
 
On Port Scan:  
Starting with ‘Low’ risk level then a port scan detected, this scan could be initiated by security 
team or by hostile party, therefore, IPFCC raises risk level to ‘Moderate’ as there is a chance 
that this scanning is malicious and security team should be notified of the current system risk 
level. 
On Vulnerability Scan:  
Staring with risk level at ‘moderate’, if a vulnerability scan is detected then the IPFCC raises 
the risk level to ‘High’. As at this risk level, a vulnerability scanning is a malicious act against 
the system hence IPFCC predict a potential attack is in preparation depending scanning 
activities, therefore, notifies security team to be alarmed of system situation and prepare 
suitable countermeasures.   
7.6 Summary 
This chapter has evaluated the IPFCC system and its fundamental modules against the abstract-
level design requirements. These requirements defined the essential aspects that IPFCC should 
offer to be suitable for intrusion prediction for cloud computing and network based 
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environments.  A summary of the supporting evidence that been used to evaluate our design is 
displayed in Table 6.17. 
 Table 6.17 Summary of Design Requirement Evidences. 
Design Requirement Evidence of Fulfilment 
Accuracy Experimental analysis in section 6.1 
Detection Speed Experimental analysis in section 6.1 
High performance Experimental analysis in section 6.1 
Real-time Experimental analysis in section 6.1 
Scalable Experimental analysis in section 6.1 
Dynamic Experimental analysis in section 6.3 
Adaptable Experimental analysis in section 6.3 
No Prior Knowledge Experimental analysis in section 6.3 
Autonomous Experimental analysis in section 6.3 
 
The intrusion prediction capabilities of the IPFCC were evaluated against several performance 
aspects via conducting multiple experiments upon well-known datasets in section 6.1. The 
results of these experiments showed the high detection accuracy and very low false alarm levels 
that IPFCC has achieved. In section 6.2 the intrusion prediction was discussed via different 
attack scenarios. Finally in section 6.3, a discussion of the thresholding method performance 
was presented and showed the effectiveness of our novel mechanism.    
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter presents an overview of the contributions and findings of the research conducted 
in this PhD work, and then sheds a light on the potential improvements and extensions for the 
proposed work into future research.  
7.1 Research Contributions and Findings 
The ever growing Internet with divergent uses of people and industry, accompanied by the fact 
that computer networks were not designed with security considerations in mind results in 
continuously discovering resident security vulnerabilities that are used to launch attacks. This 
reflects on all systems that use the network as a medium of communication such as cloud 
computing. The need for predicting potential intrusions to the system poses one of the trendy 
research areas nowadays. This thesis has presented the IPFCC intrusion prediction system 
along with novel constituent techniques and a study of port scan detection methods.  
The field of intrusion prediction systems that is proposed to be network-based has not 
witnessed a sufficient amount of research work, and for cloud computing only very few models 
have been proposed [34] [263]. This field attracts research attention because of the rising 
number of attacks that indicate the current intrusion detection systems are insufficient to secure 
information systems. In some cases when the attackers are highly skilled and the launched 
attacks are sophisticated, the detection is not that feasible because it has only taken place after 
the actual harm has occurred. Therefore, the importance of intrusion prediction systems stems 
from the efforts to provide information about potential attacks, so security administration will 
be equipped with suitable countermeasures.    
One drawback that the current solutions have, is dealing with the attacks as a single step and 
trying to detect that single step using the signature of that attack. This however, can be evaded 
by the attackers using different techniques, which means achieving the same attack using 
different variables or tactics. This results in the detection of attacks occurring during or after 
the duration of launching the attacks. In the attempt to stop the attacks, we focused on sensing 
the preparations that precede the launching of an attack. The techniques developed for IPFCC 
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allow the prediction of the potential attacks by sensing the preparation for attacking. This is 
represented in IPFCC by the ability to detect the scan activities that are launched against the 
targeted system, as demonstrated in section 6.1.  
Quantifying the threshold for detection is another area in which the present approaches are 
struggling. The existing solutions for scan detection often define the threshold offline either by 
using machine-learning methods, or manually by an expert statistician. This method might not 
be capable of accommodating the need and nature of the modern networks, with the normal 
usage not following a steady pattern.  To overcome this, the thresholding technique devised for 
IPFCC uses an online dynamic thresholding that is calculated during the runtime for the tested 
data as demonstrated in section 6.3.  
The above research points were obtained from the analytical study of different scan detection 
methods that were proposed to work in similar conditions. This investigation led to the 
formation of the method that is the most suitable for current networks and what addition might 
improve the work of these detection methods. The study includes a variation of statistical, 
probabilistic, and hypothesis examination methods.   
A number of contributions and findings have been presented by this thesis to the field of 
intrusion prediction of network based and cloud computing systems:  
1. A statistical intrusion prediction framework that overcomes the challenges of 
monitoring security in network based environments. The framework offers prediction 
of the potential intrusions before they happen, whilst ensuring not to disrupt the 
protected system performance and trivial system resources consumption. The IPFCC is 
considered novel, as the literature survey has not recognised any prediction solution for 
cloud computing that uses statistical methods and vulnerabilities information. In 
addition, our framework does not depend on historical data or previous work outcomes 
to calibrate the setting of the framework.      
2. Analytical study of the existing statistical and probabilistic scan detection methods that 
represent the background for comprehending the scan detection methods. This field has 
been chosen from a literature survey of prediction systems in computer and non-
computer fields. The study concluded that suitable methods for prediction in cloud 
computing are the statistical methods, which represented the base of IPFCC.           
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3. A new statistical algorithm for scan detection that selectively analyses network traffic 
for scan activities detection. The algorithm uses various techniques to analyse specific 
traces of scanning on which the anomaly occurred at high rates. This algorithm has been 
proposed to be more compatible with the targeted environment, which was devised to 
handle huge amounts of data at high speed rates. In order to overcome the inefficiency 
of other methods of processing high volumes of data to detect intrusions, only specific 
attributes of the traffic were monitored and processed for the detection that reflected in 
considerable reduction of the amount of processed data. 
4. A dynamic statistical technique for thresholding that was calculated adaptively for each 
given traffic window. This technique proposed to overcome the tradition of setting an 
estimated threshold based on historical data, which decreased the detection 
performance of the whole system. The technique offers in-depth dissimilarity among 
the monitored attribute values for the different variables (sources) in the same set. The 
technique is new for the anomaly detection, as the literature survey has revealed that no 
existing methods offer a comparable level of dissimilarity checking to calculate the 
threshold. 
5. A novel use of the publicly available information about the vulnerabilities of the system 
in the form of a risk assessment that increased according to the situation of the network. 
This mechanism was adapted to provide a platform neutral method that quantifies and 
ranks the weaknesses, and calculates the risk level of the system. This method is 
considered novel as no solution that appeared in the literature survey has incorporated 
vulnerability information with the traffic information to predict the potential attacks.   
7.2 Limitations  
There are some limitations that are associated with the proposed system; this section discussing 
them as follows:  
1. Specialized Dataset for cloud computing:  unfortunately, a there is a lack of 
experimental dataset that is specialized for testing cloud security solutions. Although 
we used a well-known dataset for intrusion detection that uses a cloud setup parameters, 
however, we believe more precise results would be produced with data collected from 
real life cloud traffic.      
2. Sensitivity Issue: the port scan detection algorithm (which is the core of our prediction 
system) has suffered from high ratio of false positive alarms, in spite of the high 
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detection ratio. This results of considerable amount of alarms that might confuses the 
security team. More refinement is needed to decrease the false positive ratio, which in 
turn improve our prediction system sensitivity.       
3. Dependency on external information sources: vulnerability scanners has important 
role in the system security by reporting the current vulnerabilities. These scanners 
collect information about the vulnerabilities from public databases that are obviously 
outside the system. This limited the system evaluation process and bind it to external 
sources that discover, define and rank new vulnerabilities.    
4. Location Centric: our proposed system is supposed to monitor the incoming traffic to 
the cloud, which means that our system located on the cloud network interface. This 
means limited our system effectivity on the attacks that targeted the cloud from the 
outside, and threats that are launched from the inside like insiders attacks are 
challenging to the proposed solution.    
7.3 Future Work 
The work presented in this thesis can be applied to different systems in different domains. 
Therefore, modification and extensions on different levels could be used to address different 
systems security needs as follows:  
1. IPFCC could be enhanced by conducting fine-grained analysis to predict specific 
attacks before they happen. All the risk analysis has formed a general risk assessment 
for the system as whole, while, it is possible to conduct this risk assessment according 
to individual attacks alone. This will make the prediction more precise on the potential 
attacks that might occur in the future.  
2. All of the experiments that were conducted in this thesis were designed to use only 
very little information from the packets header information, though this has been done 
intentionally, however, different header information might be exploited to predict more 
information such as suspected geographical locations. Although our focus was on the 
malicious scanning activities, different information could be extracted to support the 
prediction decision or other purpose.        
3. The risk assessment presented in this thesis depends on analyzing the vulnerabilities 
and calculating associated attributes, however, different aspects could be incorporated 
to improve the prediction such as behaviour of the users, access control and associated 
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security events. This in return will add more capabilities to the prediction system to 
produce more specified predictions. 
4. The proposed scan detection method for this thesis can easily be extended to detect 
volumetric attacks such as denial of service (DOS) attack and similar attacks. This is 
because the mechanism of the scan detection method is a general method that depends 
on discriminating between malicious and benign according to numbers in each set, and 
with a simple modification to sense the attack packets, it is weaponized to detect 
different attacks.   
5. The current scan detection does not store threshold values as they are disposable. 
However, storing these values and refining them using different statistical methods can 
be used to calibrate and tune detection and outliers variables to get improved results.   
6. Develop knowledge module from simple databases for vulnerabilities information to 
knowledge center that contains information extracted from both the traffic and the 
system and processed into beneficial security-wise information.  
7.  Professional programming development is needed to convert this framework into a 
universal plug-in tool that could be attached to different intrusion detection systems, 
and work efficiently to predict intrusions.  
8. The concept of anomaly detection that is embedded in the scan detection method, 
which calculates outliers of the set and sets a threshold then measures the Euclidian 
distance to the threshold, can be extended and exploited in different domains where 
the changing point identification is a problematic issue.  
9. Allocate  research efforts to transform this framework from centralized to decentralized 
system using small units of the system at each virtual machine, then a confederate unit 
to be responsible for orchestrating the prediction process, and calibrating variables’ 
values. 
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Appendix A  
This appendix to show the main MatLab function of our algorithm. The function called 
‘calmahdist3’ and it takes ‘set’ as input and calculates the outliers, then detect the scanners. 
The main function starts with output of the counting process ‘set’ and call the 
‘deleteoutliers’ that separates the outlier observations and returns normal observations. 
Then the function calculates the threshold and decide if the observation is scanners if exceeds 
the threshold. We used to publicly available codes for the Hyperloglog that we used for 
counting and Grubb test for outlier detection, as it is not the author work we will include only 
the main function MatLab code as following:    
function [outl,nset, info] = calmahdist3( set ) 
set.Properties.VariableNames{1} = 'IP'; % changing the ip column name 
set.Properties.VariableNames{2} = 'ports'; % changing the ports column name 
set.Properties.VariableNames{3} = 'time';  % changing the time column name 
% orgset = set; % save the original set 
% copy the ports sketches into variable to calculate the outliers 
y = set.ports;     
[~, ind, ~] = deleteoutliers(y, 0.5); % calculating the outliers  
if isempty(ind)           % if index has no value then there is no outlier 
disp('No outliers ... try with another significant factor') 
else 
x = set((ind), :);      % saving the outliers with all info in outlier 
table 
set((ind), :)= [] ;     % deleting the outliers from the original table 
nset = set ;            % storing the input set after removing outliers 
tmpout = [x.ports, x.time];         % removing the IP column from the 
outliers to prepare to compute Euclidean Distance 
tmptab = [set.ports, set.time];     % removing IP from original table  
  
setstd = std2(tmptab);    % calculating the standard deviation of input set 
thre = 3 * setstd;                  % calculate the threshold 
setpomean = mean(set.ports); 
settimean = mean(set.time); 
setcen = [setpomean, settimean] 
% checking the distance of every outlier to threshold  
  jc = numel(ind);            % store the number of outliers in identifier 
    euc = 0; 
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  fprintf('summary: %d points considered Outliers, based on Euclidean 
Distance and Threshold the judge for each point is:\n', jc) 
for i = 1:jc 
    tmpout1 = tmpout(i,:); 
    tmeuc = [tmpout1; setcen]; 
  euc = pdist(tmeuc,'euclidean')      % calculate the Euclidean distance 
between oultiers and normal set 
     ms = x.IP{i}; 
     if euc > thre  
      fprintf('the IP: %s is scan or malicious IP distanced %s from normal 
threshold %s  \n', ms, euc, thre) 
    elseif euc == thre  
      fprintf('%s malicious IP as it reached the threshold  \n', ms) 
     else 
       fprintf('the IP: %s is normal IP  \n', ms) 
     end 
    end  
outl =x;  
end   
end 
 
 
